Skip to main content
Tag

Custodial Interrogation

Feb 09
Love4
Juvenile Statements Child Police Interrogations

The Admissibility of Juvenile Statements When Taken By Police

By Juvenile

Juvenile Statements Child Police InterrogationsThe juvenile justice system in Texas is a hybrid system which incorporates major elements of the adult criminal system, while maintaining separate rules and procedures to ensure that juveniles are not treated or labeled as criminals. In keeping with this philosophy, there are some special rules that apply when police officers take statements from juvenile suspects. This article will explain these rules and when they apply.

Two Types of Juvenile Statements

There are two types of statements: those taken as a result of custodial interrogation and those that are taken without custodial interrogation. There are different rules that apply, depending on which type of statement it is.

Voluntariness of the Statement

Historically in America, confessions have been looked at cautiously. This is because the police interrogation process has always been thought to be coercive by its very nature. The primary concern when viewing a statement given by a suspect is voluntariness. Therefore, no statement can be used in court unless it was voluntarily given. This voluntariness requirement applies to juvenile statements too. For noncustodial statements, voluntariness is the only requirement.

When looking at whether a juvenile statement was voluntary, the courts look at the totality of the circumstances. This means that the court will evaluate the situation including a child’s age, experience, background, education, intelligence, and their capacity to understand their rights and the consequences of waiving them. If, after considering all of the relevant factors in a particular case, the court determines that a noncustodial juvenile statement was voluntary, then it will be admissible in court against that juvenile.

Custodial Interrogation

A police officer that takes a juvenile’s statement as a result of custodial interrogation must not only ensure that the statement was voluntarily given, but also must comply with specific rules set out in the Texas Family Code. But first, you must ask two threshold questions: (1) Was the juvenile in custody? and (2) Was the juvenile being interrogated?

(1) Was the Juvenile in Custody?

Texas Family Code Section 51.095(d) considers a child to be in custody if he is in a juvenile detention facility, is in the custody of a police officer, or if he is in CPS custody and suspected of engaging in delinquent conduct. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided that “in custody” means when a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would believe that his freedom was restricted to the point of a formal arrest. See Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The Texas courts use a “reasonable innocent child” standard when looking at juvenile cases. See In the Matter of L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999). Juveniles are not in custody, in the eyes of the Texas courts, when they are told by police that they are not in custody and are free to leave and at the end of the interview they are actually allowed to leave. See In the Matter of V.M.D., 974 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998).

(2) Was the Juvenile Being Interrogated?

If a child is in custody at the time a statement is taken, then you must look to see if the statement was the result of interrogation. The United States Supreme Court ruled that interrogation includes any questioning by a police officer and any speech or actions that are reasonably likely to get an incriminating response. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).

Special Rules for Custodial Interrogation Written Statements

If a child is in custody and interrogated, then special rules must be followed before his written statement will be admissible in court. These rules are laid out in Texas Family Code Section 51.095(a)(1).

  • Before a juvenile in custody is interrogated, he must first be taken to a magistrate. The magistrate must advise the juvenile of his rights without the police officer being present.
  • After being warned of his rights and agreeing to waive them in front of a magistrate, the child can then be questioned by the police officer outside of the magistrate’s presence.
  • He can write a statement if he chooses. Before the juvenile signs his statement, however, he must be taken back in front of the magistrate.
  • Without the police officer being present, the magistrate will review the statement with the child and determine if he understands the statement, voluntarily gave it, and voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights.
  • Once the magistrate makes these determinations, the child can sign his statement in front of the magistrate.

Special Rules for Custodial Interrogation Oral Statements

The rules for making a juvenile’s custodial interrogation oral statement admissible in court are enumerated in Texas Family Code Section 51.095(a)(5).

  • The statement must be recorded by an electronic recording device by an operator who is competent to use the device.
  • All voices on the recording must be identified.
  • The recording device must be capable of making an accurate recording.
  • The recording of the child’s statement must be accurate and unaltered.
  • Before the child gives the statement, the recording must show the magistrate giving the juvenile his warnings and the juvenile must waive each right on the recording.
  • The magistrate may request that the police officer, after the interrogation is finished, bring the child and the recording back to the magistrate so the magistrate can review the recording with the child to ensure the statement was voluntarily given.

Exceptions for Oral Statements

Texas Family Code Section 51.095(a)(2)-(4) lays out the exceptions to the requirements for oral statements made while a juvenile is the subject of custodial interrogation. If any of these exceptions applies, then the special rules for oral statements listed above do not have to be complied with. These exceptions are: statements of fact made by the juvenile which are found to be true and tend to establish his guilt, res gestae statements, and statements made in open court or before a grand jury.

Conclusion

The juvenile system in Texas is intentionally separate and distinct from the adult criminal system in order to prevent treating children as if they are miniature criminals. Likewise, there are special rules that apply in some circumstances when a police officer takes a statement from a juvenile suspect. If a juvenile gives a statement without being the subject of custodial interrogation, then the courts will look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if that statement was given voluntarily. If so, then it will be admissible in court against the juvenile. If, however, the child was in custody and subject to interrogation, then these special rules must be followed in order for the statement to be admissible. These rules involve taking the child before a magistrate to be informed of his rights as opposed to being warned by the police officer. If these rules are violated, then the statement will be deemed to be inadmissible.

Feb 17
Love0

Just Saying an Interrogation is “Non-Custodial” Doesn’t Make it So

By Miranda

United States v. Cavazos is a case out of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (Federal).  It involves an interlocutory appeal by the government after the trial court (U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas) suppressed incriminating statements made by the accused prior to receiving his Miranda warnings.

Here’s what happened:  Federal agents executed a warrant on the defendant’s home between 5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. searching for evidence that he had sent sexually explicit material to a minor female.  Approximately fourteen agents and officers (that’s right, 14 agents and officers!) entered the residence and handcuffed the defendant as he was getting out of bed.  After the home was secured, agents removed the handcuffs and took the defendant to a bedroom for an interview.  Agents told the defendant that it was a “non-custodial” interview, that he was free to get something to eat and drink during it, and that he was free to use the bathroom (they curiously left out the part about him being free to leave and free to not answer their questions and free to seek the advice of counsel, hmmm…).  The agents then began questioning the defendant without reading him his Miranda rights.  The defendant admitted that he had been “sexting” the victim and he described communications he had been having with other minor females.

At trial, the judge granted the defense motion to suppress the defendant’s statements made to the officers during this interrogation.  The trial judge ruled that even though the officers told the defendant that the interrogation was “non-custodial,” the facts of the case proved otherwise.

On appeal, the 5th Circuit affirmed the trial court and held that the defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation when the agents questioned him in his home.  As a result, the incriminating statements made by the defendant were properly suppressed.

A suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes when placed under formal arrest or when a there is a restraint on his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest, even when there is no arrest.  The key question is under the circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.  Here, the court said no.  First, fourteen agents entered the defendant’s home, in the early morning, without his consent.  Second, although the defendant was free to use the bathroom or get a snack, when he did, he was followed by the agents and closely monitored.  Third, although the defendant was allowed to use a telephone to call his brother, the agents had him position the phone so they could listen to the conversation.  This indicated the agents’ control over the defendant while implying that he had no privacy.  While the agents told the defendant the interview was “non-custodial,” such a statement made to a reasonable lay-person is not the same as telling him that he can terminate the interrogation and leave. Also, such a statement, made in a person’s home does not have the same effect as if the agents had offered to leave at any time upon request.

Overzealous agents and officers always make for good caselaw.

May 24
Love4

Custodial Interrogation or Friendly Chat

By Sex Crimes

As I wait on more slip opinions from the Court of Criminal Appeals, I’ve been randomly sifting through Courts of Appeals opinions. Today, the 7th District Court of Appeals (Amarillo) released a rather concise opinion in an aggravated sexual assault case regarding a “custodial interrogation.” It’s worth an equally concise post.

In McGee v. State, appellant complained, inter alia, that his confession should have been suppressed because he was not given Miranda warning prior to issuing his confession to the police. Unconvinced, the Court of Appeals noted that appellant signed a written document containing Miranda warnings before he began speaking with police officers. The Court went on to state that “even if the warnings afforded appellant were somehow deficient, the record contained sufficient factual basis upon which the trial court could have reasonably found that appellant was not in custody at the time.”

Here are the facts to the Court highlighted to demonstrate that appellant was not “in custody” when he gave his confession:

1) Appellant transported himself to the police station to undergo a polygraph examination and questioning;
2) Questioning occurred in a rather large 15’ by 15’ room;
3) He was never told he was under arrest;
4) He was told he was free to go at any time;
5) No one threatened him;
6) No one restrained him;
7) Those asking the questions and administering the polygraph would have stopped if appellant indicated that he wanted to leave;
8) Appellant was at the station for approximately 2.5 hours before confessing;
9) He had no marks on him to indicate that he underwent any kind of physical abuse;
10) He not only was asked if he wanted to take a break or use the bathroom but also was told that he did not have to be there before the examination began;
11) He left that station after the interview; and
12) Nothing indicates that appellant ever attempted to leave, stop the questioning, take a break, or the like.

It seems to me like the Court if stretching a bit with some of those justifications. With an apparent affinity toward list-making, the Court went on to outline scenarios that would lead them to believe a person was in “custody” and therefore the subject of a vlid “custodial interrogation:”

1) If appellant was physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way;
2) If someone told him he could not leave;
3) If the officers created an environment that would lead a reasonable person to believe his freedom of movement was significantly restricted; or
4) If there existed probable cause to arrest appellant and the officers told him he was not free to leave.

The Court explained, “[h]ad any of those four scenarios arose then appellant would have been in custody, but the evidence before us allowed the trial court of legitimately conclude otherwise.”

Seems simple enough. The problem is with the trial court interpretation of those four maxims.

Mar 04
Love0
Texas Consensual Police Encounter Law

Perpetuating the Fiction of the Consensual Police Encounter

By Consensual Encounter, Criminal Defense

Is there really such a thing as a Consensual Police Encounter that ends with an arrest?

Texas Consensual Police Encounter LawIn a case released yesterday from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (State v. Castleberry), the CCA went to great lengths to defend and perpetuate the fiction of the consensual police encounter.

In Castleberry, the defendant and a friend were walking behind an Uncle Julio’s restaurant in Dallas. They were not engaged in and did not appear likely to engage in criminal conduct. A Dallas police officer approached them and asked for identification. The defendant reached for his waistband. The police officer then ordered appellant to place his hands in the air. The defendant grabbed a baggy of cocaine from his waistband and tossed it on the ground. The trial court suppressed the cocaine, reasoning that the officer did not have “reasonable suspicion” to justify the stop. The 5th District Court of Appeals agreed.

The CCA, on the other hand, held that the lower courts applied the wrong legal standard and characterized the stop as a consensual police encounter. Writing for the majority, Judge Keasler, stated:

Even if the officer did not tell the citizen that the request for identification or information may be ignored, the fact that a citizen complied with the request does not negate the consensual nature of the encounter…We conclude that a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position would have felt free to decline [the officer’s] request for identification and information.

The obvious question then becomes, what would the CCA preferred the defendant to do? “No, thanks officer, I prefer not to provide any identification or tell you what I am doing. Thank you. Have a nice night.” Had the appellant said that, there is no doubt the court would now be using his noncompliance to justify a more intrusive search. There is absolutely no way for the defendant to win here.

The opinion goes on to suggest police officers (even when they are in uniform) are just like any average citizen.

Because an officer is just as free as anyone to question, and request identification from, a fellow citizen, [the officer’s]conduct shows that the interaction was a consensual encounter.

Ultimately, the CCA reasons that because the defendant could have been reaching for a weapon when he reached into his waistband, the officer’s further pat-down search was justified under Terry.

The CCA concludes:

The Court of Appeals failed to separate [the encounter] into two distinct parts: (1) [The officer’s] initial approach of [the defendant], which was a consensual encounter; and (2) [The defendant’s] act of reaching for his waistband, which provided [the officer] with reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk [the defendant]. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’s judgment, hold the seized contraband to be admissible, and remand the cause to the trial court.