Skip to main content
All Posts By

Brandon Barnett’s Criminal Defense Blog | HLAW

Brandon Barnett is a partner and criminal defense attorney with Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC in Fort Worth, Texas. His law practice is exclusively focused on misdemeanor and felony criminal defense in Tarrant County and surrounding areas. He is also a military judge in the Marine Corps Reserve and a law professor at Texas A&M University School of Law.

Jun22
Love0

Are “Facebook Threats” Actually Threats Under Federal Law?

ByThreats

Everyone seems to use social media today. Videos of kittens and puppies and comments about people or events are common. However, some use of social media involves threats by a user against others. The U.S. Supreme Court recently considered a case regarding how far such threats can go without violating the law.

Anthony Elonis was a Facebook user. When his wife left him, Elonis began posting violent, self-composed “rap” lyrics. Elonis’s posts included references to co-workers, his wife, law enforcement, an unidentified kindergarten class and an FBI agent who visited his home. Based on these Facebook posts, the Government charged Elonis with violating a federal statute, referred to as 875(c), that criminalizes communication that contains a threat to harm another person.

Elonis’s defense attorney moved to dismiss the charges because Elonis had not actually intended to threaten anyone. The court denied the motion, holding that the Government was not required to prove that Elonis actually intended to make a threat; it must only prove that Elonis intended to make the communication. At trial, the Government called several witnesses who testified they viewed the posts as serious threats.

Elonis argued for a jury instruction requiring the Government to prove Elonis “intended to communicate a threat.” Instead, the judge instructed the jury that a true threat requires only that the defendant make a statement that a reasonable person would interpret as a serious expression of intent to harm or kill an individual.

Elonis was convicted on four counts. He appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s verdict. Elonis then appealed to the Supreme Court.

No one disputed Elonis had posted the Facebook entries. The issue was whether Elonis’s posts contained any threats.

The language of 875(c) contains no provision regarding intent or state of mind. Elonis argued that every definition of threat requires an intent to harm. The Government argued that the use of “intent” language in sections surrounding 875(c) demonstrated that Congress did not intend to impose an intent standard in 875(c).

The Court rejected both arguments, concluding that 875(c) did not address the issue of “intent” or “mental state” at all. The Court looked elsewhere for an answer and found one in decisions in previous cases: Only conscious wrongdoing can be prosecuted as a crime. When a statute includes no provision regarding the required mental state, the Court said it implies only the state of mind which is required to distinguish wrongful conduct from conduct that would otherwise be innocent. For example, if an individual robs a bank, even under a good-faith belief the money was his, the “forceful taking” (stealing) does not constitute “otherwise innocent conduct.” The Court said the Government’s position in this case would punish a defendant who takes money without force, believing it to be his.

The court characterized the Government’s position as a standard of negligence, which asks what a reasonable person would do in the situation. The Court said a negligence standard had been rejected in criminal statutes, stating “what [Elonis] thinks does matter.” On that basis, the Court overturned Elonis’s conviction.

In a separate opinion, Justices Alito and Thomas took issue with the Court holding that a negligence standard was insufficient while not determining what standard would be sufficient. Judge Alito argued for a recklessness standard (acting in conscious disregard of the risk). Justice Thomas chastised the majority for rejecting the opinion of nine out of eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals and leaving nothing in its place. Justice Thomas did commend the majority for not imposing an intent-to-threaten requirement but believed the Court should have gone further and adopted the negligence or general intent standard put forward by the Government.

Elonis v. U.S. raises more questions than it answers. Clearly, something more than making a threatening statement with knowledge of what it says is required to violate federal law. But how much more? Was Justice Alito correct that making the statement with no consideration of its effect on the recipient is enough? Or was Elonis right that an individual must affirmatively intend the communication as a threat for it to be illegal? Setting aside moral or ethical concerns, until this question is answered, social media users should be cautious of making statements threatening other individuals, serious or not.

Jun17
Love1

The Confrontation Clause and Testimony From a Supervising DNA Analyst

ByConfrontation Clause

As Fort Worth criminal defense attorneys, we often encounter confrontation issues during trial. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives a defendant the right to confront witnesses against him. This provision prevents admission of a “testimonial” statement–a formal statement similar to trial testimony–unless the person who made the statement can be cross-examined or is unavailable but was previously cross-examined (in a deposition, for example). In the absence of cross-examination, a criminal defense attorney in Fort Worth would object to admission of the statement as evidence.

In Paredes v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals considered how the Confrontation Clause applies to DNA testimony based on computer-generated data obtained through batch DNA testing. During a robbery, two victims were shot and killed. Jovany Paredes asked Jessica Perez to wash the shirt he was wearing during the robbery. Instead, Perez gave the shirt to police, who sent it to a lab for DNA testing. DNA from blood on Paredes’s shirt matched one of the victims.

At trial, Robin Freeman, the lab director, explained that DNA testing involves four analysts. The fourth analyst interprets raw data from a computer to determine whether there is a DNA match. In Paredes’s case, Freeman herself compared the DNA profile from the blood stain to Paredes’s DNA profile. Freeman testified that she did not personally observe each of the analysts performing the first three steps but that any problem in the analysis would have been obvious. Freeman testified that the ultimate opinion was hers and that she was testifying regarding her opinion.

Paredes’s defense attorney objected, arguing that he was entitled to cross-examine the other analysts. The State said those analysts just took “physical stuff,” placed it into instruments and applied chemicals. Freeman, the State said, was the one who did the interpretation that was presented to the jury. The judge agreed with the State, and Paredes was convicted of capital murder.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Freeman’s testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause. After the Court of Appeals decision, the CCA decided in Burch v. State that admission of a drug test lab report did violate the Confrontation Clause because the testifying witness stated that the report was a “surrogate” for the technician who performed the test. Paredes appealed based on Burch. The CCA vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the case to consider whether Burch affected the decision in Paredes.

The Court of Appeals made the same decision the second time, distinguishing Paredes, where the lab director had knowledge of the tests used and conducted the crucial analysis, from Burch, where the testifying lab supervisor had not observed or performed any part of the drug test or its analysis. Because Paredes’ attorney had the opportunity to cross-examine the person who conducted the actual analysis that linked him to the crime, Paredes’ Confrontation Clause rights had not been violated.

Paredes appealed to the CCA again. The Court reviewed three U.S. Supreme Court cases involving forensic reports. In the first two cases, the Supreme Court had found the forensic reports inadmissible because only a “certificate of analysis” was presented as evidence and a testifying witness had not actually performed the test.

In the third case, a DNA case, an outside forensics specialist testified that the lab-created DNA profile matched the defendant’s DNA profile. The Supreme Court held that this evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

Based on the Supreme Court cases (Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming) and the decision in Burch, the CCA ruled against Paredes. The CCA relied on the fact that Freeman, the testifying witness, had actually performed the crucial analysis and had testified to her own conclusions. Further, the lab director had testified regarding the quality assurance system at the lab that would alert the director if the test were done improperly. The CCA also distinguished this case because Freeman had relied on raw, computer-generated data in reaching her conclusions, rather than relying on another analyst’s report. Because Paredes was given the opportunity to question Freeman regarding her opinion, the CCA held that his Confrontation Clause rights were not violated.

A Fort Worth criminal defense attorney whose client is facing forensic expert testimony will carefully consider Paredes. Challenges to DNA evidence may be more difficult, particularly if the testifying witness is the individual who actually translated the raw data into a conclusion regarding a DNA match. A criminal defense attorney in Fort Worth will carefully monitor the application of Paredes to cases with similar, yet different, facts.

Jun17
Love5

Tarrant County’s “No Drop” Policy on Family Violence Cases

ByDomestic Violence

How Do I Drop a Family Violence Case in Tarrant County?

In our practice as criminal defense lawyers, we often get calls about Family Violence (Assault of a Family Member) cases. These cases typically result from an argument that got out of hand, wherein one party called the police to help diffuse the situation, not knowing that the police would take someone to jail. Many times there seems to be a bit of confusion regarding whether the “victim” of the alleged assault can “drop” the case after the other person is arrested and charged with Family Violence.

In Fort Worth, the Tarrant County District Attorney’s office has a “No-Drop Policy” on Family Violence cases. The No Drop Policy basically means is that once the case is filed with the District Attorney’s office, it is NOT the alleged victim’s choice whether to drop the charges. It is entirely in the prosecutor’s discretion how to handle the case if the victim does not want to go forward.

Despite the No Drop Policy, there are things that an alleged victim can do to express his or her desire that the case not be prosecuted. This begins with the Alternatives Class offered through Safe Haven. Before the District Attorney’s office will allow an alleged victim to sign an Affidavit of Non-Prosecution, they require that the alleged victim attend this 4-hour class.

After the alleged victim attends the Alternatives Class at Safe Haven, he or she may then elect to speak with the victim coordinator at the District Attorney’s Office. In this interview, the alleged victim will be allowed to talk with the victim coordinator and tell them why they believe the case should not be prosecuted. This is also the time in which the alleged victim will sign the Affidavit of Non-Prosecution.

These steps can go a long way in achieving a favorable outcome on domestic violence cases. If you or a loved one needs help navigating these options, please call us today. We handle Family Violence cases on a daily basis and have a proven track record of good results. Some helpful numbers are contained below.

Alternatives Class at Safe Haven – (817) 536-5496

Tarrant County Victim Coordinator – (817) 884-3535


Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC
Rated 5.0 out of 5 based on
30Google+ Reviews.
Jun03
Love1

Sleeping in a Running Vehicle: Sufficient Proof of Operating for DWI?Asleep in a Running Vehicle: Sufficient Evidence of “Operating” for DWI?

ByDWI

Can I be Arrested for DWI for Sleeping in My Car?

One of the requirements for a DWI in Fort Worth is straightforward–the intoxicated individual must be “operating” a vehicle while intoxicated. Any DWI attorney in Fort Worth would tell you that basic requirement. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently considered the question of whether an individual who is passed out in a running, yet stationary, vehicle is “operating” the vehicle for DWI purposes. In Murray v. State, the court answered in the affirmative.

Chad Murray was passed out in his running truck in the early hours of the morning. Deputy James McClanahan observed Murray’s truck with its lights on, parked partially on the shoulder of Highway 22 and partially in a driveway near a fireworks stand. Deputy McClanahan observed exhaust coming from the truck but could not see anyone inside. The Deputy approached the truck and saw Murray asleep in the driver’s seat. The truck was indeed running. The transmission was in “park,” and the radio was on high volume. Deputy McClanahan finally succeeded in waking Murray up and, after Murray’s bungled attempts failed, in obtaining Murray’s ID. The deputy reported that he immediately smelled alcohol in the truck when Murray opened the window and that Murray appeared very intoxicated. Murray failed a field sobriety test and was charged with DWI.

At trial, Murray was found guilty and sentenced to one year in jail and a $1,000 fine. The jail sentence was suspended, and Murray was placed on two years of community supervision. Murray appealed his conviction to the Seventh Court of Appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence at trial to prove that he was actually operating his truck and that he was, therefore, not guilty of DWI. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Murray’s conviction, holding that, although it was possible to infer from the circumstances that someone drove Murray’s truck to the location where it was found, there was no evidence as to when that occurred or whether the driver was intoxicated at the time. The Prosecuting Attorney appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals based on the question of whether Murray could have been found guilty of DWI without direct evidence that he was operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

The CCA took exception to the lower court’s conclusion, pointing to evidence that the vehicle was running, that Murray was in the driver’s seat, that Murray was the only one in the vehicle and that he was the only person in the vicinity. The court also pointed to the fact that there were no alcoholic beverages or containers in the vicinity and that the Deputy’s conclusion that Murray was very intoxicated was reasonable; Murray even admitted to the Deputy that he had been drinking. Because Murray was intoxicated, no one else was around, and there was no alcohol in the area, the court found it reasonable for the jury to infer that Murray had driven his truck to the location on Highway 22 and had done so while intoxicated.

Justice Meyers disagreed and in a dissenting opinion argued that allowing Murray’s DWI conviction to stand was comparable to convicting someone for possession of marijuana based solely on the individual being high and smelling of marijuana. Justice Meyers believed that being passed out behind the wheel of a running vehicle is not enough to be considered “operating” the vehicle; operation of a vehicle requires some action to enable the use of the vehicle, even something as simple as turning the key in the ignition. For DWI purposes, there must be evidence that the action was taken while the individual was intoxicated. For Justice Meyers, inferring these facts from the evidence presented was a leap too big for a jury to make.

The case is instructive for anyone charged with DWI in Fort Worth. A trial jury will have wide latitude in drawing conclusions regarding whether you were operating the vehicle while intoxicated, even if an officer does not directly observe you doing so. If you find yourself in this predicament, you should consult a DWI attorney in Fort Worth. Do not assume that you will get off on a technicality. Chad Murray didn’t.

Apr23
Love0

Coaching a Child Victim

BySex Crimes

Texas courts have routinely held that an expert witness, such as a child psychologist, may not offer an opinion about the truth of a certain child victim’s specific allegations or about the truth of child victim allegations in general. But they haven’t shut that door completely.

A couple of weeks ago, the 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) reaffirmed the legal principle that:

Expert testimony that a child did not exhibit indications of coaching or manipulation [does] not to constitute an opinion on the child’s truthfulness.

In Cantu v. State, one of the defense theories was that the child victim had been coached by her mother to make false allegations against Appellant. To counter this theory, the State brought an experienced child interviewer from the Advocacy Center to testify that in her expert opinion, the child victim in this case did not exhibit any “red flags” that would indicate that she had been coached or manipulated. The State was careful not to elicit testimony that the victim was being truthful and thus, the conviction was affirmed on appeal.

To me, this is still an area ripe for objections at trial and a special inclusion in the jury charge. You may get a judge that will exclude it. Okay, probably not, but it’s worth a shot. While most lawyers can see the technical difference between an opinion on truthfulness and an opinion on coaching, many jurors will not.

Mar19
Love1

Miranda or No Miranda, Do Not Make a Statement

ByMiranda

In the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court created what are now commonly referred to as “Miranda Rights.” These rights were created to mitigate the coercive effect of interrogations while a defendant is in police custody. Recognizing that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit forced self-incrimination, the Supreme Court mandated that defendants are made aware of these rights before any custodial interrogation begins, namely their right to remain silent and their right to the presence of an attorney. However, if a defendant is not in custody, police officers do not have to read him or her their Miranda Rights, despite being questioned about an alleged crime.

A person is in custody for Miranda purposes when he or she is placed under formal arrest, or a reasonable person would not feel free to leave during questioning. If a defendant feels free to terminate the interrogation at any time, they are not in custody. The Court uses five factors in their analysis: (1) the length of the questioning, (2) the location of the questioning, (3) the accusatory, or non-accusatory, nature of the questioning, (4) the amount of restraint on the individual’s physical movement, and (5) statements made by officers regarding the individual’s freedom to move or leave. Using these factors and the totality of the circumstance, the Court will determine if the restraint on one’s freedom arises to the degree usually associated with a formal arrest.

In United States v. Wright, a search warrant was executed at the defendant’s home in connection to an on-going child pornography investigation. A police officer escorted the defendant to his police car where the defendant could wait during the search. The officer told the defendant that he was not under arrest and could leave whenever he wanted. He was not handcuffed or restrained in any way. Before being questioned, the defendant was read his Miranda Rights and again told that he could leave at any time because he was not under arrest. The defendant made several incriminating statements that he later moved to suppress at trial, arguing that he had unambiguously requested an attorney to be present during questioning.

Nevertheless, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant was never in custody for Miranda purposes, so he was not entitled to the right of counsel, and thus the Court denied his motion. The defendant was made aware on at least two different occasions that he was not under arrest and that he could leave at anytime. Moreover, the defendant’s movement was not restrained during questioning that prevented him from leaving, and his overall tone during the interview was cooperative since he was trying to tell his story to the police officer. Because of these factors, the Court held that the defendant’s incriminating statements were admissible at trial.

As we continue to advise: Do not make any statements to the police when they are investigating you for a crime (regardless of whether you are in “custody’). Ask for an attorney and wait until you get one before you say anything.

Mar06
Love1

Purging Unconstitutional Taint from Unlawful Search

ByUnlawful Search

Although the Fourth Amendment acts as a safeguard against unlawful search and seizures, the State can still use evidence it finds against a defendant in a consensual search of their property if the search is sufficiently detached from an illegal search that purges any unconstitutional taint. Accordingly, such a search is valid if the search was voluntary and an independent act of freewill.  In order to determine whether a search was an independent act of freewill, the Court analyzes several factors, none of which are controlling by themselves:

  1. the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent,
  2. the presence of intervening circumstances, and
  3. the purpose and flagrancy of the initial misconduct.

In US v. Montgomery, the Defendant was stopped by a police officer and frisked during a traffic stop in front of the Defendant’s house. As the officer frisked the Defendant, the Defendant pushed the officer’s hands away from his pockets after the officer felt a bulge. The Defendant revealed that the bulge was cocaine, prompting his arrest and Mirandizing. The Defendant, eventually, consented to a search of his house. During the search, the Defendant was allowed into the house to obtain medicine and made several requests to officers on scene for his cell phone to erase some “naked pictures” that he did not want his father to find. The Defendant consented to one of the officers using his phone to delete the pictures, but the officer found what appeared to be child pornography. The Defendant was later indicted for possession of child pornography.

At trial, the Defendant claimed that the frisk and seizure of cocaine that led to his arrest was unlawful, which tainted his consent for the officer the see his cell phone. Nevertheless, the Court held that even if the frisk and seizure were illegal, the Defendant’s several voluntary and independent acts of freewill relieved the search of the Defendant’s phone of any unconstitutional taint, specifically, the Defendant asking several times to see his cell phone so that he could delete the naked images, and the Defendant consenting to a search of his phone after being Mirandized. Nothing was presented at trial that showed the police officers even wanted to search his cell phone. In the words of the Court, “[The Defendant] broached the phone search himself.” Moreover, the Court also cited several intervening events and factors establishing that the Defendant’s “consent was sufficiently detached from the arrest to purge any taint” such as the officers reading the Defendant his Miranda rights, the Defendant’s criminal record, and the Defendant going into his house to retrieve his medicine.

Yet another reason why we advise NEVER GIVE CONSENT TO SEARCH, period.

Feb20
Love0

The Rest of the Story on a Wrongful Conviction

ByWrongful Conviction

Posted by Luke A. Williams.

I recently attended – along with prosecutors, other defense attorneys, and law enforcement officers – a continued legal education course regarding wrongful conviction. The course kicked off with the study of a case out of North Carolina of two men (19 and 15 at the time of their convictions) who were recently exonerated via DNA evidence.

The men, Henry Lee McCollum and Leon Brown, both confessed to killing an 11-year-old girl in 1983. The question that immediately floated around the room was: why would these two boys confess to a horrific murder if they didn’t actually commit the crime? It’s a fair-enough question and probably the reason the jury that eventually found them guilty of the murder sentenced both of these boys to death. But – in the spirit of Paul Harvey – the “rest of the story” explained how these confessions were coerced.

There was no physical evidence that tied McCollum and Brown to the crime. The lead that was provided to investigators came in the form of a rumor from a fellow schoolmate of the boys who cast suspicion on them because they had recently moved from New Jersey – they were outsiders. Investigators took them in for questioning. Initially, they took in Henry. After five hours of questioning with no lawyer present and with his mother weeping in the hallway, not allowed to see him, Henry told investigators a story of how he and three other boys attacked and killed the girl. He was promised that if he confessed to the crime he would be released to his mother – he was 19 years old. His “statement” was typed out by the investigators and he put his signature to it after the 5-hour interrogation. The last thing Henry said after signing the confession was, “Can I go home now?”

After Henry’s interrogation, Leon was brought in (at 2:30 a.m.). He was told that Henry had confessed and implicated Leon being involved as well. Leon was made similar promises and also told that he would be executed if he did not cooperate. After another lengthy interrogation, Henry also confessed to attacking and killing the girl.

Both men were tried and both men were sentenced to execution.

After 30 years, lawyers from the Center for Death Penalty Litigation began pressing for DNA testing of the physical evidence in the case, which included a cigarette butt found at the murder scene. The DNA was matched – but not to either McCollum or Brown. The DNA came back as a match to Roscoe Artis, a man who lived in a house yards away from the wooded area where the murder took place. Coincidentally, only a few weeks after the murder, Artis confessed to the rape and murder of another 18-year-old girl in the same town. The circumstances surrounding that murder contained striking similarities to the murder that McCollum and Brown were convicted of. Artis was implicated in a number of other murders that occurred in the same area and all under the same or similar circumstances. Based on the DNA testing and the investigation into Roscoe Artis, after 30 years in prison and on death row, McCollum and Brown were exonerated and released.

It’s a story that, as a defense attorney and former prosecutor, I’ve heard before. While not the norm and certainly not common, it’s something I know has happened. The key question though is, “does this still happen?” I was surprised when I overheard one of the members of law enforcement in the room exclaim that, “Oh, this would never happen these days.” While I certainly agree that things have changed and drastically improved since the days of McCollum and Brown, I can’t help but think that the mentality of the impossibility of this happening again is an extremely dangerous one.

I imagine if this case happened today; certainly DNA would be gathered and tested against suspects. But, what happens if there isn’t any DNA at the scene (yes, this could still happen)? What happens if false or speculative accusations or suspicions occur again? What happens if false confessions happen again? In a horrific murder case, I think its naïve for anyone in the field of criminal justice to make a blanked statement that, “this could never happen again.” It can and it will. We have a great justice system but not a perfect one – a human one.

Things have got better. Prosecutors, defense attorneys and law enforcement personnel have a heightened awareness of the possibility of a wrongful conviction. But, we all must remain vigilant and never put on blinders to the fact that it can happen again.

Feb19
Love0

When is a “No-Knock” Entry Legal?

ByNo-Knock Entry

Can Police Enter a House Without Knocking or Obtaining a Warrant | No-Knock Entry Defense Lawyers, Fort Worth.

The Fourth Amendment, generally, protects American citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Nevertheless, there are exceptions that allow police officers the ability to enter one’s home without a warrant or notice. These instances are commonly called “No-Knock” entries and are permitted only when a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their entry would be dangerous or futile.

In Trent v. Wade, the Defendant, a police officer, witnessed two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) racing on a closed section of a freeway. He attempted to pull over the two ATV riders, but they both fled, and the Defendant followed one rider to the Plaintiff’s house. The Defendant parked outside and entered the house without a warrant, upon which he encountered the Plaintiff and discovered that his son was the person riding the ATV. The Defendant arrested the son, and the Plaintiff sued the Defendant under 42 U.S.C § 1983 claiming that the Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures by entering his house unannounced and without a warrant.

The Defendant argued that because he was in hot pursuit of the Plaintiff’s son, the hot pursuit exception authorized his unannounced warrantless entry into the Plaintiff’s house. However, in order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police officer must reasonably suspect that knocking and announcing his or her entry would be dangerous or futile. Such an entry is futile when the occupants of a house are already aware of the police officer’s presence outside. The Court ultimately held that while the Plaintiff’s son was aware of the Defendant’s presence, there was a question of fact about whether the other occupant’s of the house were aware of his presence.

Consequentially, the Defendant was denied qualified immunity.

Feb13
Love1

The World Needs More Andy Taylors

ByDomestic Violence

I grew up with Sheriff Andy Taylor. And his trusty sidekick Deputy Barney Fife. If you’ve never seen the Andy Griffith Show, shame on you. It is an American classic about life in the small rural town of Mayberry, North Carolina. I would venture to say I’ve seen every episode (the black & white ones) at least four times each (syndicated reruns of course, because the show originally aired in the ’60s).

One of the things I loved about Sheriff Andy Taylor was his innate sense of right and wrong. While Barney Fife was out there trying to arrest jaywalkers and moonshiners and everyone else who broke a minor municipal code, Andy saw the big picture. Andy may have very well been justified to make arrests or detain citizens for investigation, but he was more concerned with what was right and decent. And when he suspected or observed actual criminal activity he took action.

As criminal defense lawyers in Fort Worth, Texas, we read police reports every single day. In many of the police reports we read, the officer’s actions are more akin to Barney Fife than Andy Taylor. I get the feeling that many officers have the mindset of “arrest everybody and let the DA sort it out.” When officers are called out on a family assault or domestic violence call, somebody is getting arrested. Period. The officers don’t try to deescalate the situation or truly figure out what the couple needs. They generally listen to the parties and arrest the one that has fewer injuries (regardless of which person may have called the police).

We’ve also seen numerous arrests of young people for committing youthful hijinks, such as trespassing on school property. Sheriff Taylor would have taken the kid home and made him tell his parents what he was doing. He wouldn’t arrest the kid. But officers in DFW are making arrests in these scenarios.

Of course, we only see the cases where there are arrests. There may indeed be officers out there that are getting it right. But, we still see too many arrests when something less would have achieved the right result. Don’t get me wrong.  We’re not against law and order. We are champions of justice, and justice does not always mean arrest and prosecution. Perhaps the police academy training should begin with a rerun of The Andy Griffith Show. Personally, I recommend the episode where the cow thief was putting shoes on the cows.