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Prosecutorial Misconduct

Oct 07
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HL Hunt Mansion Dallas Hill v State

Dallas Oil Family’s Dismissal for Vindictive Prosecution Upheld on Appeal

By Criminal Defense, White Collar

How Far Does the Trial Courts Discretion Go in Determining Whether to Hold a Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing?

HL Hunt Mansion Dallas Hill v StateOn September 21st the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued a decision on the oil tycoon heir Albert Hill III’s criminal appeal. The question the Court faced was whether it was in the trial court’s discretion to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Hill’s motions to quash and dismiss based on prosecutorial vindictiveness. The Court determined that it was within the trial court’s discretion to conduct such a pretrial evidentiary hearing and that discretion was not limited by the defendant meeting “a certain threshold evidentiary requirement.”

Court Opinion: State of Texas v. Albert Hill (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

The Facts | Trial Court Finds Dallas DA’s Actions Improper

Appellant Hill is the great-grandson of legendary Dallas oil billionaire H.L. Hunt and the events surrounding the indictment dealt with a multi-million dollar trust litigation between Hill and his father. Hill and his wife Erin were indicted in 2011 for making false and misleading statements in order to obtain a $500,000 mortgage from Omni American Bank. The indictment came shortly after Hill won in the trust litigation against his father. Prior to the indictment (but after Albert Hill’s victory in the trust litigation) Hill’s father’s attorney, Michael Lynn delivered a memo to the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office which alleged various offenses committed by Hill and his wife. Hill challenged these charges by filing a motion to quash the indictment and a motion to dismiss. Hill argued that the District Attorney, Craig Watkins, was under the influence of his disgruntled father as well as Lisa Blue Baron, one of Hill’s attorneys in the trust litigation case that had just filed a lawsuit against Hill seeking several million dollars in legal fees.

Some items of interest that the court noted were:

  • Lisa Blue Baron exchanged several phone calls and text messages with Watkins leading up to the indictment;
  • Michael Lynn’s law partner donated $48,500 to Watkins’ campaign prior to the indictment;
  • Lisa Blue Baron made a $100,000 donation to SMU LAW in Watkins’ honor after the indictment;
  • Lisa Blue Baron also held a fundraising event for Watkins’ campaign at her house and made a $5,000 donation to the campaign.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Hill’s motions and granted both the motion to quash and the motion to dismiss.

The Court of Appeals Reversed the Trial Court’s Decision

The Fifth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissals holding that the trial court “erred in conducting a hearing on Hill’s motion to dismiss.” The State argued that the trial court should not have held a pretrial evidentiary hearing because Hill failed to prove, with evidence, a prima facie case of prosecutorial misconduct and vindictiveness. The Court of Appeals stated that before a pretrial evidentiary can be held for a defendant claiming a violation of his constitutional rights, the defendant must “present facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt about the constitutionality of his prosecution.” The Court of Appeals found that Hill did not sufficiently meet this standard.

The Court of Criminal Appeals Disagrees with the Court of Appeals, holds that Trial Courts Have Sound Discretion to Conduct a Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing

1. Article 28.01 – The CCA points to Article 28.01 in determining that the trial court had the discretion to hold a pretrial hearing on Hill’s motions to quash and suppress. Article 28.01 §1 provides that a trial court “may set any criminal case for a pre-trial hearing” and that some of things that the pre-trial hearing shall be to determine is the “pleadings of the defendant,’ ‘exceptions to the form or substance of the indictment,’ or discovery.’” Article 28.01 §1(1), (2), (4), (8). Additionally, while Article 28.01 does not expressly provide for an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss like it does for a motion to suppress, the Court determined that it would be a misapplication of the rules of statutory construction to decide that oral testimony cannot be used in a pretrial hearing to resolve any other issue raised.

2. Case Law – The Court supported its Article 28.01 decision with the Court’s decision in Neal v. State which held that a defendant is required to “preserve a complaint of vindictive prosecution by filing a pretrial motion to quash and dismiss.” 150 S.W.3d 169. With that decision in mind the Court said “it would make no sense to limit the trial court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing on such motion.”

The State pointed to federal case law that provided defendant must make a prima facie case that raised a reasonable doubt. However, these cases dealt with the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying a pretrial hearing. Thus, the Court stated that this case law is not on point in Hill’s case and thus are not controlling on this issue, and do not persuade the Court to hold otherwise.

Decision of the Criminal Court of Appeals | The Trial Court’s Discretion is Not Limited

The CCA determined that Article 28.01 has no limiting factor on the judge’s discretion to hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing based on any threshold evidentiary standard. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in conducting the pretrial evidentiary hearing in Hill’s case but instead acted within its bounds of sound discretion.

Dec 18
Love3
Online Comment US v. Pratt

Prosecutor’s Online Comments Did Not Prejudice the Jury

By Ethics

When should online comments made by prosecutors rise to the level of misconduct, so that a ‘presumption of prejudice’ would likely be granted on appeal?

Online Comment US v. PrattA district court convicted Renee Pratt, a prominent Louisiana politician, of conspiracy to violate the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Pratt’s conviction resulted from a thorough investigation of her long-time friend, Mose Jefferson, a well-known Louisiana community organizer and politician, as well as his family. United States v. Pratt, 728 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1328 (2014). The Jefferson family and Pratt were accused of obtaining community-service grants, and using the money for personal gain. Id. Pratt timely appealed, citing new evidence that several prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”), made negative and persuasive online comments in public forums, including a local newspaper’s website, regarding her case around the time of trial. Pratt claims that the jury rendered a guilty verdict because of the disparaging and prejudicial comments.

Read the 5th Circuit’s Full Opinion in United States v. Pratt.

Around the time of Pratt’s filing a motion for a new trial, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) conducted an investigation to determine whether attorneys working for the DOJ/USAO were making inappropriate statements online about pending cases. Office of Prof. Resp., Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of Allegations of Professional Misconduct Against Former Assistant Attorneys Salvador Perricone and Jan Mann. OPR Report at 2, (2013). The results of the investigation showed that attorneys from the Louisiana division of the USAO and DOJ “anonymously authored dozens of…online comments…posted on nola.com, the website of the widely-read New Orleans Times- Picayune.” Id. Using several pseudonyms, a senior-level prosecutor, “posted his views…of Louisiana politics…refer[ring] to Pratt’s case.” Id. While Pratt’s trial was pending, the prosecutor commented, “If Pratt walks, it’s the judge’s victory…a sad day for justice.” Id. Post-conviction, a second prosecutor, “proclaimed Pratt’s guilt, defended Pratt’s sentence, and characterized Pratt as driven by greed” on nola.com. OPR Report at 42 (reproducing comments posted in Nov. 2011).

A few months later, the district court that convicted Pratt held a limited evidentiary hearing to “develop a clearer record of any [outside] influence the anonymous comments may have had on Pratt’s trial.” Unlike a standard hearing, this ‘limited hearing’ consisted of a questionnaire submitted to two jurors who had previously identified nola.com as their source of news during jury selection. Both jurors reported no influence by the comments on nola.com. Accordingly, the district court denied Pratt’s motion for a new trial, concluding, “[there is] a lack of evidence that…the jury…was tainted by…the [online] comments.” Pratt appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for relief.

The Court of Appeals must determine whether the online comments made by the high-level attorneys rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct, so that in Pratt’s case, a presumption of prejudice may be granted, relieving Pratt from the district court’s guilty verdict in her RICO case. The Court considered a Rule 33 Motion for New trial, where a court may “vacate a judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires” and in the interest of “fairness of the trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a); United States v. Turner, 674 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 613 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1980).

A presumption of prejudice may be made in certain extreme cases or pre-trial publicity. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 381 (2010). There is no ground, however, to presume prejudice based on prosecutorial misconduct alone. In affirming a grant of a new trial, reasons for granting a new trial are “novel and extraordinary.” United States v. Bowen, 799 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2015). For a new trial to be warranted, the court must normally find that the misconduct in question actually prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 356; United States v. Bowler, 252 F.3d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 2001).

Here, the Court concludeed that the prosecutorial misconduct—the online comments—is “too far removed from the proceedings to support a presumption of prejudice,” as the attorney who made the comment, “did not prosecute or deal with the Pratt trial,” and because, “no one from the trial team posted the comments…while the trial was underway.” Second, the Court states that rulings on Rule 33 Motions are “necessarily deferential to the trial court” in that the facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the lower court’s verdict. United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 2004). Lastly, the Court opined that in “certain extreme cases, pretrial publicity…can manifestly taint a criminal prosecution, [giving] rise to a presumption of prejudice.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 379 (2010). The Court says that the comments made regarding Pratt’s trial were not extreme, “this is not such an extraordinary case…this…concerns a handful of anonymous, speculative postings…that lacked the kind of blatantly prejudicial information…that might poison public opinion and entitle the defendant to a presumption of prejudice.” United States v. McRae, 795 F.3d 471, 481-82 (5th Cir. 2015). Even though prosecutorial misconduct did in fact occur, the Court affirms the district court’s verdict and denies Pratt’s motion for new trial. According to the 5th Circuit, the online comments were far too attenuated to apply to Pratt’s trial and did not affect the guilty verdict.

All attorneys are bound by specific ethical protocols and procedures, promulgated and enforced by each state’s bar association. In Texas, lawyers must abide by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Texas Prosecutors are held to an even higher standard under the “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor” not to make extrajudicial statements that “in the course of representing a client…a reasonable person would [not] expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the [prosecutor] knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding.” Tex. Rules of Disciplinary Procedure §3.09; 3.07(a).