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KNOW YOUR RIGHTS – Being Accused in Texas

By Criminal Defense

KNOW YOUR RIGHTS – Being Accused in Texas

Be informed. Be aware. Maintain your composure. Your Liberty is at stake. Every day, Texas citizens have interactions with Texas law enforcement. If you have an encounter with law enforcement it is extremely important that you realize that a police officer does not represent you and is not looking out for your legal interests. Only an attorney can do that. You must stay informed and aware of your rights in order to ensure that the Government does not abuse its power. Under the United States and Texas Constitutions and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, every citizen has the following rights:

  • THE RIGHT to be informed of the specific offense(s) alleged to have been committed.
  • THE RIGHT to remain silent. Any statement a person makes, oral, written, or non-verbal [nodding of the head] may be used as evidence against that person in a trial by the State of Texas in court or in other judicial proceedings.
  • THE RIGHT to an attorney for any offense other than a class c misdemeanor.
  • THE RIGHT to obtain an attorney of the person’s own choosing, at that person’s expense, for any offense.
  • THE RIGHT to consult with an attorney and to have a lawyer present during any interrogation.
  • THE RIGHT to terminate an interview or interrogation at any time.
  • THE RIGHT to refuse to give consent to search.
  • THE RIGHT against self-incrimination.

NEVER TALK TO OR FOLLOW THE ADVICE OF INVESTIGATORS  WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING THE ADVICE OF AN ATTORNEY

GENERAL ADVICE

A suspect has a legal, moral and constitutional right to remain silent and place the burden of overcoming the presumption of innocence and proving his or her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the officers, investigators, and attorneys for the government. A suspect should never make an oral, written, or non-verbal statement concerning suspected criminal conduct, even to close friends or relatives without first consulting an attorney. Your best friend can turn out to be your biggest problem at trial and your family members can sometimes be compelled to testify against you. Also, BEWARE of the fact that a routine law enforcement tactic is to monitor and record phone or personal conversations between a suspect and the alleged victim or other persons which may play a role in the case. Criminal investigators work to protect the interest of the government and not the interests of the suspect. ONLY a suspect’s personal attorney can and will work to protect the interests of the suspect. During an interview or interrogation, some officers or investigators may use the “good guy-bad guy” technique in which one acts rough and tough and the other one sympathizes and tries to “help” the suspect. The officers or investigators can legally lie to or deceive a suspect in an effort to get a statement, so be careful! These people are highly trained to elicit incriminatory statements from suspects. The safest thing to do is to simply refuse to talk (or even listen to) the investigators. The request for an attorney must be a clear, unequivocal insistence to speak to an attorney; Comments like “do I need an attorney” or “I think I want an attorney” are NOT sufficient to invoke the right to counsel and to terminate the interview. A suspect may be ordered by a judge to give certain samples (handwriting, hair samples, blood, etc). When possible, consult an attorney before doing so or as soon as possible afterwards, especially if ordered to do so over your objection. NEVER CONSENT to the taking of evidence, except for your fingerprints and photograph. Make the investigator get a search warrant. An investigator does not have authority to direct that a suspect produce evidence, except photographs and fingerprints. If a suspect finds that an appointment has been made for him/her with a physician, drug/alcohol counselor, social worker, or psychiatrist, the suspect should contact an attorney first because conversations between suspects and anyone other than his/her attorney(s) are not privileged or confidential under the law. Communications between a suspect and his/her attorney or agent for the attorney (paralegal) are privileged, unless the communication clearly contemplates the future commission of an illegal act.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A suspect should NEVER CONSENT to a search of his/her person or property without first consulting an attorney. A suspect should make it perfectly clear to the authorities that he/she does not consent, but if the authorities persist, a suspect should never physically resist. There are many theories upon which a search may be legally justified and an attorney will examine he facts of the search at a later time to determine if law supported it. If a suspect legitimately consents to the search, however, there are no legal issues. IMPORTANT: A person who does consent to a search may withdraw that consent at any time during a search. IF YOU CONSENT TO A SEARCH, ANY EVIDENCE FOUND COULD BE USED AGAINST YOU! Force the authorities to get a lawful search warrant.

APPREHENSION, ARREST, AND CONFINEMENT

In many cases, investigators do not physically “arrest” a suspect. After questioning or contact by the investigators, the suspect is usually released. When confronted by investigators, a suspect should never run away or physically resist apprehension, arrest, or confinement, whether that person is innocent or guilty. He/she should always go along peacefully with the authorities, while asking that an attorney be made available before any questioning. Any resistance or flight, even if innocent, can be considered as evidence of guilt. Additionally, resisting apprehension can lead to additional charges being added and/or pre-trial confinement. Pre-trial confinement can occur under very limited circumstances, where the officer or investigator determines that the suspect is a “flight risk,” a danger to the community or to himself, or is likely going to continue the misconduct if not put into pre-trial confinement.

POLYGRAPHS

Polygraphs are frequently used by law enforcement personnel. Under no circumstance should a suspect agree to take a polygraph with the law enforcement agency without advice of counsel. Remember it is permissible for investigators to lie to the suspect, so a suspect could actually “pass” a polygraph, but be told by the examiner that he “failed” the polygraph; the fact that a person is actually telling the truth in no manner means that the polygraph will indicate no deception. Polygraphs are notoriously unreliable, so much so that they are inadmissible in court.

GOOD CONDUCT BEFORE TRIAL

Waiting for your trial date to arrive will be a very difficult time for you. It is extremely important however that you avoid any additional problems prior to trial. As difficult as it will be, you must maintain an excellent attitude at all times and strive to be a productive member of society.

Border Patrol Agents Violate Fourth Amendment in Terry Stop But Conviction Upheld

By Warrantless Search

United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano, (5th Circuit June 27, 2013)

Border Patrol agents stopped Appellant as he was driving on Interstate 10, approximately 450 miles from the nearest United States-Mexico border crossing. The agents believed Appellant was transporting illegal aliens because he was driving an SUV; had both hands on the steering wheel, and he was not exhibiting the relaxed nature of most drivers. In addition, Appellant’s speed dropped from 70 miles per hour to 60 miles per hours as the agents followed him, and when the agents pulled alongside Appellant, he stopped talking to the person in the passenger’s seat.

The agents learned the car was registered to a woman; however, it had not been reported stolen, had no outstanding warrants or criminal activity associated with it, and had not recently crossed the border. During the stop, Appellant told the agents he was a Mexican national in the United States illegally. The government indicted Appellant for reentry without permission by an alien deported after conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).

At trial, Appellant moved to suppress his statements to the agents, arguing the stop could not be considered an extended border search and the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The district court agreed the stop was not an extended border search, but held the agents had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to support a Terry stop.

The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held the agents did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant. First, the stop occurred 450 miles from the nearest border crossing and there was no reason to believe Appellant had come from the border. Second, Appellant’s driving posture speed change and the fact the SUV was registered to a woman was not indicative of criminal activity. Third, the SUV had not been reported stolen, had no outstanding warrants or criminal activity associated with it, and had not recently been documented as crossing the border. Finally, the agents could not identify anything about the SUV that rendered it more likely than other SUVs to be transporting illegal aliens.

Even though the agents violated the Fourth Amendment in stopping Appellant, the court still denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. The court noted previous Fifth Circuit case law held an alien’s INS file and identity are not subject to suppression when law enforcement officers learn of a deported alien’s unlawful reentry after an allegedly unconstitutional stop.

Three Participants Does Not Automatically Constitute “Organized Crime”

By Organized Crime

Organized CrimeSome prosecutors and state investigators out there believe that if there are three participants in an alleged offense, then there is evidence of “Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity.”  Not so.  At least not every time.

As THIS ARTICLE from TDCAA explains, the State needs more if it wants to charge someone in Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity.

Says law school pal of ours, Ben Hoover:

“When it comes to proving an EOCA case in Texas, there is more required than just proving that three or more persons committed a crime or even multiple crimes. The law requires proof of an ongoing course of criminal activity.”

Ben provides several good case references in the article which give examples of fact scenarios where the courts of appeals have held the certain conduct did not constitute Organized Crime.  Check it out.  It helped us get a EOCA charge dismissed recently.  It may help you too.

No Per Se Exigency for Warrantless Blood Draw in DWI Cases

By DWI, Warrantless Search

U.S. Supreme Court holds:  “In drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify a blood test without a warrant.” 

, No. 11-1425 (U.S. Apr 17, 2013). The Defendant was charged with DWI.  He filed a motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw that was taken without a valid search warrant.  The trial court granted the motion to suppress.  The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the motion.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court. Kennedy concurred. Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part. Thomas dissented. The question was whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presented a per se exigency that justified an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases.  The Court held that it did not.  While the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, it does not do so categorically.

Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable has to be determined on the totality of the circumstances.  Any compelled intrusion into the human body implicates significant, constitutionally protected privacy interests.  The general importance of the interest in combating drunk driving does not justify departing from the warrant requirement without showing exigent circumstances that make securing a warrant impractical in a particular case.  Because the case was argued on the broad proposition that drunk-driving cases present a per se exigency, the Court was not provided with an adequate analytic framework for a detailed discussion of all the relevant factors to determine the reasonableness of acting without a warrant.

Where’s Your Sign? No Traffic Offense if Road Sign Not Visible

By Drug Crimes

In Abney v. Statethe Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop when a vehicle was driving in the left lane of a road without passing.  There was a road sign that prohibited driving in the left lane without passing, but it was located over 20 miles away from where the Appellant was pulled over.

As tends to happen, the police officer found marijuana during the traffic stop. At trial, and on appeal, the Appellant claimed that he did not commit a traffic violation because the road sign was not anywhere near where the stop occurred.  The trial court and 5th Court of Appeals (Dallas) overruled this argument.  The CCA, on the other hand found it meritorious.

The Transportation Code certainly indicates that if there is a sign present that says the left lane is for passing only, then it is a traffic offense to travel in the left lane when not passing another vehicle. Section 544.004(a) states that an operator of a vehicle shall comply with an applicable official traffic control device such as a “left lane for passing only” sign. Without such a sign present within a reasonable distance of the traffic stop, there is no offense.

The CCA reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the officer lack reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.  The evidence should have been suppressed at trial.

5th Circuit Update: Evidence Admitted Over Miranda Violation

By Drug Crimes, Miranda

United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3366 (5th Cir. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013)

A federal agent saw Appellant walk out of a house under surveillance as part of a drug investigation.  The agent approached Appellant, handcuffed him and placed him in his police vehicle.  Without advising Appellant of his Miranda rights, the agent asked him if he was guarding a drug-house and if there were drugs in the house.  Appellant replied, “Yes” to both questions and then requested an attorney.  The agent asked Appellant for consent to search the house, which Appellant granted.

The agents found over two thousand kilograms of marijuana in the house. The district court suppressed Appellant’s admissions that he was guarding marijuana in the house because they were obtained in violation of Miranda, which the government conceded on appeal.  However, the district court refused to suppress the marijuana recovered from the house.

First, Appellant argued the marijuana should have been suppressed because the agent obtained consent to search from Appellant after he requested an attorney.  Second, Appellant claimed the agents’ use of his admissions, which were later suppressed, automatically rendered his consent to search involuntary. The Court disagreed.

In Edwards v. Arizona the Supreme Court held when an accused invokes his right to counsel, he is not subject to further questioning until counsel has been made available to him.  However, a violation of the Edwards rule does not require suppression of physical, non-testimonial evidence.  Consequently, even if the agent violated Edwards when he asked Appellant for consent to search the house, that violation would not justify suppression of the marijuana, which is physical, non-testimonial evidence.

Next, the court held Appellant’s consent was not automatically rendered involuntary because his Miranda rights were violated.  Such a rule is not consistent with the multi-factor approach courts must use when determining voluntariness.  Using that approach, and considering the Miranda violation, the district court found Appellant voluntarily consented to the search of the house.

Another Dog Scent Lineup Case Overturned

By Dog Scent Lineup

The Court of Criminal Appeals does not like dog scent lineup evidence.  While it has not come right out and declared such evidence categorically inadmissible (like polygraph evidence), it seems pretty close.  With each new dog scent lineup case, we learn how unreliable this type of evidence can be.

In Winfrey v. State, the CCA overturned a capital murder conviction wherein the evidence included a dog scent lineup.  The Court noted that the dog scent lineup along with the remainder of the evidence (all of it circumstantial) was only enough to raise a “suspicion of guilt,” but not enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The CCA overturned the conviction as being legally insufficient.

*Anytime we have a case involving a drug dog, we employ an expert consultant to review the dog handling technique of the officer. One of the best drug dog experts in Steve Scott with Scott’s Police K9 LLC in Flower Mound, Texas.

Warrantless Search with GPS Device

By Warrantless Search

New Case from the 5th Circuit (Federal):  United States v. Andres, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 143 (5th Cir. Tex. Jan. 3, 2013)

Synopsis:  In December 2009, federal agents conducting an investigation into a large drug trafficking operation installed a GPS device underneath a pick-up truck, with a trailer attached to it, while it was parked on a public street after it had been loaded with twenty kilos of cocaine. Federal agents monitored the truck’s movements as it drove toward Chicago.

The agents contacted the Illinois State Police, gave them information about the truck, and told them they would like to have the drugs discovered during a traffic stop so they would not have to disclose the existence of a federal investigation. After being provided GPS information on the truck, a police officer saw it on an interstate highway and began to follow it.

The officer conducted a traffic stop on the truck for improper lane usage and improper lighting after he saw the trailer was swaying back and forth within its lane and its taillights were flickering.  After the officer wrote a warning ticket, he asked Appellant to get out of the truck so he could talk to him about the taillight problem.

After inspecting the electrical connection between the truck and trailer, the officer handed Appellant his clipboard so he could sign the ticket.  While Appellant was signing the ticket, the officer asked him where he was coming from.  Appellant told the officer he was coming from Joliet, but the officer knew this could not be possible based on the surveillance the officers had been conducting.  The officer also noticed that Appellant had begun to fidget and move his feet and arms around very nervously.  When the officer asked Appellant if he had any drugs in the truck, he said, “No” and then consented to a search with a drug dog.  The drug dog alerted and the officers found twenty kilos of cocaine hidden in the truck.

Appellant argued the drug evidence should have been suppressed because the initial traffic stop was a pretext and not based on any actual traffic offense.  Even if the traffic stop was valid, Appellant claimed the officer’s continued questioning and dog search were not reasonably related to the original reasons for the stop.

First, the court held the officer was justified in stopping Appellant based on the traffic violations he saw.  Second, the court held the officer’s continued seizure of Appellant after the reason for the initial traffic stop ended was supported by reasonable suspicion.  It was reasonable for the officer, who had stopped Appellant for a safety violation concerning his trailer, to ask him to get out of his truck to look at the trailer and discuss the problem.  In addition, the officer’s question, asking Appellant where he was coming from, occurred before the officer had finished dealing with the traffic offenses and did not extend the scope or duration of the stop. Appellant’s untruthful answer created reasonable suspicion that justified his continued detention, which ultimately led to the officer receiving consent to search the truck.

Appellant also argued the warrantless placement and use of the GPS device to monitor the movements of his truck violated the Fourth Amendment in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Jones, decided in 2012. The Fifth Circuit Court declined to rule on whether warrantless GPS searches are per se unreasonable.  Even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred, the court held the evidence should not be suppressed in this case because in December 2009, it was objectively reasonable for agents in the Fifth Circuit to believe that warrantless GPS tracking was allowed under circuit precedent.

The Uncertainty of Criminal Trial

By Trial Advocacy

This past week in Tarrant County, Texas I watched a sexual assault trial that I never dreamed would end in a conviction.  We were not defending the case, but I found it interesting, so I went to watch part of the trial.  While the defendant was not particularly likable, it didn’t seem to me that she was a criminal.  I knew the jurors would not like her, but I didn’t think they would convict her of a felony offense.  But that’s the thing about trial.  I don’t get to sit on the jury.  It only matters what 12 citizens think about the case.  I can think about criminal cases in purely legal terms, but jurors are often swayed by emotion.

This case reminded me that there is always a risk in going to trial.  An inherent uncertainty.  Even when you feel pretty confident about your case.  Thankfully, our criminal defense firm has been fortunate enough to get some favorable verdicts in recent trials, but those could have gone the other way very easily.  It is a sobering reality for criminal defense lawyers that someone’s life and future is in your hands.  Even more sobering, however, is the realization that at trial it’s only partly in your hands.  All we can do is prepare, prepare, prepare, and put forth our very best effort.

A Couple of Troubling Cases: Drug Dogs and Consent Searches

By Warrantless Search
The following cases were reported to me as “interesting cases,” but I would reclassify them as “troubling” (especially the second one).  We might just see these again sometime soon if the CCA decides to hear them.
 
Duration of traffic stop not unreasonable, despite officer’s remark that the purpose of checking passenger’s license was to “buy time” until the K-9 dog arrived.
Campbell v. State, 2012 WL 3201923 (Tex.App.-Tyler Aug 08, 2012) (NO. 12-11-00324-CR)
Quoting from the opinion: “Appellant contends that the true purpose of the stop ended when he was cleared of any outstanding warrants at 12:44 a.m. In his brief, Appellant points out that the evidence indicates that (1) the officers did not smell marijuana in the vehicle, (2) [officers] discussed that Appellant and [passenger] were calm, but that their demeanor might change when the K–9 unit arrived, and (3) [officer] remarked that [other officer] was just buying some time by talking to [passenger]….We initially note that [officer’s] remark concerning [other officer’s] ‘buying time’ is troubling.  But the trial court was not required to examine [the] statement in a vacuum.  The officers were justified in checking whether there were any outstanding warrants for [passenger]….The traffic stop may have concluded more quickly if the officers had requested information on outstanding warrants for Appellant and [passenger] at the same time.  But the officers were under no obligation to investigate the situation in any particular order.”
D’s consent to house search deemed “voluntary,” despite presence of twenty officers on D’s property and a police helicopter hovering overhead.
 
Schield v. State, 2012 WL 3228829 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.) Aug 09, 2012) (NO. 01-11-00466-CR, 01-11-00467-CR)
Quoting from the opinion:  “‘An environment of few or many officers is significant in determining the validity of a consent to search,’ and the Court of Criminal Appeals ‘has been critical of consent given in the face of numbers of armed officers.’….We find this case distinguishable…Appellant was behind a tall privacy fence on his property when [officer] called and asked him to come to the front of the property….[I]n Lowery, one of the officers had a pistol drawn, and at least five officers were inside the apartment before the seventeen year-old gave verbal consent, but here only two officers, with no guns drawn, approached the middle-aged Appellant at his gate to ask for consent….Appellant further testified that none of the officers yelled at him and that he made small talk with the officers before they asked him to sign the consent form.”