Tag

Search & Seizure Archives | Fort Worth Criminal Defense, Personal Injury, and Family Law

Bitcoin Privacy 4th Amendment

Are Bitcoin Transactions Private Under the Law?

By | Warrantless Search

Do You Have a Fourth Amendment Privacy Interest in Your Bitcoin Transactions?

Bitcoin Privacy 4th AmendmentNo, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information (1) contained on the Bitcoin blockchain and (2) that you provide to cryptocurrency exchanges.1 The Court reached this decision through an analysis of the facts under the “third party doctrine” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This doctrine is explained in further detail below.

Read full case HERE. US v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020).

First Off, what is Bitcoin?

Bitcoin is a “collection of concepts and technologies that form the basis of a digital money ecosystem.”2 More colloquially, the word “bitcoin” refers to a bitcoin—a unit of digital currency used to store and transmit value among participants in the bitcoin network. Bitcoin derives its value not from physical characteristics like gold or trust in a central authority like fiat money. Instead, bitcoin is backed by the cryptographic technology behind it.

Bitcoin is powered by open-source code known as blockchain, which creates a shared public ledger that is viewable by anyone. Each transaction is a “block” that is “chained” to the code, creating a permanent record of each transaction. In order to transfer anything in this world, you need to be able to send and receive your items to and from a certain location. Bitcoin is no different. Like an email, Bitcoin is transferred between locations on the internet called Bitcoin addresses. A Bitcoin address indicates the source or destination of a Bitcoin payment. The Bitcoin blockchain contains only the sender’s address, the receiver’s address, and the amount of bitcoin transferred. Bitcoin wallets provide these addresses and utilize software that allows you to securely send, receive, and store bitcoin in the bitcoin network.

The central tenet behind the creation of Bitcoin was that willing parties should be able to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party.3 A large part of the value in that kind of decentralization is in the privacy that it assumes will accompany the transaction. However, as the use and influence of cryptocurrencies expands, so too does the need of law enforcement to crack down on the illicit activities of crypto users that our society finds to be reprehensible. Analyzing the block chain for evidence of crimes involving bitcoin inevitably means that information of bitcoin transactions will be collected. This kind of forensic analysis, aside from collecting information on whether the bitcoin was used for something illegal, “can include the collection of large amounts of personal information about a user’s spending habits [and] total holdings[.]”4 The natural question for criminal law attorneys is whether a bitcoin user has a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the information related to their bitcoin transactions.

Bitcoin Transactions and the 4th Amendment

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Gratkowski recently held that individuals do not have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest the information related to their bitcoin transactions.5 More specifically, the court found that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in: (1) information on the bitcoin blockchain itself, and (2) bitcoin transactions in virtual currency exchanges.6

Gratkowski became the subject of a federal investigation when federal agents began investigating a child-pornography website. Users like Gratkowski paid the website bitcoin in exchange for downloadable child pornography. As mentioned above, the bitcoin blockchain only contains the sender’s address, the receiver’s address, and the amount of bitcoin transferred between the two parties. The identity of the owners do not appear on the bitcoin blockchain, but it is possible to discover the owner of a bitcoin address by analyzing the blockchain:

“For example, when an organization creates multiple Bitcoin addresses, it will often combine its Bitcoin addresses into a separate, central Bitcoin address (i.e., a “cluster”). It is possible to identify a “cluster” of Bitcoin addresses held by one organization by analyzing the Bitcoin blockchain’s transaction history. Open source tools and private software products can be used to analyze a transaction.”7

Federal agents used an outside service to analyze the publicly viewable bitcoin blockchain and identify a cluster of bitcoin addresses controlled by the website.8 They then served a grand jury subpoena on Coinbase (a prominent cryptocurrency exchange) for all information the exchange had on the Coinbase customers whose accounts sent Bitcoin to any of the addresses in the child-pornography website’s cluster. Coinbase turned over Gratkowski’s information, and federal agents obtained a warrant to search Gratkowski’s house. The agents found a hard drive containing child pornography and subsequently charged Gratkowski with one count of receiving child pornography and one count of accessing websites with intent to view child pornography.

At trial, Gratkowski moved to suppress the evidence the government obtained under the warrant, arguing that both the subpoena to Coinbase and the analysis done on the blockchain violated the Fourth Amendment. For the government to infringe upon an individual’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches, the person must have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the items obtained.9 The “third-party doctrine” instructs that a person generally “has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”10

For instance, the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller held that bank records were not subject to Fourth Amendment Protections.11 The Court also held that telephone call logs were not subject to Fourth Amendment protections because the telephone numbers we dial are voluntarily conveyed to the phone company when we place a call.12 However, the Supreme Court recently held that individuals do have a privacy interest in their cell phone location records, despite the records being held by a third party.13 In deciding this, the Court set-up the current framework under which courts are to determine whether the third-party doctrine applies to certain information that is shared with third parties: The sole act of sharing the information is no longer determinative as to whether we have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in it. Rather, courts are to consider, “‘(1) the nature of the particular documents sought,’ which includes whether the sought information was limited and meant to be confidential, and (2) the voluntariness of the exposure.”14

The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the information on the Bitcoin blockchain is more similar to bank records and telephone call logs than to cell phone location records.15 The court held that the information contained on the Bitcoin blockchain (the amount of Bitcoin transferred and the Bitcoin addresses of the sender and receiver) is limited, and Bitcoin users are unlikely to expect that information to be kept private as it is well known that it is recorded on the publicly available blockchain.16 The court also reasoned that the public exposure of this information is voluntary because transferring and receiving Bitcoin requires an affirmative act by the Bitcoin address holder.17 The Fifth Circuit therefore held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained on the Bitcoin blockchain.18

The Court used similar reasoning regarding the question of privacy in the Bitcoin transactions on Coinbase. Coinbase is a financial institution like a bank. Both are subject to the Bank Secrecy Act as regulated financial institutions, and both keep records of customer identities and currency transactions. The Court held that, “[h]aving access to Coinbase records does not provide agents with ‘an intimate window into a person’s life’; it provides only information about a person’s virtual currency transactions.”19 The court also held that, “[s]econd, transacting Bitcoin through Coinbase or other virtual currency exchange institutions requires an ‘affirmative act on the part of the user[,]’ which speaks to the voluntariness with which the information was turned over to Coinbase.20

Conclusion

The Gratkowski decision makes it difficult to imagine any situation in which a court would find there to be a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in information on the Bitcoin blockchain itself. Although Bitcoin users may truly value and believe in the privacy considerations contained in the monetary philosophy of Bitcoin, there is no getting around the fact that a “block” on the blockchain requires two Bitcoin addresses and the amount of bitcoin exchanged. And as long as private blockchain analytics companies continue to analyze only that information in determining the identity of Bitcoin users, courts will likely continue to find there to be no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in that information.

There appears to be more room to work with when it comes to cryptocurrency exchanges. Perhaps a court could find there to be a privacy interest in information given to an exchange whose business centers around user confidentiality. However, exchanges must comply with the same federal financial laws that govern Coinbase, and the record-keeping requirements under those laws would likely provide for a strong analogy to the Gratkowski case.

ENDNOTES:

1. United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020).
2. A. M. Antonopoulos, Mastering bitcoin: Programming the open blockchain (2nd ed.). Beijing etc.: O’Reilly.
3. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (2008).
4. Sasha Hodder & Rafael Yakobi, Bitcoin Fungibility, Mixing and the Legal Limits on Maintaining Privacy, https://bitcoinmagazine.com/culture/bitcoin-fungibility-mixing-and-the-legal-limits-on-maintaining-privacy (2020).
5. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 309.
8. Private blockchain analytics companies also provide services of this nature to cryptocurrency exchanges to help the exchanges meet their obligations under federal money laundering laws. See footnote 4 on the previous page for a discussion of privacy and these laws.
9. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
10. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
11. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1976).
12. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
13. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
14. Gratkowski (quoting Carpenter, at 2219-20).
15. Id., at 311.
16. Id. at 312.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Carpenter, at 2217).
20. Id. (quoting Carpenter, at 2220).

Supreme Court Holds Police May Not Search Vehicle in Driveway Without a Warrant

By | Search & Seizure

Collins v. Virginia – US Supreme Court Considers Whether Police May Search a Vehicle in a Driveway Without a Warrant

 

Collins v. Virginia (US Supreme Court 2018)

In Collins v. Virginia, police officers were looking for a motorcycle that they suspected was stolen. They tracked the motorcycle to a home where it appeared to be parked in the driveway and covered by a tarp. Officers walked up the driveway, removed the tarp, discovered the motorcycle and conducted a search of the license plates. The license plate search indicated that the motorcycle was indeed stolen. The officers then replaced the tarp over the motorcycle and waited in their car for the driver of the motorcycle. When Collins appeared, they arrested him.

Collins’s Motion to Suppress the Warrantless Search

In the trial court, Collins made a motion to suppress evidence, claiming that the officers violated his 4th Amendment right when they entered the curtilage of his home and conducted a warrantless search of the driveway. The trial court denied the motion and Collins was convicted of Receipt of Stolen Property. The Virginia appellate court and State Supreme Court affirmed Collins’ conviction, reasoning that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement applied to the search in this case.

What is the Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement?

Generally, the “automobile exception” to the 4th Amendment allows officers to search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause. The rationale behind this exception is that automobiles should be treated differently than houses because of the “ready mobility” of the automobile. Virginia argued that the automobile exception should apply in this case, because the motorcycle was capable to being driven away from the home.

Supreme Court Overturns the Virginia Courts, Defining the “Curtilage” of the Home to Include the Driveway

The US Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor writing for a nearly unanimous court, held that the officers violated Collins’ 4th Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court emphasized that the area of the driveway where the motorcycle was parked was a protected area of the home.

[T]he part of the driveway where Collins’ motorcycle was parked and subsequently searched is curtilage. When Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle, it was parked inside a partially enclosed top portion of the driveway that abuts the house. Just like the front porch, side garden, or area “outside the front window,” that enclosure constitutes “an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home life extends.’ “

Justice Sotomayor further explained that:

Nothing in this Court’s case law suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant. Such an expansion would both undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage and “ ‘untether’ ” the exception ” from the justifications underlying’ ” it.

In holding that the search violated the 4th Amendment, the Court reversed the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court and remanded to case back to the state.

Takeaway

The curtilage of the home extends to the driveway and items that might be found therein. Of course, if the officers had been able to view the license plates from the street, without removing the tarp, things would likely be different. However, as it stands, the Supreme Court is unwilling to adopt any rule that would allow police to enter the curtilage of the home to conduct a warrantless search.

Bus Driver Consent Search Wise 2017

Can a Bus Driver Give Consent to Search the Passenger Compartment?

By | Search & Seizure

The Case of the Not Too “Wise” Bus Passenger

United States v. Wise, 877 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. TX 2017)

Bus Driver Consent Search Wise 2017FACTS: In this case, police officers were conducting bus interdictions at a Greyhound bus stop. After a certain bus stopped, the driver got off the bus and the officers approached him requesting consent to search the passenger cabin of the bus. The bus driver consented to a search and two experienced narcotics officers in plain clothes boarded the bus. The officers did not block the exit or otherwise obstruct any of the passengers from departing the bus. One officer walked to the back of the bus while the other officer remained at the front.

The officer at the front of the bus noticed a man who was pretending to be asleep. The officer found this suspicious, because in his experience, criminals on buses often pretended to be asleep to avoid police contact. The officer walked past the “sleeping” man and turned around. The sleeping man (named Morris Wise) then turned to look back at officer, revealing that he was not asleep after all. The officer then approached Wise (now awake) and asked to see his bus ticket. Wise gave the officer a bus ticket, bearing the name “James Smith.” The officer had a hunch that James Smith was a fake name. The officer then asked Wise if he had any luggage with him on the bus. Wise said yes and motioned to the luggage rack directly above his head.

Wise then gave the officers consent to search the duffle bag in the overhead compartment. The officers did not find any contraband in the duffle bag. The officers also noticed a backpack near Wise and asked if the backpack belonged to him. Wise denied ownership of the backpack. The officers then asked the other passengers about the backpack and no one claimed it, so the officers removed the backpack at the bus driver’s request.

Outside the bus, a trained police canine alerted to the backpack. The officers then cut a small lock off the backpack, searched it, and found seven brick-type packages that appeared to contain cocaine.

The officers then went back onto the bus and asked Wise if he would mind getting off the bus to speak to the officers. Wise complied with the officers’ request and got off the bus. The officers asked Wise if he had any weapons, which he denied that he had any weapons, and then they asked him to empty his pockets.

From his pockets, Wise gave the officers his ID card with bearing the name “Morris Wise” and a lanyard with several keys attached to it. Not surprisingly, one of the key opened the lock that the officers had to cut off of the backpack (that Wise said was not his). The officer then arrested Wise, and the government charged him with several drug-related offenses.

Motion to Suppress the Search as the Fruits on an Illegal “Checkpoint Stop”

Wise filed a motion to suppress the evidence as a violation of his 4th amendment right against unreasonable searched and seizures. The district court held that the officers’ conduct in searching the bus constituted an unconstitutional checkpoint stop. In addition, the district court held that the bus driver did not voluntarily consent to the officers’ search of the luggage compartment where the backpack was located. As a result, the district court suppressed all evidence the officers seized after the stop.

The government appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

First, the court held that the district court incorrectly characterized the officers’ bus interdiction as an unconstitutional checkpoint. The court noted that the Supreme Court’s cases involving checkpoints involve roadblocks or other types of conduct where the government initiates a stop to interact with motorists. In this case, the officers did not require the bus driver to stop at the station. Instead, the driver made the scheduled stop as required by his employer, Greyhound. In addition, the officers only approached the driver after he had disembarked from the bus, and the driver voluntarily agreed to speak with them. The court concluded that the interaction between the officers and the driver was better characterized as a “bus interdiction.”

Second, although Wise had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his luggage, the court held that as a passenger, Wise did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the luggage compartment of the commercial bus. As a result, the court concluded that Wise had no standing to challenge the officers’ search of that compartment, to which the bus driver consented.

Third, the court held that the officers did not seize Wise, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, when they approached him, asked to see his identification, and requested his consent to search his luggage. Instead, the court concluded that Wise’s interaction with the officers was a consensual encounter because a reasonable person in Wise’s position would have felt free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.

Finally, the court held that Wise voluntarily answered the officer’s questions, voluntarily emptied his pockets, and voluntarily gave the officer his identification and keys.

Stale Traffic Violation Zuniga Drug Case

Does a 15-Minute Delay Render a Traffic Violation Stale? | U.S. v. Zuniga

By | Drug Crimes

How Long Can an Officer Wait to Pull a Vehicle Over After Observing a Traffic Violation?

Stale Traffic Violation Zuniga Drug CaseUnited States v. Zuniga (US Court of Appeals, 5th Cir. 2017)

In this case, a San Antonio police detective, who was working with an informant, suspected that Appellant Zuniga was transporting methamphetamine in his vehicle and followed it. The detective witnessed the driver of the vehicle fail to engage the turn-signal as required. He did not pull the vehicle over at that time, but radioed the traffic violation to other officers. Approximately fifteen minutes later, an officer who had received the radio dispatch but had not witnessed the turn-signal violation, stopped the vehicle. During the stop, the officer encountered Appellant, who was riding in the passenger seat, and his girlfriend, who was driving the vehicle. The officer arrested Appellant on outstanding warrants and his girlfriend for driving without a valid driver’s license.

The arresting officer conducted a search of Appellant incident to arrest and found methamphetamine on his person. The officer also searched Zuniga’s car and found a backpack containing methamphetamine, a handgun, and other evidence related to drug trafficking.

As a result, the federal government charged Appellant with several drug-related offenses.

Motion to Suppress for Unreasonable Traffic Delay

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the stop, arguing that the fifteen-minute delay in conducting the stop for the turn-signal violation rendered the information provided by the detective who observed the violation stale.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the delay in conducting the stop was not enough to render the information stale or the stop unlawful. The court did not state a specific time limitation to which officers must adhere when conducting a traffic stop. Instead, the court stressed that stops following traffic violations must be reasonable in light of the circumstances. In this case, the court found that the fifteen-minute delay was reasonable. As soon as the officer observed the turn-signal violation, he immediately relayed this information to other officers, although none of those officers were in position to stop the vehicle at that time.

Collective Knowledge Doctrine Allows an Officer to Make a Stop for a Violation He Did Not Observe

The trial court further held that the collective knowledge doctrine allowed the arresting officer to lawfully stop the vehicle even though he did not personally observe the traffic violation. The collective knowledge doctrine allows an officer, who does not observe a criminal (or traffic) violation, to conduct a stop when that officer is acting at the request of another officer who actually did observe the violation. Here, the detective who observed the turn-signal violation communicated this information to the traffic officer who ultimately stopped the vehicle; therefore, the detective’s knowledge transferred to the officer who conducted the stop and made the arrest.

The 5th Circuit upheld the search and the conviction, holding that reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle continued to exist despite the 15-minute lapse between the original observation of the traffic offense and the stop. The court explained:

“We make no attempt to articulate a specific time limitation to which officers must adhere in effecting a stop following a traffic violation. Rather, we stress that, consistent with our holdings in similar contexts, stops following transportation violations must be reasonable in light of the circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 598 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that “[s]tale information cannot be used to establish probable cause”). To reiterate, we hold only that the elapsed time between an observed violation and any subsequent stop must be reasonable upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances.”

Terry Stop Officer Pat Down Search

“Acting Suspicious” is Not Enough to Justify a Pat Down Search

By | Search & Seizure

Does an Officer’s Testimony That a Person was “Acting Suspicious” Establish Reasonable Suspicion to Support a Terry Stop?

Terry Stop Officer Pat Down SearchThe Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently handed down an opinion concerning the reasonable suspicion standard required for law enforcement officers to conduct a Terry stop—an exception to the warrant requirement. The issue facing the Court was whether merely “acting suspicious” is enough to establish reasonable suspicion to justify a law enforcement officer to initiate a Terry stop.

United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2017)

The Facts — District Court Found the Terry Stop to be Lawful Based On the Defendant’s Demeanor, Remarks, and for Officer-safety Reasons

While on patrol in a marked police car, two officers observed Monsivais walking down the side of the I-20 interstate away from an apparently disabled truck. The officers stopped in front of Monsivais and activated the car’s emergency lights in order to ask Monsivais if he needed roadside assistance. As Monsivais approached, he ignored the officers and walked past their patrol car. At this point, the officers exited their vehicle, and asked Monsivais where he was going and if he needed any help. Monsivais told the officers he was heading to Fort Worth (even though his vehicle was pointed towards Abilene). During questioning, Monsivais appeared nervous and repeatedly placed his hands in his pockets; however upon the officer’s request, Monsivais removed his hands. Additionally, Monsivais responded politely to all of the officers’ questions. After approximately four minutes, one of the officers advised Monsivais that he was going to pat Monsivais down for weapons because of his behavior, inconsistent statements and for officer safety reasons. Shortly thereafter, Monsivais told the officer that he had a firearm in his waistband. The officer seized the firearm and Monsivais was later charged with possession of a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States.

Monsivais filed a motion to suppress the firearm and other evidence, arguing that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment because he did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Monsivais was involved in criminal activity when he detained him. The district court denied Monsivais’ motion to suppress, holding only that the “consensual encounter was transformed into a lawful Terry frisk due to the Defendant’s demeanor, remarks, and for officer-safety reasons.”

The Court of Appeals Reversed the District Court’s Decision—Holding the Officers Lacked a Basis to Reasonably Suspect Monsivais of a Criminal Act

The Court first determined that the officer seized Monsivais for Fourth Amendment purposes when he told Monsivais that he was going to pat him down. At this point, the officer converted the roadside assistance “welfare check” into an investigative detention—otherwise known as a Terry stop.

“The Fourth Amendment generally requires officers to obtain a warrant before searching or seizing an individual.” However, pursuant to a narrow exception announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968), police officers may briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if under the totality of relevant circumstance they can point to “specific and articulable facts” that give rise to reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 2014).

Here, the Court found that while Monsivais’ behavior might not have been typical of all stranded motorists, the officers could not point to any specific and articulable facts that Monsivais had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime before seizing him.

The court explained that Monsivais’ nervous demeanor alone was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to justify a Terry stop. In fact, the Court gives little or no weight to an officer’s statement that a suspect appeared nervous. United States v. Portillo–Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the Court held that evidence of Monsivais placing his hands in his pocket is of little significance. The Court noted that any number of people walking down the street might have their hands in their pockets. Additionally, the Court determined there were no inconsistencies in Monsivais’ story; and, even if there were, the inconsistencies would not connect Monsivais with any reasonably suspected unlawful conduct. Moreover, Monsivais’ choice to ignore the officers’ presence by merely walking past them, not fleeing, did not give rise to criminal activity.

In conclusion, the officer testified that he never suspected Monsivais was involved in any criminal activity, but rather that Monsivais was just acting “suspicious.” As such, the court found that the officer seized Monsivais without reasonable suspicion and that the evidence obtained from the unlawful seizure should have been suppressed.

traffic stop duration king

When Does a Traffic Stop End and Improper Police Conduct Begin?

By | Drug Crimes, Search & Seizure

A Traffic Stop for a Minor Traffic Infraction Leads to Search, Seizure, and Arrest: Exactly When Should Traffic Stops End?

traffic stop duration kingIf you’ve been a licensed (or even unlicensed) driver in Texas for long enough, you’ve experienced a traffic stop. Whether it be for speeding or something worse, a traffic stop is not generally a pleasant experience. But in some traffic stops across the state (hopefully not yours), the police conduct a search of the vehicle, then a search of the driver or passengers, and, finally make an arrest of some sort. How does something like a broken tail light or speeding lead to search, seizure, and arrest? When traffic stops for minor infractions potentially lead to serious criminal charges, it’s important to know how Texas courts define the moment when a traffic stop ends.

King v. State (2nd Court of Appeals – Fort Worth, 2016)

Broken Tail Light Leads to a Traffic Stop

Around 1:00 am, Jennifer Dowling drove Christopher King’s car home from a night on the town. Blue Mound Police noticed that the car had a broken right tail light and conducted a traffic stop pursuant to the infraction. Police ran the standard background check on Dowling, the driver, and King, the passenger, only to discover that neither had a valid driver’s license. As a result, Dowling was arrested for driving without a license. Police did not permit King to drive the car away and informed him that they would impound the car because leaving the car behind posed a safety hazard for other motorists.

Consent to Search Obtained, Traffic Stop Continued

To begin the impounding process, police asked King to exit the vehicle. When King got out of the car, police asked if they could perform a pat-down. Nervously, King complied with the request. When King stood up, a white cylinder-shaped container fell out of King’s pants onto the ground, and he admitted that the container held meth. King was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance.

Trial Court Holds That King Consented to the Pat-Down

Before trial, King filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence—the meth and the container—because the evidence was seized without a warrant. At the suppression hearing, the State prevailed, arguing that King consented to the pat-down, and the interaction was a consensual encounter. King lost his suppression motion, and plead guilty to the charges. The trial court sentenced King to twelve years confinement. Arguing that the traffic stop ended when Dowling was arrested and that the traffic stop was improperly extended to him, King appealed to the Second Court of Appeals.

Second Court of Appeals Discusses Traffic Stops

The Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth relied upon existing case law from the Supreme Court to evaluate the merits of King’s appeal. “A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333; 129 S. Ct. 781,, 788 (2009). “A traffic stop ends when police have no further need to control the scene.” Id., 129 S. Ct. at 783. According to the Second Court of Appeals, the police needed to control the scene even after Dowling was arrested. In asking King for a pat-down, they were taking reasonable steps to secure the area by ensuring that King was not a safety threat while waiting for a tow truck. Further, “the impoundment of the vehicle was a task tied to the traffic infraction, and King ma[de] no argument that the task [of impoundment] should have reasonably been completed at the time the police asked for consent to the pat-down.” The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the traffic stop was not improperly extended.

What does all of this mean for motorists? So long as the police are reasonably securing the scene by taking steps in an effort to maintain safety, the police may continue the traffic stop until the conclusion of such safety measures, including but not limited to, pat-downs, security sweeps, background checks, and impoundments.  In this case, King would have had a more colorable argument if he had been a licensed driver and the police extended the stop rather than letting him drive the vehicle away from the scene.

Cell Phone Text Message Search Love 2016

Police Must Obtain Search Warrant to See Content of Text Messages

By | Search & Seizure

Cell Phone Text Message Search Love 2016From call logs, to cell tower info, to sent and received text messages, many criminal investigations involve the contents of a defendant’s cell phone.  Under the Stored Communications Act, cell phone providers can provide a users cell phone data to police during an active criminal investigation with a simple court order (like a subpoena).  But what about the actual content of text messages?  Can the police or the prosecutor get the actual content from those text messages with the same court order?

Capital Murder Conviction Gained After Judge Admits Content of Text Messages

Recently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered a capital murder (death penalty) case in which the State relied on text message evidence during trial. During the trial, the state admitted (over defense objection) the contents of text messages sent and received by the defendant. The messages established the defendant’s presence at the scene of the murder and implied his direct involvement. The state leaned on this evidence during both its opening and closing statements in the case. The defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.

The Content of Text Messages are Not Covered by the Stored Communications Act

The appellant argued on appeal that while the Stored Communications Act allows the state to gain evidence of text messages sent and received, it does not allow the dissemination of the content of those messages. The appellant argued that the State should have obtained a search warrant backed by probable cause in order to get these records. The CCA agreed, drawing comparisons to the contents of letters sent in the mail and email stored on a server. Text message enjoy the same reasonable expectation of privacy and should be protected.

The Question in Love v. State is Whether Appellant had an Expectation of Privacy in his Service Provider’s Records

LOVE v. STATE (Tex. Crim. App – 2016), Majority Opinion

Judge Yeary penned the majority opinion in Love. The following excerpts are taken from the opinion:

Many courts have treated text messages as analogous to the content of an envelope conveyed through the United States mail…Admittedly, the analogy is not a perfect one…A letter remains in its sealed envelope until it arrives at its destination, and the telephone company does not routinely record private telephone conversations. But internet and cell phone service providers do routinely store the content of emails and text messages, even if they do not necessarily take the time to read them…[E]mpirical data seem to support the proposition that society recognizes the propriety of assigning Fourth Amendment protection to the content of text messages…All of this leads us to conclude that the content of appellant’s text messages could not be obtained without a probable cause–based warrant. Text messages are analogous to regular mail and email communications. Like regular mail and email, a text message has an “outside address ‘visible’ to the third-party carriers that transmit it to its intended location, and also a package of content that the sender presumes will be read only by the intended recipient…Consequently, the State was prohibited from compelling Metro PCS to turn over appellant’s content-based communications without first obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause.

Finding that “the probable impact of the improperly-admitted text messages was great,” the CCA then reversed the conviction and remanded the case back to the trial court for a new trial.

TAKEAWAY: Not all records can be gained so easily through a court order. Some require a probably cause warrant.  Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in the message? It might take a new analysis as our media is changing daily, but it can be worth the fight.

Note: Presiding Judge Keller dissented. She did not believe that the appellant preserved this issue for appeal.

Drug Found in Car Driver Charged with Possession

Do Drugs Found in a Car Automatically Belong to the Driver?

By | Drug Crimes

Between the Driver and Two Passengers, who is in Possession of the Drugs Found in the Middle Compartment in Plain View?

Drug Found in Car Driver Charged with PossessionThe Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion dealing with legal sufficiency of evidence in the context of possession of a controlled substance when it was not found in the exclusive possession of the defendant. The issue facing the Court was whether Appellant Tate intentionally or knowingly possessed methamphetamine by exercising “control, management or care” of the methamphetamine and he knew it was methamphetamine. Tex. Penal Code §1.07(a)(39). The Court found that a rational jury could infer that the owner and driver of a vehicle possessed the controlled substance found in the vehicle in plain view even when there were two other passengers.

Tate v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

The Facts—Trial Court Found Sufficient Evidence

Tate was pulled over by Detective Beckham due to his outstanding warrants. When pulled over Tate had two passengers. Tate explained that he owned the vehicle but did not have any proof of ownership. Tate was arrested after officers confirmed his outstanding warrants. The police searched Tate, the two passengers, and their belongings, but did not find any weapons or contraband. During Officer Beckham’s inventory search of the vehicle, he found a syringe loaded with a substance later identified as .24 grams of methamphetamine. He found the syringe in “plain view” in a compartment underneath the air conditioner and heating controls.

Tate, the owner of the vehicle, was charged with possession of a controlled substance. At trial, Officer Beckham described the compartment as “directly to the right” of Tate, accessible to Tate and the front-seat passenger but not the backseat passenger. He also testified that even though he couldn’t tell exactly what the front-seat passenger was doing, he observed her moving a lot but never towards the compartment. Tate argued that one of the passengers put the syringe there when Tate was talking to Beckham at the rear of the vehicle. The trial court found Tate guilty, relying on Tate’s “self-purported” ownership of the vehicle and his proximity to the syringe.

The Court of Appeals Reversed the Trial Court’s Decision

The Court of Appeals held that there was “insufficient evidence to prove that Tate had intentionally and knowingly possessed methamphetamine.” The court rejected the proximity argument made by the trial court for two reasons:

  1. There was insufficient evidence to show the syringe was in the car before Tate got out.
  2. Officer Beckham observed the front-seat passenger moving a lot but couldn’t tell exactly what she was doing.

Additionally, the court said that since Tate’s ownership could not be proven it was insufficient evidence to prove possession.

The Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses the Court of Appeals—Holding Defendant’s Ownership and Control of Vehicle Where Controlled Substance was Found in Plain View and Within Defendant’s Reach is Sufficient Evidence to Convict for Possession of a Controlled Substance

The CCA held that a rational jury, with these facts, could reasonably infer that the syringe was in the car the entire time. In coming to that decision the Court relied on the fact that the jury believed Beckham’s testimony that he never saw her reach for the compartment, that the back-seat passenger could not reach it, Tate said he owned the vehicle, and that the syringe was found in plain view. Therefore, a rational jury could infer that Tate would be aware of items in his vehicle in plain view, thus find he intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine in the syringe.

In making this decision the Court relied on the Jackson standard: “Based on the combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The Court found that the court of appeals incorrectly applied this standard. The Court pointed to a few links that the jury could reasonably rely on to find Tate guilty, which include:

  1. the contraband was found in the vehicle that Tate owned and was driving;
  2. the contraband was in plain view and conveniently accessible to Tate; and
  3. the jury could reasonably believe Beckham’s testimony that the front-seat passenger did not reach over to the compartment and that the back-seat passenger could not reach the compartment.

Thus, when the standard is applied here a rational jury could find the evidence sufficient to find Tate intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt.

Decision of the Criminal Court of Appeals—Evidence is Legally Sufficient Where a Rational Jury Could Infer Guild Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

The CCA found that the evidence at trial was sufficient for the jury to reasonably find Tate guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the court of appeals overstepped its bounds in assessing the legal-sufficiency of the evidence.

Stop and Frisk Furr v. State 2016

Reasonable Suspicion to Stop and Frisk Upheld | Furr v. State (2016)

By | Reasonable Suspicion, Search & Seizure

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Upholds a Stop and Frisk Case

Stop and Frisk Furr v. State 2016Furr v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

On September 21st the Criminal Court of Appeals decided Furr v. State. In Furr, the Court held that an anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to establish reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Appellant Furr. To support the stop and frisk, the court noted that Appellant:

  • watched the officer as he drove by,
  • repeatedly looked at the officer as he walked away,
  • was nervous, anxious and sort of out of it,
  • appeared under the influence of drugs, and
  • did not initially respond as to whether he was armed.

Further, the Court stated it is not per se objectively reasonable for a police officer to execute a pat down of a suspect for weapons simply because they are accused of drug possession.

The Facts of Furr v. State

Corpus Christi Police Department received an anonymous tip that two men were doing drugs on a particular street corner, one dressed in all black and the other in a black shirt carrying a brown backpack. In response, an officer drove past the street corner. He observed two men that fit the description from the tip and noticed in his rearview mirror that the men were watching him as he drove by. The officer then approached the two men but one of the men, Furr, walked away into the nearby shelter, repeatedly looking over his shoulder at the officer. The officer described Furr’s actions as furtive, “like he was trying to get away.”

When another officer arrived, the officers made contact with Furr. Furr was described as nervous, anxious, evasive, and was sweating excessively. Furr did not respond when the officers initially asked if he had any weapons on him. Officers said he appeared “kind of out of it” and “like he was under the influence of a drug. As a result, for safety reasons, officers frisked Furr for weapons and found a glass crack pipe in Furr’s front pocket. When removing the pipe, the officer also found two syringes, and after arrest, two small balloons of heroin.

Furr was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal after his motion to suppress was denied. Furr argued on Appeal that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him and that the trial court erred by not granting the Motion to Suppress the search.

The Court of Appeals Affirmed the Trial Courts Decision

The court of appeals held that Furr’s nervousness coupled with the observation that he seemed to be under the influence of a drug sufficiently corroborated the tip to support the investigative detention and that Furr’s failure to initially respond about being armed coupled with the other circumstances justified the frisk.

The Criminal Court of Appeals Concluded that there Was Reasonable Suspicion to Detain and Frisk Furr.

1. The Analysis of the Detention

In order to detain a person, the police officer must have reasonable suspicion based on “specific articulable facts, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Anything that happens or that is observed before the detention will be considered in determining whether the officer indeed had reasonable suspicion to detain Furr.

Furr argued that the anonymous tip alone was not enough.  The Court, however, explains that if there had only been the anonymous tip, it would not have established reasonable suspicion, but here there was more. The Court identifies several independent observations:

  • Furr and the other man were at the specified location and matched the informant’s description.
  • The area was a “high drug, high crime” area.
  • Furr and the other man watched the officer as he drove past
  • When the officer approached the two, Furr walked away “furtively.”
  • When the officers came upon Furr in the shelter he was sweaty, nervous, anxious, and appeared out of it as if he was under the influence of a drug.

Thus, the reasonable suspicion here was not solely based on the informant’s tip, but instead that tip was corroborated by independent observations made by the police officers. Looking at the totality of these circumstances, the Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Furr and investigate the information from the anonymous tip that Furr and the other man were using and possessing a drug.

2. The Terry Frisk

The Court rejected the State’s request to adopt a rule that it is, “per se, objectively reasonable for the police to pat down a suspect for weapons if they are accused of possessing drugs,” because reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect cannot be established by accusations of drug possession alone.

The Court further rejects the State’s argument that the officer was objectively justified in patting Furr down for weapons because this was outside of a homeless shelter for two reasons: 1) Nothing in the record shows that the shelter was a homeless shelter; and 2) Even if it was a homeless shelter, the Court does not see a correlation between being armed and dangerous and being at a homeless shelter.

Even so, the Court ultimately agrees with the court of appeals that reasonable suspicion was established here because the anonymous tip was corroborated by all of the circumstances surrounding the officers’ interactions with Furr. Specifically, the Court noted the tip, personal observations by the officers and the high drug, high crime area would warrant a belief that the safety of officers and others was in danger.

DISSENT – Stop and Frisk Should Have Been Held Unlawful

Judge Meyers dissented from the majority and opined that the stop and frisk of Furr was unlawful and that the motion to suppress should have been granted. Judge Meyers concluded that neither Furr’s action of looking over his shoulder or the anonymous tip, alone or combined, were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Thus, there was no need to analyze the legality of the frisk. Judge Meyers believes that the majority made its decision “not based on law but on the feeling that Furr should not get relief.”

Utah v. Strieff Illegal Police Conduct

US Supreme Court Allows Evidence From Illegal Police Stop in a Shocking Decision

By | Search & Seizure

In a 5-3 Split, Utah v. Strieff Causes Strife for the Supreme Court: What Happens When an Illegal Stop Leads to the Discovery of an Outstanding Warrant?

Utah v. Strieff Illegal Police ConductUtah v. Strieff (United States Supreme Court – 2016)

The Supreme Court has had a busy term already! Handed down just yesterday, Utah v. Strieff divided the Supreme Court over the question of what happens when an illegal stop leads to the discovery of an outstanding warrant? And when that warrant is executed, what happens when drug paraphernalia is found incident to arrest? Should evidence obtained at a search incident to arrest be suppressed when the stop was unlawful from the start?

Surveillance of a Suspected Drug House Leads to an Arrest for a Traffic Violation

In Strieff, law enforcement conducted surveillance of a Salt Lake City, Utah, residence, after an anonymous tipster called a drug hotline to report to police that drugs were being sold in the home. During the surveillance, police observed a large number of people visiting the home for mere minutes at a time and leaving, increasing law enforcement’s suspicion that the residents were dealing drugs. Shortly after Edward Strieff visited the home, law enforcement stopped and detained Strieff, asking him the reason for visiting the home. Next, police ran Strieff’s identification information through their electronic records, discovering an outstanding arrest warrant on Strieff for a traffic violation. Strieff was arrested and searched. During the search, police found a baggie of meth and other drug paraphernalia in Strieff’s pockets. Strieff was charged with unlawful possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.

Strieff Moves to Suppress the Evidence as the Fruits of an Illegal Police Stop.

At trial, Strieff moved to suppress the evidence as a result of an unlawful investigatory stop. Strieff argued that because law enforcement’s stop was illegal from the beginning, then any evidence found on him as a result of the stop was “tainted.” The State argued that the evidence was in fact admissible because it was found as a result from a search incident to a lawful arrest with a warrant, and that the warrant itself attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the drugs and drug paraphernalia. Agreeing with the State, and finding the presence of the arrest warrant to be an “extraordinary intervening circumstance” the trial court denied Strieff’s motion to suppress. United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (CA8 2006). Strieff pleaded guilty to a lesser charge, but preserved his right to appeal.

Utah Supreme Court Holds that Illegal Police Conduct Was Not Attenuated.

On appeal, Strieff argued that the evidence should have been suppressed at trial. However, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 2012 UT App. 245, 286 P. 3d 317. On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Strieff argued that the evidence should have been suppressed at trial and that the court of appeals was incorrect in their verdict. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with Strieff, and reversed the lower courts’ rulings, ordering the evidence to be suppressed. 2015 UT 2, 357 P. 3d 532. In declining to apply the attenuation doctrine, the Utah Supreme court held, “the evidence is inadmissible because only a voluntary act of a defendant’s free will sufficiently breaks the connections between an illegal search and the discovery of evidence.Id. at 536.

The State of Utah appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Strieff contends that the facts of his case show that he was stopped illegally for the purpose of obtaining his identifying information, and that because of flagrant police misconduct, he was detained and searched unlawfully.

US Supreme Court Must Determine Whether Illegal Police Conduct Must Result in Exclusion of the Tainted Evidence.

When a police officer lawfully stops a person and asks for identification, then, discovers that there is a traffic warrant for this person’s arrest, and in the process of arresting and searching him discovers drugs and drug paraphernalia, the evidence found in the search of a person can be used against him.

However, what if the initial stop was not lawful. Doctrinally, does the “attenuation doctrine”—an exception to the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment—apply when law enforcement makes an unconstitutional investigatory stop, discovering during that stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant, and then, arrests the suspect, seizing incriminating evidence during a search incident to arrest?

The Law of the Land: The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “ the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. To enforce the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, “[the Supreme] Court has required…courts to exclude evidence obtained by unconstitutional police conduct” via the exclusionary rule. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___(2016).

The Exclusionary Rule to the Fourth Amendment

The Exclusionary Rule to the Fourth Amendment is a legal principal, put forth by the Supreme Court in precedent case law, protecting defendants in criminal cases where evidence is collected in violation of a person’s constitutional rights, by deeming the evidence inadmissible for criminal prosecution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Exclusionary Rule encompasses both the “primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure [and] evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). However, courts will only apply the exclusionary rule, “where the deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).

The Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Attenuation Doctrine (and Brown Factors)

Over the years, the Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule, one of which is called the “Attenuation Doctrine.” The Attenuation Doctrine provides for admissibility when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstances. Id. at 593. The doctrine “evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence.” Strieff, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).

The factors, articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (the “Brown factors”), are used by courts in legal analyses to determine whether the Attenuation Doctrine is applicable to the facts of a case. The three factors are temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and flagrant police misconduct.

  1. Temporal proximity—For example, how much time did it take for police to stop the suspect and to arrest him, and under what circumstances?
  2. Intervening circumstances—For example, did the suspect make a confession, or volunteer some other information to law enforcement to indicate that he has committed a crime?
  3. Flagrant police misconduct—For example, did police act in an unethical manner to discover evidence, or, is there a pattern of misconduct for that officer or police department as a whole?

The Supreme Court Holds That The Valid Arrest Warrant Attenuated the Taint of the Illegal Stop.

In a 5-3 split, the Supreme Court reverses the Utah Supreme Court’s ruling, holding that the evidence the officer seized as part of the search incident to arrest is admissible because the officer’s discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest. Essentially, the arrest warrant was, in and of itself, the attenuation or the reason that the evidence seized is admissible. “The evidence [law enforcement] seized incident to Strieff’s arrest is admissible based on an application of attenuation factors from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590.”

First, the “temporal proximity” factor “favors suppressing the evidence,” the Supreme Court states, as the stop was initially unlawful and because law enforcement discovered the drug paraphernalia on Strieff mere minutes after he an illegal stop. However, the other two factors strongly favor the State.

Second, the “intervening circumstances” factor is met under the facts of the case. “The existence of a valid arrest warrant, predating the investigation and entirely unconnected with the stop, favors…attenuation between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence.” Further, the warrant itself authorized law enforcement to arrest Strieff—once the arrest was authorized by a magistrate’s signature on a warrant, a search incident to an arrest is “undisputedly lawful.”

Third, the “flagrant police misconduct” factor strongly “favors the state” as law enforcement was “at most negligent…but [these] errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant violation of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights.” In this case, there was no indication that the stop was part of any systemic police misconduct. Police misconduct and flagrancy requires more than “mere absence of proper cause.”

Additionally, the Supreme Court says that Strieff’s arguments are not persuasive. Law enforcement did not stop Strieff randomly. Strieff had visited a suspicious house that was under surveillance. Law enforcement’s purpose in surveilling the residence was to “gather information about activity inside a house whose occupants were legitimately suspected of dealing drugs.” Further, it is “unlikely that the prevalence of outstanding warrants will create dragnet searches,” says the Supreme Court.

Three Supreme Court Justices Dissent and Would Hold That the Illegal Stop Requires Exclusion of the Seized Evidence.

There were three dissenters who put forth two written dissents to the holding in this case. In the first dissent, Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg (in part) state that, “the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights.” Further the Justices add, “If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant.” “Two wrongs don’t make a right” they implore, “as it is tempting in a case like this, where illegal conduct by an officer uncovers illegal conduct by a civilian.” The holding in this case, they say, undermines the heart of the constitutional protections, “the Fourth Amendment should prohibit, not permit.”

Additionally, Justices Kagan and Ginsburg dissented together. The Justices argue that the majority misapplied the Brown factors altogether, and that an outstanding warrant in and of itself does not an intervening circumstance make. Further, they argue that the outcome of this case invites law enforcement to stop citizens, even without reasonable suspicion. “If the target[ed] [citizen] is one of the many millions of people in this country with an outstanding arrest warrant, anything the officer finds in a search is fair game for use in criminal prosecution,” the Justices argue. Thus, law enforcement’s incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment increases, which is in opposition to the purpose of the Exclusionary Rule altogether—to remove potential temptation from police to stop random individuals without reasonable suspicion.

Commentary

This is a very troubling decision. While we never hope that our police officers would engage in illegal conduct to stop folks that have not committed a violation, it is never good to allow a 4th Amendment violation to be trumped by the later discovery of a traffic warrant. If we subscribe to an “ends justify the means” mentality, all of our constitutional rights are in serious jeopardy. It will be interesting to see how this decision plays out in real life, but I predict that it will not be good in the short term.