Tag

Sex Crimes Archives | Page 4 of 4 | Fort Worth Criminal Defense, Personal Injury, and Family Law

An Improper Jury Instruction Matters Not

By | Jury Trial

Texas Jury InstructionIt seems like all I write about anymore is the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing a Court of Appeals case and siding with the State. Well, this post is no different.

In Taylor v. State, the appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to 70 years confinement and a $10,000 fine for each offense. Much of the testimony at trial, however, related to acts appellant committed while he was a minor. The evidence showed that appellant began sexually abusing a young girl when he was 13 years old and she was 8. The abuse continued for several years, the final occurrence happening when appellant was 20 years old and the victim was 15.

Texas Penal Code Section 8.07(b) provides that unless a juvenile court waives (or has previously waived) jurisdiction and certifies an individual for criminal prosecution, “a person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense committed before reaching 17 years of age.”  Accordingly, while evidence was admitted at trial regarding appellant’s acts before he turned 17, he can only be convicted of those acts that occurred after he was 17.

The trial court failed to instruct the jury of this requirement and the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal, appellant argued that the jury charges were erroneous because they did not limit the jury’s consideration to evidence of acts committed after he turned 17. The 1st Court of Appeals (Houston) held that the Court was required to instruct the jury that appellant could not be convicted of criminal acts committed before he turned 17, and that appellant was denied a fair and impartial trial as a result. The Court of Appeals reversed the case.

The CCA now reverses the Court of Appeals. It agrees with the Court of Appeals that the instruction should have been given to the jury, even if neither party requested the instruction. But the CCA held, nonetheless, that the error did not deprive appellant of a fair and impartial trial. The CCA states:

Here, the error was the omission of an instruction, rather than the presentation to the jury of an erroneous instruction…[T]he jury in this case could have convicted Appellant based upon evidence presented, even if the proper instruction had been given and Appellant’s pre-seventeen acts were disregarded by the jury. The evidence showed an eight-year pattern of escalating sexual abuse of J.G. by Appellant. Appellant turned 17 years old midway through the abusive period, meaning that he is subject to prosecution for his conduct beginning on that birthday…and evidence of molestation that occurred after that date was introduced at trial.

So, basically the CCA is saying – “We don’t know from the face of the record exactly which instances of abuse the jury believed, and we can’t say with 100% certainty that they believed any of the instances after appellant was 17, but we know they definitely believed something happened at some time.”

The CCA ultimately concludes that Appellant was not denied a fair and impartial trial. My question is – “How do we know that?” I realize that appellant said he didn’t commit any of the alleged acts and I also realize that the jury, by their verdict, believed that he did.  But how do we know that the jury didn’t conclude that the appellant was guilty of only those acts that occurred when he was a minor?  We don’t.

Barshaw v. State 2010

A Simple Truth: Sexual Assault Conviction Reversed for Improper Expert Testimony

By | Sex Crimes

Barshaw v. State 2010It’s been my experience that folks with mental retardation can be painfully honest, really.  I mean, it’s like a little kid who looks at somebody and says in the supermarket, ‘You’re really old,’ or, you know, whatever little kids do.

That was part of the testimony of an MHMR expert at the sexual assault trial of Mark Barshaw.  Barshaw was accused of sexually assaulting a mentally retarded victim, who was 21 years-old at the time, but functioned at approximately a 10 year-old level.  Upon hearing this testimony, the defense counsel objected, “You can’t have somebody come in and testify to a class of people are truthful.”  The State responded by stating that it was simply trying to show how mentally retarded persons “adapt” and that the testimony also went to show that “she’s incapable of either appraising the the situation or the nature of the act.”  The trial judge allowed the testimony to continue.

…again, it’s been my experience in the hundreds and hundreds of people with mental retardation that I’ve seen, that it’s more going to be that they’re painfully honest.  They haven’t learned the social skills and probably never will to know when you should lie or when it would be socially appropriate to not tell the truth because it might hurt someone’s feelings, or things of that nature, to hold things back.

In allowing the testimony of the MHMR expert, the trial judge abused its discretion, said the 3rd District Court of Appeals (Austin).  The Court explained that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that evidence rule 702 “does not permit an expert to give an opinion that the complainant or a class of persons to which the complainant belongs is truthful.”  Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  Such an expert, is essentially telling the jury that they can believe the victim in the instant case.  This, held the CCA, “is not ‘expert’ testimony of the kind which will assist the jury under rule 702.”  Id. at 711.

The Court also cited the CCA case Schutz v. State.  957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).  In Schutz, the CCA explained that:

children and mentally retarded persons are viewed by society as “impaired.” When such a witness is expected to testify, expert testimony should be permitted in the offering party’s case in chief concerning the ability of the class of persons suffering the “impairment” to distinguish reality from fantasy and to perceive, remember, and relate the kinds of events at issue in the case.  The court emphasized that such testimony should be limited to the “impaired” class’s ability to accurately relate events and should not extend to the class’s tendency to do so; the latter would violate the holding in Yount.

Id. at 70 (emphasis added).  Having violated the CCA holdings in Yount and Schutz by allowing the expert to testify that mentally retarded persons are, as a class, truthful, the Court found harm and reversed the sexual assault conviction.

Justice Henson dissented and would have held that there was no harm in the trial judge’s erroneous ruling.