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Feb 04
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When Should You Fight Traffic Offenses

By Traffic Offenses

If you’re reading this, odds are that you’ve been ticketed for one or more traffic offenses at some point in your life.  Among the ticket-receiving public, misconceptions and misunderstandings abound regarding whether you should “fight” a ticket. Below is some advice from a former municipal prosecutor in the Dallas Fort Worth metroplex…

1) It is unlikely that you can just “talk to a prosecutor” and get your ticket dismissed.
Two to three times a week, most courts hold conferences between the prosecutor and citizens who have violated traffic offenses. During these conferences, most people go to the prosecutor immediately to ask for a dismissal on their citation. I would venture to say that in a metropolitan area, a municipal prosecutor gets asked for a dismissal between 25-50 times per week. Starting your conversation off with a prosecutor by asking for a dismissal is the least effective approach for negotiating a favorable result. The concept of a dismissal is WIDELY misunderstood and the bottom line is that dismissals are rare.

2) Instead of demanding your dismissal, start by pointing out legitimate issues with your ticket.
There are legitimate issues with citations. Those issues can result in dismissals. But for every one legitimate issue, there are one-hundred ridiculous excuses. A municipal prosecutor has heard them all and there is a really good chance that the prosecutor has heard your specific excuse many, many times. Most of the time, people come go to court with an assumption about the law and they hang on to it with everything they are worth. Do some research before coming to court to determine whether you have a “legitimate issue” or just “another excuse”. Whether that means consulting with an attorney or jumping onto Google, come to court with a little research and you may actually put the prosecutor in a better mood.

3) Document your defense.
If you have documentation (especially on vehicle equipment issues, inspections, registrations, licenses, and insurance), bring it to court and have it ORGANIZED and ready for the prosecutor to look at. If there is some legitimate discrepancy between the status of your vehicle or license (on the date of the citation) and the citation you received you might actually get that all-elusive dismissal, but you had better have documentation to support your defense.

4) “Fine, I’ll take it to trial.”
It’s got a nice ring to it, but the reality of a trial is that most cases will come down to the officer’s testimony versus the defendant’s testimony. More than likely, the officer will testify that he’s been an officer for multiple years, been through training and education specifically for observing and enforcing traffic violations. He’ll also testify that he spends 90% of his 8-10 hour shift in and amongst traffic observing traffic and that he was focused solely on looking for your vehicle violating a traffic law. Meanwhile, you’ll testify (if you choose to testify) that you’re number one priority was not following the traffic laws (I dare you to say that it was), but that you were on the way to work, dropping kids off at school, going to the grocery store or had some other objective in mind. The bottom line with trial: The officer will testify that he observed you commit a traffic violation and you’ll testify you didn’t and the judge or jury will decide who they believe.

5) If you really want a chance…
..hire an attorney. He or she will analyze your citation based on current law and the rules of evidence and procedure and not just based on what you heard from your neighbor’s friend’s ex boyfriend. Ultimately, you may decide that hiring an attorney would cost more than it is worth, but it you really want a fighting chance, you should hire an attorney.

Feb 03
Love0

Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty

By Death Penalty

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court determined that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment bars the execution of mentally retarded persons. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

The Court reasoned that neither retribution nor deterrence could be achieved by executing mentally retarded persons and that, because mentally retarded persons have a reduced ability to participate in their own defense, there is an enhanced risk that they would be sentenced to death unnecessarily.  However, the Supreme Court left it to the individual states to determine which offenders fit the definition of “mental retardation,” in order to enforce this constitutional restriction.

In Ex Parte Briseno, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals established non-mandatory guidelines to determine “that level and degree of mental retardation at which a consensus of Texas citizens would agree that a person should be exempted from the death penalty.” 135 S.W. 3d 1 (2004).  If an offender meets the definition of mental retardation, then the guidelines are designed to consider some more subjective criteria. The definition of mental retardation that the CCA adopted was:

(1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, generally shown by an IQ of 70 or less, (2) accompanied by related limitations in adaptive functioning, (3) the onset of which occurs prior to the age of 18.

If a person meets that definition, the following guidelines were designed to help factfinders in criminal trials focus upon weighing the evidence as indicative of mental retardation or of a personality disorder:

  • Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage – his family, friends, teachers, employers, and authorities – think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, did they act in accordance with the determination?
  • Has the person formulated plans and carried them through, or is his conduct impulsive?
  • Does his conduct show leadership, or does it show that he is led around by others?
  • Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?
  • Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions, or do his responses wander from subject to subject?
  • Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?
  • Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?

The CCA cautioned that these factors should not be considered in isolation, but rather in the context of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in the Atkins decision.

In 2012, the CCA considered a capital murder habeas case (Ex Parte Sosa) wherein the applicant alleged that he was mentally retarded at the time of the offense.  The habeas court found that the applicant established mental retardation.  The CCA cited some inconsistencies and ultimately remanded the case back to the convicting court for the judge gather more information and consider the Briseno factors in determining whether the applicant was (or is) indeed mentally retarded.

This is an interesting area of law to me.  I’ve had the occasion to dig into some literature on autism, and at first glance it would seem that some autistic indviduals (those that are higher on the spectrum) might satisfy the factors laid out by the CCA.  Of course, the Briseno and Atkins cases deal only with the death penalty and capital punishment, but as far as retribution and deterrence go, this could be good extenuation and mitigation evidence for the factfinder to consider in other cases as well.

Feb 02
Love2

Unanimous Verdict Not Required for Continuous Family Violence

By Domestic Violence

Domestic Violence Case Law Update.  Continuous Family Violence.

Except for the military context, you’ve always heard that a jury verdict must be unanimous, right?  Well, not exactly.

Recently, the Sixth Court of Appeals (Texarkana) held that a jury does not have to unanimously agree upon which assaults occurred in order to convict a defendant for Continuous Family Violence, as long as the jury agrees that the defendant committed at least two assaults within the time allotted by statute. Under section 25.11 of the Texas Penal Code, a person who assaults a family member two or more times within twelve months commits Continuous Family Violence. The relevant statutes provides:

(a) A person commits an offense if, during a period that is 12 months or less in duration, the person two or more times engages in conduct that constitutes an offense under Section 22.01(a)(1) against another person or persons whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by Section 71. 0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005, Family Code.

(b) If the jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on the specific conduct in which the defendant engaged that constituted an offense under Section 22.01(a)(1) against the person or persons described by Subsection (a) or the exact date when that conduct occurred. The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 12 months or less in duration, two or more times engaged in conduct that constituted an offense under Section 22.01(a)(1) against the person or persons described by Subsection (a).

In Hill v. State, the appellant was charged with Continuous Family Violence after the State alleged that the appellant assaulted his girlfriend three times on two different dates within a twelve-month period. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and on appeal, the appellant contended that the trial court erred when it did not instruct the jury that in order to convict, the jury must unanimously agree upon which assaults transpired. Thus, of the possible assaults that may have happened, the appellant argued that some of the jurors cannot find sufficient evidence for one assault and the other jurors find sufficient evidence for another because “it is axiomatic that Texas law requires a unanimous verdict in a felony case.”

Nevertheless, the Court rejected this reasoning. The State advocated following the way of the Continuous Sexual Abuse statute and allow jurors to not unanimously agree on which assaults occurred, so long as the jury agrees beyond a reasonable doubt that at least two assaults did occur within twelve months of each other. Adopting this rationale, the Court ultimately held, “In the circumstances of construing the statute under examination here, it is sufficient to allow a jury to select from a menu of possible bad acts and agree that a defendant committed two of them without the concomitant requirement that the jurors be shown to all concur as to which of the acts did occur.”

As such, as long as a jury unanimously agrees that a defendant assaulted a family member at least twice within twelve months, it does not need to agree upon which assaults actually occurred.  (Note: this same logic applies to continuous sexual abuse cases as well.)

Jan 28
Love0

When the Jury’s Sentence is Outside the Punishment Range

By Jury Trial

Jury Trial Sentencing in Texas

Every level of criminal offense in Texas has a corresponding punishment range for the jury to consider.  With the exception of enhancements or other minor differences, the Texas punishment ranges are as follows:

  • Class B Misdemeanor = 0-180 days County Jail and $0-$2,000 fine
  • Class A Misdemeanor = 0-365 days County Jail and $0-$4,000 fine
  • State Jail Felony = 6 months – 2 years State Jail and $0-$10,000 fine
  • 3rd Degree Felony = 2-10 years Prison and $0-$10,000 fine
  • 2nd Degree Felony = 2-20 years Prison and $0-$10,000 fine
  • 1st Degree Felony = 5-99 years Prison and $0-$10,000 fine

A jury verdict on sentencing should be within the punishment range to the particular offense.  But what happens if the jury deviates from the punishment range?

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District (Amarillo) recently considered this scenario in Melton v. State. In Melton, the defendant was facing 2-20 years and up to a $10,000 fine if convicted.  The jury returned a sentence of 15 years in prison and a $15,000 fine.  Of course, the $15,000 fine was outside the punishment range.

The court of appeals wrestled with the option of remanding the case back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing on BOTH the term of confinement and the fine or the fine only.  Ultimately, the court reasoned:

Article 37.10(b) contemplates that a jury can assess more than one type of punishment, to-wit: “punishment that is authorized by law for the offense and punishment that is not authorized by law for the offense . . . .” Because this statutory provision contemplates the situation where the period of confinement is authorized by law and the amount of the fine is not authorized by law, we conclude the Legislature intended to allow the reformation of a judgment as to the issue of the fine only.

Accordingly, the COA remanded the case back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing on the fine only.  The term of confinement was sustained.

Jan 27
Love0

DWI: Is Passing on the Shoulder Evidence of a Traffic Offense?

By DWI

DWI Conviction Overturned | Passing on the Shoulder Permitted in Certain Circumstances

In many ways, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also acts the State’s highest traffic court. What follows is a synopsis of Lothrop v. State, wherein the CCA opines on the legality of using the right shoulder of a road to pass a slower vehicle.

In Lothrop, the police stopped Appellant after observing him use the right shoulder of the road to pass a vehicle that was slowing down.  Appellant was later arrested for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). At trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence gained from the stop, arguing that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Appellant pointed to Section 545.058(a) of the Texas Transportation Code, which provides:

(a) An operator may drive on an improved shoulder to the right of the main traveled portion of a roadway of that operation is necessary and may be done safely, but only:

(1) to stop, stand, or park;

(2) to accelerate before entering the main traveled lane of traffic;

(3) to decelerate before making a right turn;

(4) to pass another vehicle that is slowing or stopped on the main traveled portion of the highway, disabled, or preparing to make a left turn;

(5) to allow another vehicle traveling faster to pass;

(6) as permitted or required by an official traffic-control device; or

(7) to avoid a collision.

The trial court denied the motion and Appellant pled guilty to DWI. The 2nd Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed the conviction, holding that “driving on an improved shoulder, regardless of circumstance, is prima facie evidence of an offense, and that Section 545.058(a) merely establishes defenses that a defendant may raise at trial.”

Think again, said the Traffic Court (a.k.a. CCA):

[T]he offense of illegally driving on an improved shoulder can be proved in one of two ways: either driving on the improved shoulder was not a necessary part of achieving one of the seven approved purposes, or driving on an improved shoulder could not have been done safely. Merely driving on an improved shoulder is not prima facie evidence of an offense. Thus if an officer sees a driver driving on an improved shoulder, and it appears that driving on the improved shoulder was necessary to achieving one of the seven approved purposes, and it is done safely, that officer does not have reasonable suspicion that an offense occurred.

With that, the CCA reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court.   So there you have it – your traffic lesson for today from the CCA. You are free to drive on the improved shoulder of the road (without worrying that you will be pulled over) IF you are doing it safely and for one of the seven listed purposes.

Jan 26
Love0

The Genius of Specialty Courts

By Specialty Courts

As I’m sure you’ve noticed by now, specialty courts (drug courts, DWI courts, Mental health courts, reentry courts, etc.) are rapidly becoming the norm in most criminal jurisdictions.  Why the increase in popularity?  Simple.  They work.

The National Association of Drug Court Professionals’ website cites the five primary goals these programs are working to achieve.

1) They reduce crime
2) They save money
3) They ensure compliance
4) They combat addiction
5) They restore families

Incarcerating addicts only delays their inevitable addiction cycle.  Specialty courts offer a real, life-changing alternative that not only aid individuals in their battle against addiction, but also improve the crime rates in every community in which they exist.  These specialty courts work to provide intense supervision through the cooperative efforts of local probation offices, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and, most importantly, judges. Read more about drug courts.

If you haven’t researched specialty courts in your jurisdiction, I’d highly encourage you to do so immediately.  These programs could offer an incredible opportunity that may not have been available before.  Let’s hope specialty courts continue to gain traction, and that more specialty court keep popping up throughout Texas.  It is important to remember that the criminal justice system is not always about punishment, it’s also about rehabilitation.

Jan 22
Love0

Attenuating of the Taint of Unlawful Police Conduct in Drug Crimes

By Drug Crimes

In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court identified three factors that courts should consider when determining whether the taint of an unlawful arrest was attenuated prior to obtaining a confession:

1. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession;
2. The presence of intervening circumstances; and
3. The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct (in making the arrest).

In May of 2012, in State v Mazuca, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the proper application of the “attenuation of taint doctrine,” not to a confession, as in Brown, but to contraband that is seized immediately following an unconstitutional detention or arrest.  The question presented was this:

Will the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant in the relatively few moments that ensue between the illegal stop and the seizure of the contraband invariably serve as an intervening event sufficient to purge the taint of the primary illegality?

In Mazuca, an El Paso police officer stopped the car in which appellee was a passenger because the officer believed he saw white light (rather than red) emitting from the tail lights.  Photos at trial would later prove that the tail lights were indeed red and that the car was not in violation of the Texas Transportation Code.  During the stop, the officer requested to see appellee’s driver’s license, and quickly learned that appellee had outstanding warrants.  During the course of the stop (after learning about the warrants) the officer seized both ecstasy and marijuana from appellee.  Appellee moved to suppress the contraband as the fruits of an illegal search.  The trial court granted the motion, making, inter alia, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The driver of the Mustang did not violate Section 547.322 of the Transportation Code on December 11, 2008.
2. The Police Officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to perform a traffic stop on that date.
3. The arrest warrants of the Defendant did not purge the taint of the illegal stop due to the flagrancy of the police action, the close temporal proximity and the fact that no Miranda warnings were read.

The 8th Court of Appeals (El Paso) affirmed.  The CCA considered the Supreme Court precedent, as well as the Texas Court of Appeals opinions in coming up with the rule below:

When police find and seize physical evidence shortly after an illegal stop, in the absence of the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant in between, that physical evidence should ordinarily be suppressed, even if the police misconduct is not highly purposeful or flagrantly abusive of Fourth Amendment rights. Under this scenario, temporal proximity is the paramount factor. But when an outstanding arrest warrant is discovered between the illegal stop and the seizure of physical evidence, the importance of the temporal proximity factor decreases. Under this scenario, the intervening circumstance is a necessary but never, by itself, wholly determinative factor in the attenuation calculation, and the purposefulness and/or flagrancy of the police misconduct, vel non, becomes of vital importance.

While the rule sounds simple enough, the CCA’s application of the rule to the facts of the case is a bit troubling.  The CCA reversed the Court of Appeals, and held that…

[T]he behavior of the arresting officers, although clearly unlawful at the outset, was not so particularly purposeful and flagrant that the discovery of the appellee’s outstanding arrest warrants may not serve to break the causal connection between the illegal stop and the discovery of the ecstasy in the appellee’s pants pocket, thus purging the primary taint.  We hold that the trial court erred to conclude otherwise.

The opinion in this case seems a logically disconnected from the ultimate outcome. Apparently, some of the judges agree.  Here’s what Judge Meyers had to say in his dissenting opinion:

The result fashioned by the majority opens the door for police to ignore the probable cause requirement and make traffic stops without adequate grounds for doing so.  The majority’s analysis of the weight of the Brown factors may be correct, but the result discounts the trial court’s findings as to the credibility of the officers.

Judge Johnson dissented as well, writing:

I would hold that the court of appeals correctly recognized that, without the highly improper traffic stop, the officers could not have learned appellee’s name, found active warrants, or searched him and recovered contraband, all fruits of the poisonous tree.  We, like the court of appeals, should “afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of historical facts that are supported by the record, particularly when such findings are based on an evaluation of witnesses’ credibility and demeanor” and affirm its suppression of the evidence that was obtained because of the improper traffic stop.  I respectfully dissent.

If you were the subject on an unlawful arrest on a drug crimes case, contact the Fort Worth, Texas drug crimes defense lawyers at Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC today.  (817) 993-9249.

Jan 18
Love10
Sharen Wilson Tarrant County District Attorney

Tarrant County District Attorney Sharen Wilson Oversees all Fort Worth Prosecutors

By Criminal Defense

Tarrant County District Attorney Sharen Wilson

Sharen Wilson Tarrant County District Attorney

Sharen Wilson, who took office in 2015, is the elected Tarrant County District Attorney. She is the top of all Fort Worth prosecutors, managing a large office of Assistant District Attorneys, investigators, support staff, and even a therapy dog.  Prior to assuming her new role as the Tarrant County District Attorney, Sharen Wilson presided over Criminal District Court Number 1 as a District Judge.  Her office receives cases from the various police departments across Tarrant County, investigates the cases, and files misdemeanor or felony criminal cases.  The Assistant District Attorneys under Sharen Wilson present cases to grand juries and manage dockets in the 20 Tarrant County criminal courts and the Courts of Appeals.  If you are interested in observing a criminal trial in Tarrant County, check out the Tarrant County Trial Board for a list of cases each week.

Fort Worth Prosecutors | Tarrant County DA

The Tarrant County District Attorney office has over 150 Fort Worth prosecutors and over 50 investigators. The office has a budget of $38 million dedicated to criminal prosecutions and investigations in Tarrant County.  Colloquially, every Assistant District Attorney is referred to as a “Tarrant County DA” or “prosecutor,” but the ultimate authority over criminal prosecutions is retained by Sharen Wilson.  Fort Worth prosecutors are known across the state as fair and collegial attorneys.  They have a reputation for taking a fair look at each case and providing all available information to the defense bar in a timely manner.  Although the Tarrant County District Attorney office is one of the largest in the state, in one of the largest counties in the state, the office and its staff carry themselves with small-town values.  While each criminal case is different and may have its own challenges, our criminal defense attorneys have always been satisfied with the professionalism of the Tarrant County DA office.

Free Consultation of Tarrant County Criminal Cases

Our Fort Worth criminal defense attorneys square off every day with the Tarrant County DA office. We have a proven track record of favorable results for our clients. We understand that every case and every client are different. We take a personal approach to every client and pursue every option to address our clients’ individual needs. For a FREE consultation of your Tarrant County criminal case, contact our team at (817) 993-9249.

Jan 16
Love0

Is That Your Final Answer? Double Jeopardy and Partial Verdicts

By Double Jeopardy

United States Supreme Court case highlight: Blueford v. Arkansas

The case dealt with the double jeopardy clause and whether it applies to partial or informal verdicts.

In Blueford, the defendant was being tried for capital murder.  The trial judge instructed the jury that if it did not find the defendant guilty of capital murder, it should consider the lesser included offense of first degree murder.  The court further instructed that if the jury did not find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it should consider manslaughter…and so on and so forth.  After several hours of deliberations, the jury reported that it could not reach a unanimous verdict.  The judge inquired into how the voting was going and the jury reported that it had decided that the defendant was not guilty of capital murder or first degree murder, but that it could not agree on manslaughter.  The judge instructed the jury to go back and keep trying, but they were unable to break the impasse.  Accordingly, the trial judge declared a mistrial.

During the retrial for the same offense, the defendant objected on double jeopardy grounds to the charge of capital murder, arguing that the jury’s informal verdict that he was not guilty of capital or first degree murder precluded him being retried for that same charge at a later trial.  The trial court disagreed, as did the appellate courts.

In a 6-3 opinion (Majority: Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito), the Supreme Court held that :

The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrying Blueford on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder.  The jury did not acquit Blueford of capital or first-degree murder.  Blueford contends that the foreperson’s report that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the murder offenses represented a resolution of some or all of the elements of those offenses in his favor.   But the report was not a final resolution of anything.  When the foreperson told the court how the jury had voted on each offense, the jury’s deliberations had not yet concluded.  The jurors in fact went back to the jury room to deliberate further, and nothing in the court’s instructions prohibited them from reconsidering their votes on capital and first-degree murder as deliberations continued.  The foreperson’s report prior to the end of deliberations therefore lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses.  That same lack of finality undermines Blueford’s reliance on Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, and Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323.  In both of those cases, the verdict of the jury was a final decision; here, the report of the foreperson was not.

This holding appears to be consistent with Texas law, in that a jury foreperson must sign a verdict form and the court must accept the verdict, before it is given any legal significance.

Justices Sotomayer dissented (joined by Ginsberg and Kagan), and would hold that partial verdicts should be required before a mistrial is granted on the grounds of a deadlock.

Jan 09
Love0

How Court-Appointed Defense Lawyers are Like Drill Instructors

By Indigent Defense

I’ll never forget something I heard back when I was going through Marine Corps Officer Candidate’s School.  After somebody said “thank you” to a Drill Instructor, the Drill Instructor looked at the person (in a way only a Drill Instructor can) and responded “Don’t thank me.  The government thanks me every two weeks!”

I felt a little like my former Drill Instructor recently as I was talking to a couple of my court-appointed clients.  For court-appointed cases, the county pays me to represent indigent defendants.  This doesn’t mean that I have any obligation to help the county move cases or plead my clients guilty.  My only loyalty is to my client, regardless of who is paying the bill.

However, on two separate occasions last week, a court-appointed client offered to give me a little cash if I could help them get a better deal.  Like my former Drill Instructor, I did my best to explain there is no need to give me anything.  You’ll get my very best even though the county is footing the bill.

Misconceptions abound when a defendant spends any amount of time in jail.  The jailhouse lawyers love dispensing their “legal knowledge.”  One of the first “CLE’s” that the jailhouse lawyers hold is the primer on court-appointed lawyers.  About how we are in cahoots with the State and how we are only interested in pleading the clients out at the first setting.  Not true.  At least not true in our criminal defense firm.

Of course there are times when the very best plea offer from the State comes at the first setting (as it should) and it is in the defendant’s best interest to take it.  But not always.  And if we need to expand our investigation and do a little more negotiating with the prosecutor, or if we need to prepare for trial, then we’ll do it.  No need to pay me any more money and no need to thank me (but a thank you is nice from time to time).