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Consensual Police Encounters: CCA’s State v. Castleberry

Lego police officer character smiling and waving, representing themes of law enforcement and consensual police encounters in a legal context.

Perpetuating the Fiction of the Consensual Police Encounter

ByConsensual Encounter, Criminal Defense

Is there really such a thing as a Consensual Police Encounter that ends with an arrest?

Lego police officer character smiling and holding a handcuff, representing themes of law enforcement and consensual encounters in criminal defense discussions.In a case released yesterday from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (State v. Castleberry), the CCA went to great lengths to defend and perpetuate the fiction of the consensual police encounter.

In Castleberry, the defendant and a friend were walking behind an Uncle Julio’s restaurant in Dallas. They were not engaged in and did not appear likely to engage in criminal conduct. A Dallas police officer approached them and asked for identification. The defendant reached for his waistband. The police officer then ordered appellant to place his hands in the air. The defendant grabbed a baggy of cocaine from his waistband and tossed it on the ground. The trial court suppressed the cocaine, reasoning that the officer did not have “reasonable suspicion” to justify the stop. The 5th District Court of Appeals agreed.

The CCA, on the other hand, held that the lower courts applied the wrong legal standard and characterized the stop as a consensual police encounter. Writing for the majority, Judge Keasler, stated:

Even if the officer did not tell the citizen that the request for identification or information may be ignored, the fact that a citizen complied with the request does not negate the consensual nature of the encounter…We conclude that a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position would have felt free to decline [the officer’s] request for identification and information.

The obvious question then becomes, what would the CCA preferred the defendant to do? “No, thanks officer, I prefer not to provide any identification or tell you what I am doing. Thank you. Have a nice night.” Had the appellant said that, there is no doubt the court would now be using his noncompliance to justify a more intrusive search. There is absolutely no way for the defendant to win here.

The opinion goes on to suggest police officers (even when they are in uniform) are just like any average citizen.

Because an officer is just as free as anyone to question, and request identification from, a fellow citizen, [the officer’s]conduct shows that the interaction was a consensual encounter.

Ultimately, the CCA reasons that because the defendant could have been reaching for a weapon when he reached into his waistband, the officer’s further pat-down search was justified under Terry.

The CCA concludes:

The Court of Appeals failed to separate [the encounter] into two distinct parts: (1) [The officer’s] initial approach of [the defendant], which was a consensual encounter; and (2) [The defendant’s] act of reaching for his waistband, which provided [the officer] with reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk [the defendant]. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’s judgment, hold the seized contraband to be admissible, and remand the cause to the trial court.

Walmart greeter wearing a blue vest with "How may I help you?" text, standing at store entrance, overseeing customers and shopping carts.

Man Convicted of Forgery for Showing a Fake Walmart Receipt

ByForgery

Walmart greeter in blue vest with text "How may I help you?" observing store entrance, relevant to case of forgery involving fake receipt.Allen walks into Walmart, picks out a nice computer and matching desk, loads both into a shopping cart and proceeds to the exit. Of course, before he can make it out of the store, the infamous receipt-checker stops him at the door. Allen shows a fake Walmart “receipt.” Unfortunately for Allen, the receipt-checker isn’t as dumb as he was hoping. The receipt checker quickly identifies the receipt as a phony and Allen is detained while police are called.

These are the general facts of Shipp v. State, a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case released last week and designated for publication. In Shipp, the appellant was tried and convicted of the state jail felony offense of Forgery of a Commercial Instrument. With his enhancements, punishment was assessed at 20 years in TDCJ-ID.

Can a Consensual Police Encounter in Texas Lead to Arrest?

Shipp argued on appeal that the phony receipt didn’t qualify as a “commercial instrument” under 32.21(d) of the Penal Code. The 6th District Court of Appeals (Texarkana) agreed, holding:

There was no testimony provided here to demonstrate that a receipt issued by this Wal-Mart store is anything more than the memorialization of a past transaction, as opposed to other kinds of things granting or ceding future benefits or rights listed in Section 32.21(d).

The 6th Court of Appeals used the statutory construction doctrine of Ejusdem generis (you can read the opinion for more, but simply put, when general words in a statute follow specific words, courts should look to the specific words for meaning) to arrive at its conclusion that the legislature did not intend to include such items as a Walmart receipt in the statute .

The CCA, on the other hand, declined to use the doctrine here because of the wide range of writings set out in 32.21(d).  Instead, the CCA looked to the legislative history behind 32.21(d) and held that this degree of forgery (state jail felony) was meant to include “documents of commerce.”  The CCA did not define “other commercial instrument” but nevertheless concluded that a store receipt falls within the definition of “documents of commerce.” Adressing Ejusdem generis the CCA states:

To invoke the rule of ejusdem generis to exclude such a patent example of a ‘commercial instrument’ would serve to defeat rather than effectuate the intent of the Legislature…

Dissenting, Presiding Judge Keller joined by Judge Johnson agree with the Court of Appeals’ use of Ejusdem generis stating:

the phrase ‘or other commercial instrument’ must also refer to a document that creates or discharges an economic obligation or that transfers property.

Presiding Judge Keller points out that a receipt has consistently been considered a “document” for purposes of the forgery statute (citing all the way back to 1884 – wow!) but is not an “other commercial instrument” for purposes of making it a state jail felony level. Thus, in her opinion, Shipp should have been prosecuted for a misdemeanor offense.

I would never have imagined a Walmart receipt being a “commercial instrument,” but apparently it is, so says the Court.