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7th COA

Apr 23
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Coaching a Child Victim

By Sex Crimes

Texas courts have routinely held that an expert witness, such as a child psychologist, may not offer an opinion about the truth of a certain child victim’s specific allegations or about the truth of child victim allegations in general. But they haven’t shut that door completely.

A couple of weeks ago, the 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) reaffirmed the legal principle that:

Expert testimony that a child did not exhibit indications of coaching or manipulation [does] not to constitute an opinion on the child’s truthfulness.

In Cantu v. State, one of the defense theories was that the child victim had been coached by her mother to make false allegations against Appellant. To counter this theory, the State brought an experienced child interviewer from the Advocacy Center to testify that in her expert opinion, the child victim in this case did not exhibit any “red flags” that would indicate that she had been coached or manipulated. The State was careful not to elicit testimony that the victim was being truthful and thus, the conviction was affirmed on appeal.

To me, this is still an area ripe for objections at trial and a special inclusion in the jury charge. You may get a judge that will exclude it. Okay, probably not, but it’s worth a shot. While most lawyers can see the technical difference between an opinion on truthfulness and an opinion on coaching, many jurors will not.

Jan 28
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When the Jury’s Sentence is Outside the Punishment Range

By Jury Trial

Jury Trial Sentencing in Texas

Every level of criminal offense in Texas has a corresponding punishment range for the jury to consider.  With the exception of enhancements or other minor differences, the Texas punishment ranges are as follows:

  • Class B Misdemeanor = 0-180 days County Jail and $0-$2,000 fine
  • Class A Misdemeanor = 0-365 days County Jail and $0-$4,000 fine
  • State Jail Felony = 6 months – 2 years State Jail and $0-$10,000 fine
  • 3rd Degree Felony = 2-10 years Prison and $0-$10,000 fine
  • 2nd Degree Felony = 2-20 years Prison and $0-$10,000 fine
  • 1st Degree Felony = 5-99 years Prison and $0-$10,000 fine

A jury verdict on sentencing should be within the punishment range to the particular offense.  But what happens if the jury deviates from the punishment range?

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District (Amarillo) recently considered this scenario in Melton v. State. In Melton, the defendant was facing 2-20 years and up to a $10,000 fine if convicted.  The jury returned a sentence of 15 years in prison and a $15,000 fine.  Of course, the $15,000 fine was outside the punishment range.

The court of appeals wrestled with the option of remanding the case back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing on BOTH the term of confinement and the fine or the fine only.  Ultimately, the court reasoned:

Article 37.10(b) contemplates that a jury can assess more than one type of punishment, to-wit: “punishment that is authorized by law for the offense and punishment that is not authorized by law for the offense . . . .” Because this statutory provision contemplates the situation where the period of confinement is authorized by law and the amount of the fine is not authorized by law, we conclude the Legislature intended to allow the reformation of a judgment as to the issue of the fine only.

Accordingly, the COA remanded the case back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing on the fine only.  The term of confinement was sustained.

Apr 14
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Warrantless Search: DWI Blood Draw Struck Down as Unconstitutional

By DWI, Warrantless Search

Issue before the Court: “In the absence of exigent circumstances or consent, does Texas Transportation Code §724.012(b)(3)(B) violate the Texas and U.S. constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures where the statute requires law enforcement officers to seize a specimen of a DWI arrestee’s blood without a search warrant in all cases where the officer believes the arrestee has been previously convicted of DWI two or more times?”

Sutherland v. State (2014)- On the night of February 2, 2011, Austin PD Officer Housmans initiated a traffic stop after a vehicle changed lanes without using a turn signal.  Once the vehicle had pulled over, Housmans approached the driver, appellant Sutherland, and, after speaking with him for “a bit,” asked the appellant to step out of the vehicle.  Housmans administered field sobriety tests on appellant, and arrested appellant based on his performance on the tests and on his suspicion that the appellant was driving while intoxicated.  Appellant refused to provide a breath specimen. Dispatch provided Housmans with Texas DPS records showing that appellant had two or more previous convictions for DWI.  The appellant was then transported to the Travis County jail where, ultimately, a blood sample was drawn without appellant’s consent and without a warrant.

Following the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication, appellant pleaded guilty to the charges but reserved his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling.  The appellant appealed his conviction for felony DWI.  The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the procedure and authority under which a sample of his blood was taken without his consent.  Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the results of the testing done on the sample of his blood taken in such a manner.

Housmans claimed that he relied on the provision of the Texas Transportation Code that required him to obtain a sample of a suspect’s blood whenever he learns that the individual has been convicted two or more times of DWI.  Appellant maintained that, regardless of the mandatory language of the Transportation Code, constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures require that a warrantless search be supported by an established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, in this case, the exigent circumstances exception.  Appellant further contended that no established exception-exigent circumstances or otherwise – applied here.

According to the Seventh Court of Appeals- Amarillo, the arresting officer was not faced with exigent circumstances such that the natural dissipation of alcohol from appellant’s bloodstream would support a warrantless seizure of a specimen of appellant’s blood.  The arresting officer did not describe any factors that would suggest he was confronted with an emergency or any unusual delay in securing a warrant.  He testified that he made no effort to obtain a warrant because he believed that the law required that he obtain a blood sample under the circumstances presented to him.  The appellant was not transported to the hospital for medical care, the scene of the traffic stop was not very far from the booking facility, and transportation time was not a factor that could be said to lend to the exigency of the circumstances.  Furthermore, while the unavailability of a magistrate may affect whether an exigency exists to justify a warrantless blood draw, a magistrate is available twenty-four hours a day, every day at the Travis County central booking facility.  Therefore, based on these facts, the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.  Reversed and remanded.

Jan 10
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Reliable Enough for Probable Cause

By Probable Cause

When a probable-cause affidavit describes a “controlled purchase” that was performed by an individual whose credibility or reliability were unknown, is that (or can it be) sufficient to sustain a probable-cause determination?  The Court of Criminal Appeals said YES in Moreno v. State.

Moreno v. State: After receiving a tip from the Clovis, New Mexico Police Department that Appellant, Dimas Moreno, was distributing narcotics from his home, the Lubbock police department orchestrated a controlled purchase of drugs from Appellant. Officers enlisted the help of a confidential informant (“CI”), who was familiar with cocaine deals, to purchase crack cocaine from Appellant. The CI approached an unknowing participant in an effort to purchase the crack cocaine. The individual told the CI that he would go to Appellant’s house to pick up the crack cocaine. Police observed the individual go to Appellant’s house, enter, and exit a few minutes later. The unknowing participant then drove to the predesignated location and delivered the crack cocaine to the CI.

On the basis of these facts, a magistrate issued a warrant to search Appellant’s residence for crack cocaine and any other related contraband. After executing a warrant, police found the drugs and arrested Appellant. Appellant was subsequently charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in an amount of four or more but less than 200 grams. Appellant filed a motion to suppress, challenging the sufficiency of the affidavit. He claimed that there could be no probable cause when an affidavit describes a controlled purchase in which an unidentified individual of unknown credibility and reliability purchased the drugs.

The trial court held a hearing and denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant preserved his right to appeal, pled guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years’ confinement. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit was sufficient because probable cause was based upon police observations rather than upon any statements made by the unknowing participant.

To issue a search warrant, a magistrate must first find probable cause that a particular item will be found in a particular location. The magistrate must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”

In this case, the court of criminal appeals held that the police observations of the controlled purchase and the reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. It was reasonable for the magistrate to infer that the unknowing participant obtained the crack cocaine from Appellant’s house based on “common-sense conclusions about human behavior.” While it was possible that the third party obtained the cocaine from another source, Appellant presented no persuasive argument as to why the magistrate’s inference was unreasonable or whether the unknown participant had a motive to mislead the police. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed.

Search & Seizure Defense Lawyers | Fort Worth, Texas

If you or a loved one were the subject of an unconstitutional and illegal search, seizure, or arrest, please contact us today for a free consultation of your case.

Aug 01
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Use Caution When Arguing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

By Ineffective Assistance

Last week, Justice Quinn of the 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) very thinly masked his disgust in a three-page opinion (designated for publication) aimed at an appellant and his attorney who claimed that the trial defense counsel had been ineffective.  A shot across the bow to other would-be appellate attorneys who might be considering an ineffective assistance challenge, Justice Quinn warns “It ain’t a game folks; it’s real lives we are dealing with.”

The opinion (Nanez v. State) is short enough to read in about two minutes so I won’t reprint much of it, but here is, IMO, the best paragraph:

Counsel is not ineffective simply because he did not do that which his accuser thought he should have done. Nor is he legally deficient simply because some attorney who enjoys the benefit of hindsight and cool reflection would have taken a different tact. Indeed, appellate counsel should not only recognize what is required by law but also use caution when calling someone ineffective. Those before us today should heed that admonishment when next they think about invoking the theory. Unfounded and undeveloped accusations like those uttered at bar needlessly belittle their human target and do little to serve a client’s interests. It “ain’t” a game folks; it’s real lives we are dealing with.

May 24
Love4

Custodial Interrogation or Friendly Chat

By Sex Crimes

As I wait on more slip opinions from the Court of Criminal Appeals, I’ve been randomly sifting through Courts of Appeals opinions. Today, the 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) released a rather concise opinion in an aggravated sexual assault case regarding a “custodial interrogation.” It’s worth an equally concise post.

In McGee v. State, appellant complained, inter alia, that his confession should have been suppressed because he was not given Miranda warning prior to issuing his confession to the police. Unconvinced, the Court of Appeals noted that appellant signed a written document containing Miranda warnings before he began speaking with police officers. The Court went on to state that “even if the warnings afforded appellant were somehow deficient, the record contained sufficient factual basis upon which the trial court could have reasonably found that appellant was not in custody at the time.”

Here are the facts to the Court highlighted to demonstrate that appellant was not “in custody” when he gave his confession:

1) Appellant transported himself to the police station to undergo a polygraph examination and questioning;
2) Questioning occurred in a rather large 15’ by 15’ room;
3) He was never told he was under arrest;
4) He was told he was free to go at any time;
5) No one threatened him;
6) No one restrained him;
7) Those asking the questions and administering the polygraph would have stopped if appellant indicated that he wanted to leave;
8) Appellant was at the station for approximately 2.5 hours before confessing;
9) He had no marks on him to indicate that he underwent any kind of physical abuse;
10) He not only was asked if he wanted to take a break or use the bathroom but also was told that he did not have to be there before the examination began;
11) He left that station after the interview; and
12) Nothing indicates that appellant ever attempted to leave, stop the questioning, take a break, or the like.

It seems to me like the Court if stretching a bit with some of those justifications. With an apparent affinity toward list-making, the Court went on to outline scenarios that would lead them to believe a person was in “custody” and therefore the subject of a vlid “custodial interrogation:”

1) If appellant was physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way;
2) If someone told him he could not leave;
3) If the officers created an environment that would lead a reasonable person to believe his freedom of movement was significantly restricted; or
4) If there existed probable cause to arrest appellant and the officers told him he was not free to leave.

The Court explained, “[h]ad any of those four scenarios arose then appellant would have been in custody, but the evidence before us allowed the trial court of legitimately conclude otherwise.”

Seems simple enough. The problem is with the trial court interpretation of those four maxims.