Fraudulent Prescription Forms Texas

Fraudulent Prescription Form Versus Alteration of Legitimate Prescription

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Can a Defendant Be Convicted for Using a “Fraudulent Prescription Form” When They Only Altered the Information on an Otherwise Valid Prescription?

Avery v. State, 359 S.W. 3d 230 (2012)

Fraudulent Prescription Forms TexasIn 2012, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals released an opinion concerning whether a defendant may be convicted under Texas Health and Safety Code Section 481.129(a)(5)(B) for using a “fraudulent prescription form” when the facts showed that the defendant altered the dosage information on an otherwise valid prescription that had been written by the defendant’s physician.

The Facts — The Trial Court Denied Defendant’s Motion and Defendant was Convicted for Using a Fraudulent Prescription Form

In 2009, Defendant received a prescription for forty 2.5-milligram Lortab pills from her doctor after she complained of knee and back pain. Before dropping off the prescription at the pharmacy, Defendant attempted to scribble out the “2.5” and make it look like “7.5.” The pharmacist became suspicious and called the doctor’s office to confirm the prescription. The nurse confirmed the Defendant’s prescription was for 2.5-milligram pills and the pharmacist called the store security, who then contacted police.

During trial in which the defendant had been charged with using a fraudulent prescription form, Defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. Defendant argued that, while there was evidence of forgery, there was no evidence that she used a “fraudulent prescription form” as alleged in the indictment. Defendant further argued that the prescription form was not fraudulent, but only that what the doctor wrote was altered. Therefore, there was no evidence that Defendant committed fraud by using a fraudulent prescription form.

However, the State responded that even by altering an otherwise legitimate prescription form, as Defendant did when attempting to change the dosage, Defendant had created a fraudulent prescription form. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and the jury found Defendant guilty. Defendant was sentenced of 25 years’ confinement and a $1,500 fine.

The Court of Appeals Vacated the Trial Court’s Judgment and Entered a Verdict of Acquittal, Holding Defendant’s Actions More Closely Resembled Actions in a Different Subsection of Statute Instead of that Listed in the Indictment

Section 481.129 of the Texas Health and Safety Code governs the offense of fraud under the Texas Controlled Substances Act. According to Section 481.129(a)(5)(A), a person commits an offense if they possesses, obtains, or attempts to possess a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge.

Section 481.129(a)(5)(B) differs slightly in that a person commits the offense if they possess or attempt to possess a controlled substance through the use of a fraudulent prescription form.

Section 481.075 of the Texas Health and Safety Code governs the “Official Prescription Program,” which prescribers must follow in order to prescribe Schedule II Controlled Substances. This section describes the elements of an “official prescription form” as the controlled substance prescribed as well as the quantity of that controlled substance. The State argued that since the prescriber’s written words are part of the “official prescription form,” the Defendant turned the entire document into a “fraudulent prescription form” when she altered the written words.

The Court of Appeals, however, accepted neither party’s argument in full and believed its job was to determine whether Defendant’s actions were “more” like the “misrepresentation, fraud, [or] forgery” or like the “use of a fraudulent prescription form.” The Court of Appeals determined that the action may fall under either description, but cannot fall under both. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that Defendant’s actions—altering the writing—more closely resembled “forgery” than the “use of a fraudulent prescription form.”

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s judgment and entered a verdict of acquittal.

The Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed the COA, Holding that Defendant’s Alteration of Information on the Legitimate Prescription Violated a Different Statute than that for which Indicted

The Court of Criminal Appeals first addressed factual matters in the Court of Appeals’s opinion. Beginning with discussing the original indictment, it did not specify which Schedule of controlled substance Lortab is on. The Court of Appeals identified it is a Schedule II controlled substance, but also cited to definitions that describe Lortab as a combination drug that may be Schedule III. The pharmacist’s testimony identified Defendant’s Lortab as a Schedule III controlled substance mixture.

Secondly, as a result of a different schedule drug, Section 481.075 would not be applicable as it only applies to Schedule II controlled substances and does not mention Schedule III substances. Further, there was nothing in the record that led the Court of Criminal Appeals to believe that Defendant used an “official prescription form.”

The Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed how the Court of Appeals discussed the history and intent of the statutes, and determined that, based on statutory inferences and common language, “prescription form” refers to a pre-printed form that is used to write information on it. Further, the Legislature intended to create a legal distinction between completed prescriptions and the prescription forms.

After analyzing the statute applied in the Court of Appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Subsection (B) of Section 481.129(a)(5) only governs the use of a fraudulent prescription form. Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the writing on the form is not an element of that offense.

In the case at hand, the State originally charged Defendant with attempting to obtain a controlled substance “through use of a fraudulent prescription form.” The evidence presented by the State adduced that Defendant fraudulently altered the information written on the legitimate prescription form. Although the evidence would have supported a conviction had Defendant been charged under another statute, the evidence does not support a conviction for the offense Defefndant was charged with.

Although the Court of Criminal Appeals disagrees with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, it agrees in its judgment and affirms the Court of Appeals’s judgment of acquittal.

Stale Traffic Violation Zuniga Drug Case

Does a 15-Minute Delay Render a Traffic Violation Stale? | U.S. v. Zuniga

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How Long Can an Officer Wait to Pull a Vehicle Over After Observing a Traffic Violation?

Stale Traffic Violation Zuniga Drug CaseUnited States v. Zuniga (US Court of Appeals, 5th Cir. 2017)

In this case, a San Antonio police detective, who was working with an informant, suspected that Appellant Zuniga was transporting methamphetamine in his vehicle and followed it. The detective witnessed the driver of the vehicle fail to engage the turn-signal as required. He did not pull the vehicle over at that time, but radioed the traffic violation to other officers. Approximately fifteen minutes later, an officer who had received the radio dispatch but had not witnessed the turn-signal violation, stopped the vehicle. During the stop, the officer encountered Appellant, who was riding in the passenger seat, and his girlfriend, who was driving the vehicle. The officer arrested Appellant on outstanding warrants and his girlfriend for driving without a valid driver’s license.

The arresting officer conducted a search of Appellant incident to arrest and found methamphetamine on his person. The officer also searched Zuniga’s car and found a backpack containing methamphetamine, a handgun, and other evidence related to drug trafficking.

As a result, the federal government charged Appellant with several drug-related offenses.

Motion to Suppress for Unreasonable Traffic Delay

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the stop, arguing that the fifteen-minute delay in conducting the stop for the turn-signal violation rendered the information provided by the detective who observed the violation stale.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the delay in conducting the stop was not enough to render the information stale or the stop unlawful. The court did not state a specific time limitation to which officers must adhere when conducting a traffic stop. Instead, the court stressed that stops following traffic violations must be reasonable in light of the circumstances. In this case, the court found that the fifteen-minute delay was reasonable. As soon as the officer observed the turn-signal violation, he immediately relayed this information to other officers, although none of those officers were in position to stop the vehicle at that time.

Collective Knowledge Doctrine Allows an Officer to Make a Stop for a Violation He Did Not Observe

The trial court further held that the collective knowledge doctrine allowed the arresting officer to lawfully stop the vehicle even though he did not personally observe the traffic violation. The collective knowledge doctrine allows an officer, who does not observe a criminal (or traffic) violation, to conduct a stop when that officer is acting at the request of another officer who actually did observe the violation. Here, the detective who observed the turn-signal violation communicated this information to the traffic officer who ultimately stopped the vehicle; therefore, the detective’s knowledge transferred to the officer who conducted the stop and made the arrest.

The 5th Circuit upheld the search and the conviction, holding that reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle continued to exist despite the 15-minute lapse between the original observation of the traffic offense and the stop. The court explained:

“We make no attempt to articulate a specific time limitation to which officers must adhere in effecting a stop following a traffic violation. Rather, we stress that, consistent with our holdings in similar contexts, stops following transportation violations must be reasonable in light of the circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 598 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that “[s]tale information cannot be used to establish probable cause”). To reiterate, we hold only that the elapsed time between an observed violation and any subsequent stop must be reasonable upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances.”

Marijuana Laws in Texas

Not Up in Smoke Yet: Marijuana Laws in Texas 2017

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Marijuana Laws in TexasYou have seen it on the news…yet another state has legalized marijuana. It seems as if weed is everywhere, surely Texas has jumped on the bandwagon and legalized it too! Our firm receives calls from people all the time who all say the same thing; they thought marijuana was legal now. Not in Texas.

Current Marijuana Laws in Texas

Despite having been legalized in other states, possessing even a small amount of marijuana is a crime in Texas. The Texas Health and Safety Code says it is illegal for a person to knowingly or intentionally possess a usable quantity of marijuana. How much marijuana a person has in their possession will affect the level of severity of the offense.

  • Up to 2 0z– Class B Misdemeanor, punishable by up to 180 days in jail and up to a $2,000 fine
  • 2oz to 4oz– Class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to 1 year in jail and a $4,000 fine
  • 4oz to 5lbsState Jail Felony, punishable by 180 days to 2 years in jail and up to a $10,000 fine
  • 5lbs to 50lbs– 3rd Degree Felony, punishable by 2 to 10 years in jail and up to a $10,000 fine
  • 50lbs to 2000lbs– 2nd Degree Felony, punishable by 2 to 20 years in jail and up to a $10,000 fine
  • More than 2000lbs– 1st Degree Felony, punishable by 2 to 99 years in jail and up to a $50,000 fine

Proposed Texas Laws Relating to Marijuana

Texas could be a state to watch in 2017 for Marijuana law reform. Texas Senator Jose Rodriguez has introduced Senate Joint Resolution 18, which would legalize cannabis for medicinal use, and Senate Joint Resolution 17, which would allow Texans to vote on legalization of marijuana in November 2018.

There are also three different proposed bills that would lessen punishment for possession of a small amount of marijuana under one ounce. Two propose a fine only, with a third taking the offense from a Class B to a Class C misdemeanor (also fine only).

Medical Marijuana in Texas

The Texas Compassionate Use Act was signed by Governor Greg Abbot in 2015. The Act allows for individuals with intractable epilepsy to have access to CBD oil, a low THC cannabis oil. The bill prohibits smoking marijuana. Critics of the law say it is unworkable, as it requires a doctor to “prescribe” marijuana rather than recommend it as they do in other states where medical marijuana is legal. Under current federal law, a doctor “prescribing” marijuana could be open to sanctions, while one recommending the use is not. Another issue is that the ratio of THC to CBD that is allowed under the law is not potent enough to help some patients. There is potential for changes to be made to the Act during this legislative session, with proponents of the Act looking to broaden the scope and make access easier for patients.

THC Oil in Texas (Wax, Dabs, Marijuana Concentrate)

Possessing THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) oil in Texas is considered a more serious crime than simply possessing marijuana. Over the last few years, vaping THC oil, which is a concentrated version of the mind-altering component of marijuana, has become popular. Under Texas law, THC oil or wax is considered a concentrate and possessing it is a felony criminal offense.

  • Less than 1 Gram– State Jail Felony
  • 1 Gram to 4 Grams– Third Degree Felony
  • 4 to 400 Grams– Second Degree Felony
  • 400 grams or more – First Degree Felony

The law considers THC oil and wax to be in a different penalty group that marijuana, due to the higher level of THC, and consequences are much harsher. So while a typical small amount of marijuana could be punishable as a misdemeanor, even a very small amount of THC oil can be punishable as a felony.

Edible THC in Texas

The use of THC oil in edibles can be very serious. When weighing the amount of a controlled substance, the Texas Health and Safety Code includes all adulterants and dilutants in the total weight. Popular THC laced edibles like gummy candy and brownies will be weighed in their entirety, and can result in very serious felony charges.

CBD Oil in Texas

Cannabidiol (CBD) oil is made from cannabis, but is non-psychoactive. Proponents claim it can have many health benefits. CBD oil that is made from industrial hemp is legal in Texas.

Synthetic Marijuana in Texas

K2, or Spice, is a synthetic form of marijuana that is created by spraying natural herbs with chemicals meant to mimic the effects of marijuana. Synthetic Marijuana is illegal in Texas, and carries the same punishment as marijuana.

Selective Prosecution for Marijuana Offenses in Texas

The District Attorney in Harris County (Houston) has decided not to prosecute low-level possession of marijuana cases. So far, that is the only county with such a policy. Other counties have diversion programs for first-time or low level offenders. You should check with a knowledgable attorney in your local area to learn more about the diversion programs available.

In Tarrant County, depending on the circumstances of the case, a marijuana offender may qualify for the Deferred Prosecution Program (DPP) or the First Offender Drug Program (FODP). Again, you should check with an attorney to determine whether you might be eligible to participate in either program.

Conclusion

Regardless of whether you disagree with what the law should be in regard to marijuana in Texas, it is currently illegal to use or possess. If you are arrested for possession of marijuana, you may qualify for a diversion program that will ultimately allow you to get your record fully expunged. Contact one of our attorneys today if you have pending marijuana charges in Tarrant County. We will be happy to discuss your options and defend your case.

traffic stop duration king

When Does a Traffic Stop End and Improper Police Conduct Begin?

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A Traffic Stop for a Minor Traffic Infraction Leads to Search, Seizure, and Arrest: Exactly When Should Traffic Stops End?

traffic stop duration kingIf you’ve been a licensed (or even unlicensed) driver in Texas for long enough, you’ve experienced a traffic stop. Whether it be for speeding or something worse, a traffic stop is not generally a pleasant experience. But in some traffic stops across the state (hopefully not yours), the police conduct a search of the vehicle, then a search of the driver or passengers, and, finally make an arrest of some sort. How does something like a broken tail light or speeding lead to search, seizure, and arrest? When traffic stops for minor infractions potentially lead to serious criminal charges, it’s important to know how Texas courts define the moment when a traffic stop ends.

King v. State (2nd Court of Appeals – Fort Worth, 2016)

Broken Tail Light Leads to a Traffic Stop

Around 1:00 am, Jennifer Dowling drove Christopher King’s car home from a night on the town. Blue Mound Police noticed that the car had a broken right tail light and conducted a traffic stop pursuant to the infraction. Police ran the standard background check on Dowling, the driver, and King, the passenger, only to discover that neither had a valid driver’s license. As a result, Dowling was arrested for driving without a license. Police did not permit King to drive the car away and informed him that they would impound the car because leaving the car behind posed a safety hazard for other motorists.

Consent to Search Obtained, Traffic Stop Continued

To begin the impounding process, police asked King to exit the vehicle. When King got out of the car, police asked if they could perform a pat-down. Nervously, King complied with the request. When King stood up, a white cylinder-shaped container fell out of King’s pants onto the ground, and he admitted that the container held meth. King was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance.

Trial Court Holds That King Consented to the Pat-Down

Before trial, King filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence—the meth and the container—because the evidence was seized without a warrant. At the suppression hearing, the State prevailed, arguing that King consented to the pat-down, and the interaction was a consensual encounter. King lost his suppression motion, and plead guilty to the charges. The trial court sentenced King to twelve years confinement. Arguing that the traffic stop ended when Dowling was arrested and that the traffic stop was improperly extended to him, King appealed to the Second Court of Appeals.

Second Court of Appeals Discusses Traffic Stops

The Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth relied upon existing case law from the Supreme Court to evaluate the merits of King’s appeal. “A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333; 129 S. Ct. 781,, 788 (2009). “A traffic stop ends when police have no further need to control the scene.” Id., 129 S. Ct. at 783. According to the Second Court of Appeals, the police needed to control the scene even after Dowling was arrested. In asking King for a pat-down, they were taking reasonable steps to secure the area by ensuring that King was not a safety threat while waiting for a tow truck. Further, “the impoundment of the vehicle was a task tied to the traffic infraction, and King ma[de] no argument that the task [of impoundment] should have reasonably been completed at the time the police asked for consent to the pat-down.” The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the traffic stop was not improperly extended.

What does all of this mean for motorists? So long as the police are reasonably securing the scene by taking steps in an effort to maintain safety, the police may continue the traffic stop until the conclusion of such safety measures, including but not limited to, pat-downs, security sweeps, background checks, and impoundments.  In this case, King would have had a more colorable argument if he had been a licensed driver and the police extended the stop rather than letting him drive the vehicle away from the scene.

“Smith Triple Murder” Crime Spree Defendants Appeal Convictions on Evidentiary Grounds

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Case law Update: United States v. Barnes, et al (5th Circuit Court of Appeals – 2016)

Defendants Martel Barnes, Randale Jones, and Kentorre Hall were each charged with (1) conspiracy to possess illegal drugs, (2) maintaining a drug-involved premises, (3) conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of drug crimes, and (4) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime for their involvement. In 2012, law enforcement grew suspicious of the group when investigating a triple murder where circumstantial evidence linked the Defendants to a network of drug trafficking in Mississippi, based out of a home rented by Hall. After interviewing witnesses and corroborating stories of informants, the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics executed a search warrant on the home which netted firearms, digital scales, and plastic baggies. Law enforcement linked the drug trafficking to the triple murder by analyzing shell casings from the murder scene and comparing them with casings found during the search. In addition to the murders and the drug distribution ring, the men were eventually linked to a string of armed robberies.

At trial, the Government called thirty-four witnesses in total. After hearing testimony for over a week, the jury found the Defendants guilty on all counts, and they were each sentenced to life in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. The Defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing insufficient evidence for each charge in the indictment. The Fifth Circuit had to determine whether a reasonable jury would have found that the evidence established the guilt of the Defendant(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. Below, we examine each charge and discuss the Court’s analysis of conclusions reached on appeal.

Charge #1: Conspiracy to Possess Illegal Drugs

Each Defendant was charged with conspiracy to possess illegal drugs, a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Under the law, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense [herein] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.

On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Defendants argued that the witnesses used by the Government at trial lacked credibility. The Defendants argued that the witnesses were criminals with their own convictions and that their testimonies should not have been used at trial. Here, the Fifth Circuit stated, “this argument holds no weight given the quantity and consistency of the evidence presented at trial.” Moreover, held the Court, “credibility issues are for the finder of fact and do not undermine the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 854 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997). The Court affirmed the district court’s holding regarding the conviction for this charge.

Charge #2: Maintaining a Drug-Involved Premises

Second, each Defendant was charged with maintaining a drug-involved premises pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Under this section of the code, it is unlawful to knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance; whoever commits an offense…or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. “In determining whether a person maintained a drug-involved premises under Section 856, the Court typically considers whether a Defendant (1) has an ownership or leasehold interest in the premises; (2) was in charge of the premises; or (3) exercised supervisory control over the premises.” United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340, 346 (5th Cir. 1997). Surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit declined to resolve this issue, as the Defendants were “subject to criminal liability for aiding and abetting” Hall, who rented the house where the criminal activity had taken place.

To prove up aiding and abetting, the Government had to have established that (1) the elements of the substantive offense occurred and (2) the Defendant(s) associated with the criminal activity, participated, and acted to help it succeed. United States v. Delagarza-Villarreal, 141 F.3d 133, 140 (5th Cir. 1997).

Here, said the Fifth Circuit, the Government sufficiently proved up that Hall rented the home where the criminal activities were taking place, and that the other Defendants helped him in furtherance of the crimes. The Defendants spent hours a day at the home where the drugs were measured and sorted, “we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that [the Defendants] were guilty of the charged offenses.”

The Defendants also appealed that the word “place” in the statute was ambiguous and therefore, should not have been applied to include their cars and the area surrounding their cars, where more incriminating evidence supporting this charge was eventually seized. The Fifth Circuit stated that according to the Oxford Dictionary, “the definition of ‘place’ is not limited to buildings or structures…[although] the term ‘premises’ is commonly defined as a house or building.” The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not error when instructing the jury that “place” could mean “house” or the “yard area” [where cars are parked] around a house.

Charges #3 and #4: Conspiracy to Possess and Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Drug Crimes

Third, each Defendant was charged with conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of drug crimes and possession of firearms in furtherance of drug crimes, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) and 2. At trial, the Government presented extensive circumstantial evidence linking all the Defendants with the triple murder. Some of the evidence included Facebook and text messages with incriminating statements. On appeal, the Defendants argued that the social media and text messaging evidence was irrelevant to prove their involvement with the alleged crimes, and that it was to have been considered improper character evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that “the evidence of the Smith Triple Murder was directly relevant to the conspiracy charges because it showed that the [Defendants] were willing to use firearms in furtherance of their drug trafficking activities.”

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Defendant-Appellants’ convictions.

Drug Found in Car Driver Charged with Possession

Do Drugs Found in a Car Automatically Belong to the Driver?

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Between the Driver and Two Passengers, who is in Possession of the Drugs Found in the Middle Compartment in Plain View?

Drug Found in Car Driver Charged with PossessionThe Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion dealing with legal sufficiency of evidence in the context of possession of a controlled substance when it was not found in the exclusive possession of the defendant. The issue facing the Court was whether Appellant Tate intentionally or knowingly possessed methamphetamine by exercising “control, management or care” of the methamphetamine and he knew it was methamphetamine. Tex. Penal Code §1.07(a)(39). The Court found that a rational jury could infer that the owner and driver of a vehicle possessed the controlled substance found in the vehicle in plain view even when there were two other passengers.

Tate v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

The Facts—Trial Court Found Sufficient Evidence

Tate was pulled over by Detective Beckham due to his outstanding warrants. When pulled over Tate had two passengers. Tate explained that he owned the vehicle but did not have any proof of ownership. Tate was arrested after officers confirmed his outstanding warrants. The police searched Tate, the two passengers, and their belongings, but did not find any weapons or contraband. During Officer Beckham’s inventory search of the vehicle, he found a syringe loaded with a substance later identified as .24 grams of methamphetamine. He found the syringe in “plain view” in a compartment underneath the air conditioner and heating controls.

Tate, the owner of the vehicle, was charged with possession of a controlled substance. At trial, Officer Beckham described the compartment as “directly to the right” of Tate, accessible to Tate and the front-seat passenger but not the backseat passenger. He also testified that even though he couldn’t tell exactly what the front-seat passenger was doing, he observed her moving a lot but never towards the compartment. Tate argued that one of the passengers put the syringe there when Tate was talking to Beckham at the rear of the vehicle. The trial court found Tate guilty, relying on Tate’s “self-purported” ownership of the vehicle and his proximity to the syringe.

The Court of Appeals Reversed the Trial Court’s Decision

The Court of Appeals held that there was “insufficient evidence to prove that Tate had intentionally and knowingly possessed methamphetamine.” The court rejected the proximity argument made by the trial court for two reasons:

  1. There was insufficient evidence to show the syringe was in the car before Tate got out.
  2. Officer Beckham observed the front-seat passenger moving a lot but couldn’t tell exactly what she was doing.

Additionally, the court said that since Tate’s ownership could not be proven it was insufficient evidence to prove possession.

The Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses the Court of Appeals—Holding Defendant’s Ownership and Control of Vehicle Where Controlled Substance was Found in Plain View and Within Defendant’s Reach is Sufficient Evidence to Convict for Possession of a Controlled Substance

The CCA held that a rational jury, with these facts, could reasonably infer that the syringe was in the car the entire time. In coming to that decision the Court relied on the fact that the jury believed Beckham’s testimony that he never saw her reach for the compartment, that the back-seat passenger could not reach it, Tate said he owned the vehicle, and that the syringe was found in plain view. Therefore, a rational jury could infer that Tate would be aware of items in his vehicle in plain view, thus find he intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine in the syringe.

In making this decision the Court relied on the Jackson standard: “Based on the combined and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The Court found that the court of appeals incorrectly applied this standard. The Court pointed to a few links that the jury could reasonably rely on to find Tate guilty, which include:

  1. the contraband was found in the vehicle that Tate owned and was driving;
  2. the contraband was in plain view and conveniently accessible to Tate; and
  3. the jury could reasonably believe Beckham’s testimony that the front-seat passenger did not reach over to the compartment and that the back-seat passenger could not reach the compartment.

Thus, when the standard is applied here a rational jury could find the evidence sufficient to find Tate intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt.

Decision of the Criminal Court of Appeals—Evidence is Legally Sufficient Where a Rational Jury Could Infer Guild Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

The CCA found that the evidence at trial was sufficient for the jury to reasonably find Tate guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the court of appeals overstepped its bounds in assessing the legal-sufficiency of the evidence.

THC Controlled Substance Analogue Designer Drug

Controlled Substance Analogue Ratio Equates to Higher Federal Sentence

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THC Controlled Substance Analogue Designer DrugSynthetic Cannabinoids became popular in the 2000’s when they were first marketed as “legal herbs.” In 2008, chemical analysis revealed that these designer drugs were more than just herbs.  The military, in particular, had a big problem with Spice and K2 (two forms of synthetic marijuana) in the late 2000’s, because they gave users a similar (or greater) high than marijuana, but they were not included in any federal schedule of controlled substances.  As these substances became more popular and widely consumed, the DEA banned their use in 2010 using emergency temporary powers and then later by placing them on Schedule I of Controlled Substance Act.

How Do Controlled Substances Analogues (Designer Drugs) Fit Into the Federal Drug Control Scheme?

 

United States v Malone (5th Circuit Court of Appeals – 2016)

Thomas Malone and his business partner Drew Green owned NutraGenomics Manufacturing, LLC, a distributor of JWH-018, a synthetic cannabinoid substance, also known as “Spice” and “K2” on the street. However, in 2011 federal and state legislatures banned JWH-018 and other similar designer drugs or synthetic cannabinoids. Malone and Green began selling other synthetic cannabinoids, namely, AM-2201, known as “Mr. Miyagi…a mixture of AM-2201 and vegetable material that visually resemble[s] marijuana.” Eventually, Malone and Green ordered the mass manufacture of Mr. Miyagi, selling in bulk to a distributor in Louisiana. Although labeled as potpourri, Mr. Miyagi was supposed to be smoked like marijuana.

Malone Faced Federal Indictment For Possession and Distribution of Mr. Miyagi

A federal grand jury returned an indictment, charging Malone with one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute AM-2201, and, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. Malone decided to take a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute a Schedule I Controlled Dangerous Substance, a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§846, 841(b)(1)(c), 813, 802(32)(A). The district court accepted Malone’s guilty plea of distributing not less than 1400 kilograms of AM-2201, and ordered a pre-sentence report. A pre-sentence report “PSR” is a report created by a probation office in anticipation of the punishment phase of a trial—the PSR in this case set out to determine “the base offense level using the marijuana equivalency of the most closely related controlled substance to AM-2201.”

Pre-Sentencing Report’s Mathematical Formula Indicated Severe Penalty

The PSR listed Tetrahydrocannabinol, THC, as the most closely related controlled substance to AM-2201. Further, the federal Drug Equivalency Tables indicated that a 1 to 167 ration be applied to convert the 1400 kilograms of AM-2201 into marijuana for the purpose of sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Using this mathematical equation, it was determined that Malone should be sentenced for 233,800 kilograms of marijuana—the highest level set forth by the Drug Equivalency Tables. At trial, each side put forth an expert witness arguing for and against the use of the THC and the THC ratio set forth in the PSR.

Battle of the Experts at Trial

The Government’s Expert

The Government called Dr. Jordan Trecki to testify that THC is the most closely related substance to AM-2201. Dr. Trecki relied on a scientific study “showing that both THC and AM-2201 bind to the same cannabinoid receptor” in the brain. Second, he testified about a study on rats where the rats could not tell the difference between THC and AM-2201. Third, he discussed AM-2201’s potency and effects on humans. Dr. Trecki told the court that THC and AM-2201 are close in chemical make-up and in effect on the structures of the brain. Dr. Trecki said, however, that there was no scientific basis for the 1:167 ratio.

Malone’s Expert

Malone’s attorney called Dr. Nicholas Cozzi, who stressed the importance of comparison of the two drug compounds—THC and AM-2201—in humans, not just in animals. Dr. Cozzi criticized Dr. Trecki’s analysis because Trecki “combined the results of several studies” and that the studies were not conducted on humans, rather they were animal studies. Dr. Cozzi stated that marijuana, not THC, was the most closely related substance to AM-2201 because it’s smoked and inhaled, like marijuana, and because both substances are consumed for their effect. Dr. Cozzi agreed with Dr. Trecki on one point—that the 1:167 ratio was not rooted in science.

The Big Issue Before the Fifth Circuit

Relying heavily on Dr. Trecki’s expert testimony, the District Court sentenced Malone to 117 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release following prison. The court noted that “the ratios in sentencing guidelines are often arbitrary… [however] the ratios seek to outline the relative harm of certain drugs.” Malone appeals to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Fifth Circuit must determine whether THC really is the most closely-related substance to the controlled substance analogue, AM-2201, and if so, whether the 1:167 ratio is a reasonable conversion for sentencing purposes.

The Fifth Circuit Weighs In

Here, the Fifth Circuit points out that the district court spent a day holding an evidentiary hearing on the equivalency of AM-2201 to other drugs, “it is significant that the district court gave this matter studied attention.” The court notes that each side had the ability to present an expert witness and to cross examine. “Nothing in the record leaves us with…the conviction that a mistake [was made].”

Second, the Fifth Circuit compares AM-2201 and marijuana, disagreeing with Dr.Cozzi’s assertion that both drugs are smoked and inhaled in the same manner. “Marijuana is not consumed way…there is no evidence that a user would smoke a pure form of AM-2201, just as a user would not smoke pure THC.”

Third, the Fifth Circuit says that the district court did not have to “engage in a piece-by-piece analysis of empirical grounding behind…[the] sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Court says that only the Commission on sentencing guidelines can change the guidelines, and therefore, does not rule on this issue. The Fifth Circuit agrees with the holding and reasoning of the district court—Malone’s sentence is affirmed.
*This case consolidates two cases, United States v. Malone and United States v. Green.

Movie Plot Defense Opens Door 404b

Movie Plot Defense Opens the Door to Evidence of Other Crimes

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The Fugitive, The Doctrine of Chances, and The Texas Rules of Evidence Collide: CCA Reviews a “Movie Plot” Defense Strategy

Movie Plot Defense Opens Door 404bDabney v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

Have you ever seen a movie like The Fugitive or Double Jeopardy where the main character finds himself in suspicious circumstances, only to be arrested and convicted, with the rest of the movie focused on proving the main character’s innocence? The defense counsel in Dabney v. State used this sort of analogy as the theme of his case to the jury—that the defendant was trapped in a bad movie plot and wasn’t actually guilty of any crime.

A Mystery Meth Lab Was Constructed at the Defendant’s Home

Defense counsel made a memorable opening statement at Ronnie Dabney’s trial. Dabney had been arrested and charged with manufacturing meth. Defense counsel told the jury that the evidence would show that the meth lab found on Dabney’s property was set up by others, without his knowledge, and that Dabney arrived home mere moments before law enforcement arrived to discover the lab. Defense counsel offered a movie-plot defense theory, “Have you ever seen a movie like The Fugitive or Double Jeopardy where a person is found in suspicious circumstances and [they] arrest and convict them?” The defense added, “Ronnie Dabney has been living this movie where he’s innocent, found in suspicious circumstances, and he’s trying to prove himself not guilty.”

In response to the movie-plot defense theory, the State filed a brief arguing that it should be permitted to present evidence of a previous incident years ago, in which Dabney was present when a search warrant was executed on his property and an active meth lab was found. The State argued that the opening statements about the movie-plot amounted to a defensive theory, where evidence or mistake is at issue, worthy of a rebuttal argument supported by rebuttal evidence allowed under Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence.

Before trial, Dabney submitted a request for “notice” of the State’s intent to use evidence of past “extraneous” offenses under the Texas Rules of Evidence 404(b). The state failed to give proper notice of any 404(b) allegations. However, after hearing the defense opening statement, the State argued that the similarities between the case at bar and a previous case “rebutted [Dabney’s] defensive theory of accident or mistake” and requested permission to use the previous incident as 404(b) evidence to show the absence of mistake. The judge concluded the evidence of the previous crime was admissible. During closing remarks, the State averred, “[Dabney is] the unluckiest man in the world…[he] wants you to think [he] is Harrison Ford from the Fugitive…[with] a confluence of unfortunate events that frame him…but…common sense says it’s not an accident if it has happened twice…it’s the Doctrine of Chances.” Ronnie Dabney was found guilty of manufacturing meth and the jury sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment.

Dabney appealed to the Second Court of Appeals arguing the State failed to give proper notice of intent to use evidence of Dabney’s past crimes in its rebuttal argument under Texas evidentiary rules. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the evidence of Dabney’s past crimes was inadmissible without proper notice from the State. Dabney v. State, No. 02-12-00530-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 11496 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, Oct. 16, 2014) (mem.op., not designated for publication). The State petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for review, arguing that notice is not required for rebuttal evidence because defensive theories cannot be predicted ahead of time. Dabney asserts that the State has a duty to anticipate all defensive issues that may come up in rebuttal.

The Court of Criminal Appeals considered the following issues (among others not discussed in this article):

(1) Did the court of appeals incorrectly add a “notice requirement” for rebuttal evidence?
(2) Did the court of appeals improperly ignore the overwhelming evidence of Dabney’s guilt?

Texas Evidentiary Rules Regarding Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts

Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence states

evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity [of the crime being prosecuted].” “However, [such evidence] may be admissible for other purposes, such as…intent, preparation…knowledge…absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon timely request by the [defendant], reasonable notice is given in advance of trial of intent to introduce in the State’s case.

A defense opening statement can open the door for the admission of extraneous-offense evidence to rebut the defensive theory presented in opening statements. Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

The Doctrine of Chances tells [the court] that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.” LaPaz v. State, 279 S.W. 3d 336, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, rather than of exclusions—it excludes only evidence that is offered solely for the purpose of proving bad character and conduct in conformity with that bad character. Id. at 343.

The CCA Holds that the Court of Appeals Improperly Added a Notice Requirement for Rebuttal Evidence

Here, the CCA reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals improperly added a notice requirement for rebuttal evidence and ignored the overwhelming evidence pointing to Dabney’s guilt. Because of the exception to the notice requirement when the defense opens the door to rebuttal evidence by presenting a defensive theory that the State may rebut using extraneous-offense evidence, the evidence of the prior crime was proper at trial, even without notice to defense beforehand. “To hold otherwise would impose upon the State the impossible task of anticipating, prior to the beginning of any trial, any and all potential defenses that a defendant may raise.” Also, there was no evidence that the prosecution acted in bad faith, or attempted to willfully avoid a discovery order. “Under the Doctrine of Chances, [Dabney’s] defense that he found himself in an unfortunate, highly unlikely situation becomes less credible when presented with evidence that he has been found in the exact same situation before.”

In sum, [Dabney] presented his defensive theory in opening statements and the State could use extraneous-offense evidence to rebut this theory in its case-in-chief, instead of waiting until the defense rested. Bass at 563. Defendants who are planning to use the “movie plot” defensive theory in the future, must be prepared to have the theory tested in front of a jury with 404(b) rebuttal evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.

Brian Cuban The Addicted Lawyer

Addiction Issues Are Not Just for Clients

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Brian Cuban: The Addicted Lawyer

Brian Cuban The Addicted LawyerBe it alcohol, drugs, or something else, many of our clients struggle with addiction.  We work everyday to counsel them and help them get plugged into the right places that assist in recovery.  But we sometimes forget that addiction issues aren’t limited to our clients.  Many of our friends and colleagues in the legal community struggle with addiction.  Overworked and overstressed, many lawyers turn to alcohol or drugs as an escape.

Recently, a friend of mine connected me with Brian Cuban. For those of you who don’t know of Brian Cuban, he is a lawyer, speaker, and activist, and the brother of Mark Cuban (the owner of the Dallas Mavericks).  Brian has been fighting (and winning) his battle against addiction since 2007.  He is also a writer with a new book coming out soon – The Addicted Lawyer.  I asked Brian if he would write a guest blog post about addiction.  The story below is from Brian.  Our hope is that this story will help to remind us to remember to help our colleagues in times of need and be on the lookout for the warning signs of addiction.

Gary Was a Lawyer, A Friend, An Addict

I drove past the same bus-stop every day. To the average person on his/her way to their next “stop” of the day, in life, nothing to set it off from any other.

That morning, I saw one such story I was intimately familiar with. There was Gary waiting for the bus. A lawyer. Undergraduate of Boston College Summa Cum Laude. Near the top of his class at Antioch School of Law. On to a great job with NBC. On to the NYC nightlife and the genetic pull of a family line ripe with alcohol use. Gary was an alcoholic and drug addict long before that bus stop. An addict trying to keep the shreds of his life and legal career together.

I had met Gary years before when we both worked of-counsel to a local Dallas firm. I was trying to hold my life together between addiction and an eating disorder. High functioning was a blessing and a curse. I needed no help. I showed up to court sober. I only did cocaine in the bathroom of the firm when I had no appointments. The pick up I needed after all night cocaine and alcohol benders. It all made perfect sense to me. In my mind, I was not an addict.

I had actually tried my last case with Gary. A bench trial contract matter. He ran the show. He was sober and brilliant. I didn’t want that show. I hated the practice of law. I was not afraid of a courtroom but I was sickened by them. A reminder of how much I hated my life and the career I had chosen for all the wrong reasons. We had a good result. Then Gary disappeared as he had sporadically done over the years since I first met him. I knew what that meant. We all knew. Periods of sobriety and stellar representation of his clients, periods of complaints of neglect and even showing up to client meetings apparently high.

Gary does not see me drive by him at the bus stop. He is looking at the ground. Waiting. My calls to him were never heard as his voicemail was full. I knew what that meant. Most addicts and their families know what that means. I went further down the road and turned around so I could drive up along side him. He got in. He had been to a 12-step meeting and was headed down to the Dallas 24-Hour club where he was a resident. He asked if I knew he had been disbarred. I had seen it in the local legal periodical. As what often happens with lawyers and addiction, clients money never made it to the client. State Bars take a dim view of stealing from clients and addiction is not an excuse. A common story. A common explanation from Gary. It was all a mistake. He had lost everything and was still in denial. I thought back to what my shrink had said to me April 8th 2007, the day I began my sobriety journey. “Brian, you have a law degree but you’re not a lawyer, you’re an addict.”

I drove Gary down to the 24 Hour Club. I bought him lunch. A familiar request for money until “he got back on his feet.” It became our routine. The bus stop. The drive. The excuses. The helplessness. Then he was gone again. The full voicemail. No longer at the transitional living home. He had tested dirty.

August 2013. My cell phone rings. A 516 area code. Long Island. Where some of Gary’s family lived. He had moved back home much as I had moved to Dallas to be with my brothers after finishing Pitt Law deep in alcohol use disorders. My family would save me. If recovery was only that simple. A quick conversation. He said he was sober and working as an attorney. He was also licensed in New York. I hid my annoyance at the fact that he had just been disbarred and yet was right back participating in another jurisdiction that may not know about his past. Was I ethically bound to say something? I struggled with the conflict between my view as a lawyer and as a recovering addict. It was not my recovery. It was his.

The day is finally here! My first book, “Shattered Image” is going to be released. Looking forward to the release party! A Facebook message from Gary. I had not heard from him in a while. The message was cheerful. A photo of a plane ticket to come to Dallas for my book signing. It would be the last time I would hear from Gary.

The message came from his ex-wife. The google explosion of his name told the story.

“Gary Abrams , 54 Fatally Struck By Truck Tractor Trailer” walking along a highway.

It is unknown whether he had been drinking but it does not matter. He is gone. He never “got it” in recovery. It’s not that he didn’t want it. He tried. I miss him and wish he had gotten it. Gary was a lawyer, a friend, a husband, a sibling, an alcoholic. an addict. In his passing, he also helped me. I know my recovery is only as good as today. Thank you Gary.

***************************

Brian Cuban: An authority on body dysmorphic disorder, male eating disorders and addiction(including steroids), Brian Cuban is the author of the best-selling book, Shattered Image: My Triumph Over Body Dysmorphic Disorder. It chronicles his first-hand experiences living with, and recovering from, twenty-seven years of eating disorders, alcoholism, drug addiction and Body Dysmorphic Disorder (BDD).

www.briancuban.com

Houston Crime Lab Scandal

More Aftermath from the Houston Crime Lab Scandal

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CCA Says “No Relief” for Defendant Who Accepted Plea Deal, even though the Court Infers Defendant’s Lab Reports Were Falsified

Houston Crime Lab ScandalSee the CCA opinion in Ex Parte Barnaby 

Setting the Stage: The Houston Crime Lab Scandal

In January of 2012, the Texas Rangers investigated a Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) Crime Laboratory technician, Jonathan Salvador, for allegedly tampering with crime lab evidence. The Rangers questioned DPS technicians and reviewed evidence records, bringing information that pointed to Salvador’s mishandling of lab results to Harris County’s District Attorney’s office. However, after an extensive investigation, the grand jury did not indict the technician. Subsequently, the DPS Office of Inspector General issued a report, stating that Salvador “failed to properly follow laboratory protocols…misidentified substances, and dry-labbed [falsified] samples.” Following the report, Salvador was terminated from his position at the Houston Crime Lab.

The fallout from Salvador’s actions, “call…into question the veracity and reliability of many cases handled by Salvador…[and as a result courts have] granted relief on several writs of habeas corpus, finding that each case involved a presumptive violation of due process.” Ex Parte Turner, 394 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (per curiam); Ex Parte Hobbs, 393 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (per curiam). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) has since “retreated from a presumption that due process was violated in every Salvador case, [instead] requir[ing] a showing of falsity and materiality.” Ex Parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597, 605.

How to Demonstrate a Due Process Violation from the Houston Crime Lab Scandal

In order for a defendant to prove that due process has been violated, the defendant must show (1) falsity—that his evidence from the lab or lab report was falsified; and, (2) materiality—that such falsifications/false reports were material to the outcome of the guilty verdict. Ex Parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Falsity

The defendant bears the initial burden of showing falsity; the CCA “has implemented a five-part protocol to be used when a [defendant] raises an inference of falsity.” Coty, 418 S.W.3d at 605.
A defendant shows falsity when:

  1. The technician in question is a state actor
  2. The technician has committed multiple instances of intentional misconduct in another case or cases;
  3. The technician is the same technician that worked on the [defendant’s] case;
  4. The misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have affected the evidence in the [defendant’s case]; and,
  5. The technician handled and processed the evidence in the [defendant’s] case within roughly the same period of time as the other misconduct.

Materiality

A defendant bears the burden of persuasion with regard to materiality. Id. at 606. Materiality of false evidence is measured by the impact it had on the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. Id. In cases involving plea agreements, the court examines the voluntariness of the plea—whether there is a reasonable likelihood that [the plea] affected the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, [but] not whether it affected the conviction or sentence. Id. The Court ponders questions like, “if the defendant had known that the lab reports were falsified, would he have plead guilty, or would he have gone to trial?” A plea, however, is not involuntary simply because a defendant does not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision [to take the plea]. Ex Parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Brady v United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). The CCA implies that the decision to “go to trial” is an indicator that the false evidence is indeed material; the decision to “take a plea deal” is a soft indicator that the false evidence is not material.

Applying this to Ex Parte Barnaby

On March 13, 2009, Kemos Marque Barnaby was stopped for a traffic offense. During the traffic stop, police smelled an odor of marijuana coming from inside the car. Barnaby was asked to exit the vehicle, and he consented to a pat-down search. With dashboard cameras rolling, a small plastic bag with white rocks, which tested positive for cocaine during a rapid field test, was found in Barnaby’s pants. The bag was delivered to the Houston Crime Lab, where Jonathan Salvador issued a drug analysis report, identifying the white rocks as cocaine. Instead of going to trial, Barnaby plead guilty to four separate offenses of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in exchange for four concurrent fifty-year sentences. Barnaby appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that because of Salvador’s false report, his guilty plea was involuntary, and had an impact on his decision to take the plea deal.

Here, the Court examines falsity to determine whether due process was violated. Using the five-part falsity protocol, the Court says, (1) Salvador was a state actor; (2) Salvador had multiple instances of misconduct; (3) Salvador worked on Barnaby’s case; (4) Salvador’s misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have affected the evidence in Barnaby’s case; and, (5) Salvador handled Barnaby’s evidence in the same time period as the other misconduct at the Houston Crime Lab. The State conceded that Barnaby was able to raise the inference of falsity, and accordingly the Court infers that Salavador’s report in this case is false, carefully noting that an ‘inference of falsity’ is not an affirmative finding of a negative cocaine test result.

Next, the Court examines materiality to determine whether the false lab report was material to the decision to take a plea bargain and whether the value of the undisclosed information was outweighed by the benefit of accepting the plea offer. Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 294 (1st Cir. 2006). Here, the Court says that Barnaby, a habitual offender, was faced with four drug charges, on top of having two prior felony convictions, thus, enhancing sentencing guidelines ranging from 25 to 99 years imprisonment for each charge. On top of that, Barnaby was also charged with three additional charges of possession with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, all of which were also enhanced to the habitual-offender statute. The plea resolved all four of those charges in exchange for four concurrent fifty-year sentences; “even if the falsity of the laboratory report had come to light…the State could have still prosecuted [Barnaby] for the three other [drug-free zone] cases. “[Barnaby’s] assertion that he would not have plead guilty had he known of the falsity of the laboratory report is unpersuasive in light of the benefit he received from the plea bargain.”

Even though the Court infers “that the laboratory report in [Barnaby’s] case was falsified, [the Court] finds that [such] falsity was not material to [Barnaby’s] decision to plead guilty,” adding that he received a benefit of a lighter prison sentence by choosing to take the plea deal. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals denies relief to Barnaby.

We’ve recently seen experienced drug lab problems in Fort Worth as well.  The problems have impacted countless drug and DWI cases in Tarrant County.  Any case that involves an outside crime lab must be scrutinized carefully by the criminal defense attorney.  While bad lab techniques (or technicians) might not mean an acquittal, but it could mean considerable relief for the defendant.