Terry Stops & Court Cases: Understanding Reasonable Suspicion

Short answer: In Texas, you generally do not have to give police your name if you are only being questioned or briefly detained as a pedestrian. Refusing to give your name, address, or date of birth becomes a crime under Penal Code §38.02(a) only after you have been lawfully arrested. Giving a false name, address, or date of birth is a separate and more serious offense if you have been lawfully arrested or detained, or if an officer believes you witnessed a crime. Drivers are different: a driver stopped for a traffic violation must show a license, and a driver who has no license to show and then refuses to give identifying information can be charged under a newer subsection, §38.02(b-1).

"Failure to identify" is one of the most misunderstood charges in Texas. Many people believe they must always answer when an officer asks for their name. Others believe they never have to. The truth depends on whether you are being questioned, detained, or arrested, whether you are driving, and whether you tell the officer the truth.

At Howard Lotspeich Alexander & Williams, PLLC (HLAW), our Fort Worth criminal defense lawyers defend misdemeanor and felony charges in Tarrant, Dallas, Denton, Collin, Johnson, and Parker counties. This guide explains what Texas Penal Code §38.02 actually requires, how failure to identify is punished, and the defenses that often matter in these cases.

Key Takeaways

• Refusing to identify is a crime only after a lawful arrest. Under §38.02(a), the offense requires a refusal to a peace officer "who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information" (Tex. Penal Code §38.02).
• Lying is broader than refusing. Under §38.02(b), giving a false or fictitious name, address, or date of birth is an offense if the officer has lawfully arrested you, lawfully detained you, or has good cause to believe you are a witness to a crime.
• Drivers have extra duties. A driver must "display the license on the demand of a magistrate, court officer, or peace officer" (Tex. Transp. Code §521.025). Under §38.02(b-1), a lawfully detained driver who fails to show a license and intentionally refuses to give identifying information commits an offense.
• Penalties range from a fine-only Class C to a Class A misdemeanor. Refusing is a Class C misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $500. Giving false information is a Class B misdemeanor, punishable by up to 180 days in jail and a $2,000 fine. The level goes up if the person was a fugitive from justice (Tex. Penal Code ch. 12).
• The stop itself must be lawful. In Brown v. Texas (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a conviction under an earlier version of §38.02 because El Paso officers "lacked any reasonable suspicion" when they stopped the defendant (Brown v. Texas).
• The State must prove you knew it was a peace officer. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the State must allege that the accused knew the person asking was a peace officer (Green v. State, Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

What Does Texas Penal Code §38.02 Say?

Section 38.02 creates three distinct offenses (Tex. Penal Code §38.02):

Offense	What the State must show	When it applies	Usual level
Refusing to identify, §38.02(a)	You intentionally refused to give your name, residence address, or date of birth	Only after a lawful arrest and a request for the information	Class C misdemeanor
Giving false identification, §38.02(b)	You intentionally gave a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth	After a lawful arrest, during a lawful detention, or when the officer has good cause to believe you are a witness to a crime	Class B misdemeanor
Driver refusing to identify, §38.02(b-1)	A lawfully detained driver failed to provide or display a license and intentionally refused to give name, license number, residence address, or date of birth	Traffic stops and other lawful detentions of a motor vehicle operator	Class C misdemeanor (Class B if a false name was given)

The statute also says that giving an officer a residence address that is different from the one on your license is not a refusal under (b-1) "if the address given to the officer is the person's actual residence address."

Do You Have to Give Police Your Name in Texas?

It depends on what stage the encounter is in.

During a voluntary conversation

If an officer simply approaches and starts asking questions, and you are free to leave, Texas law does not make it a crime to decline to give your name. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "in the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment," but a request is not the same as a legal duty to answer (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court).

During a detention

If you are detained, meaning an officer has reasonable suspicion and you are not free to leave, Texas does not make a mere refusal to identify a crime for a pedestrian. Section 38.02(a) applies only after a lawful arrest. However, if you choose to answer and give a false name, address, or date of birth during a lawful detention, you can be charged under §38.02(b).

This is a key difference between Texas and some other states. In Hiibel (2004), the Supreme Court upheld a Nevada law that required a person detained on reasonable suspicion to state his name. Texas's current statute is narrower for pedestrians. It does not make refusing during a detention a crime, though it does punish lying.

After an arrest

Once you have been lawfully arrested and an officer asks for your name, residence address, or date of birth, an intentional refusal is an offense under §38.02(a). Courts have reversed convictions where the State could not prove the refusal happened after an arrest. In Curry v. State (Tex. App. Texarkana 2015), the court rendered an acquittal because "no evidence shows that Curry was under arrest at any time before he failed to identify" (Curry v. State).

What Are the Rules for Drivers at a Traffic Stop?

Drivers have duties that pedestrians and passengers do not. Under Transportation Code §521.025, a person required to hold a driver's license must have it while driving and must "display the license on the demand of a magistrate, court officer, or peace officer" (Tex. Transp. Code §521.025). Failing to do so is a separate misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $200 for a first offense.

Section 38.02(b-1) adds a failure-to-identify offense specific to drivers. It applies when a motor vehicle operator is lawfully detained for an alleged violation of law, fails to provide or display a license on request, and intentionally refuses to give his name, driver's license number, residence address, or date of birth. It is a Class C misdemeanor, raised to a Class B if the driver gave a false name (Tex. Penal Code §38.02).

Passengers are generally treated like pedestrians under §38.02. They are not required to identify themselves unless arrested, but they can be charged if they give false information while lawfully detained. Officers can also extend a traffic stop only in limited circumstances; see our guide to how long a Texas traffic stop can last.

What Are the Penalties for Failure to Identify in Texas?

Penalties under §38.02(c) and (d) depend on what happened and whether the person was a fugitive from justice (Tex. Penal Code §38.02; Tex. Penal Code ch. 12):

• Refusing after arrest, or driver refusal under (b-1): Class C misdemeanor, a fine of up to $500.
• Giving false information: Class B misdemeanor, up to 180 days in jail and a fine of up to $2,000.
• Refusing after arrest while a fugitive from justice: Class B misdemeanor.
• Giving false information while a fugitive from justice: Class A misdemeanor, up to one year in jail and a fine of up to $4,000.

"Fugitive from justice" situations often arise when a person has an outstanding warrant and gives a false name to avoid it. If you think you may have a warrant, our guide on what to do about an outstanding warrant in DFW explains safer options than avoiding officers.

A failure-to-identify charge often comes alongside other charges, such as evading arrest or resisting arrest. Even a Class C conviction creates a criminal record, so it is worth taking seriously.

What Defenses Apply to a Failure to Identify Charge?

Every case depends on its facts, but these issues come up frequently in DFW courts.

There was no lawful arrest or detention

The statute requires a "lawful" arrest or detention. If the officer had no reasonable suspicion for the stop, or no probable cause for the arrest, an essential element may be missing. Brown v. Texas arose from an El Paso stop where officers saw two men walking away from each other in an alley in a high-crime area. The Supreme Court held that "the fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct" (Brown v. Texas).

The refusal happened before the arrest

Under §38.02(a), timing matters. If the request and refusal happened during a detention but before an arrest, a refusal alone is not the offense. That was the basis for the acquittal in Curry.

The State cannot prove the person was arrested, detained, or a witness

For false identification under §38.02(b), the State must prove one of three circumstances. In Mikel v. State, a Denton County case, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals ordered an acquittal because, "without proof that Mikel was either lawfully arrested, lawfully detained, or a witness to a criminal offense, a rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offense" (Mikel v. State, Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004).

The person did not know it was a peace officer

The Court of Criminal Appeals held in Green v. State that "in a prosecution under § 38.02, the State must allege that the person who refused to give identification or gave false identification knows the individual requesting the identification is a peace officer" (Green v. State). This can matter with plainclothes officers or chaotic scenes.

The information was not intentionally false

The offense requires intent. A misunderstanding, a nickname, a recent move, or a simple mistake about an address may not be an intentional false report. For drivers, (b-2) expressly protects a person who gives an actual residence address that differs from the address on the license.

What Should You Do if Police Ask for Your Name?

1. Stay calm and polite. Do not physically resist, even if you believe the stop is unlawful. Our article on resisting an unlawful arrest in Texas explains why.
2. Ask whether you are free to leave. The answer helps clarify whether you are in a voluntary encounter or a detention.
3. If you are driving, show your license when asked.
4. Never give a false name, address, or date of birth. Lying is the most common way people turn a simple encounter into a Class B or Class A charge.
5. If you are arrested, give your name, address, and date of birth. Refusing after arrest is a separate offense. You can still decline to answer other questions and ask for a lawyer; see our guide to the pre-arrest right to remain silent.
6. Write down what happened as soon as you can, including when the officer asked for your name and when you were told you were under arrest. Body camera and dash camera video often decide these cases.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is it illegal to refuse to show ID to police in Texas?

For a pedestrian or passenger who has not been arrested, refusing to identify is generally not a crime under §38.02. Once you are lawfully arrested, refusing to give your name, residence address, or date of birth is a Class C misdemeanor. Drivers must display a license on demand, and a lawfully detained driver who fails to show a license and refuses to give identifying information can be charged under §38.02(b-1).

Is giving a fake name to police a crime in Texas?

Yes, if the officer has lawfully arrested you, lawfully detained you, or has good cause to believe you witnessed a crime. It is generally a Class B misdemeanor, and a Class A misdemeanor if you were a fugitive from justice at the time.

Can I be arrested just for refusing to give my name?

Not lawfully, if you were only detained as a pedestrian and refusing was the only conduct, because §38.02(a) requires a prior lawful arrest. But an officer may arrest you for another offense if there is probable cause, and after that arrest, refusing to identify becomes an offense.

Do passengers have to identify themselves during a traffic stop in Texas?

Generally, passengers are not required to identify themselves under §38.02 unless they are arrested. However, giving a false name while lawfully detained is an offense. If an officer has reasonable suspicion that a passenger committed a crime, other legal rules may apply.

Can a failure to identify charge be expunged?

It may be. Eligibility for expunction or nondisclosure depends on how the case ends, such as a dismissal, an acquittal, or deferred adjudication. See our Texas expunction and nondisclosure guide.

Is failure to identify a serious charge?

It ranges from a fine-only Class C misdemeanor to a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in jail. It often travels with other charges, and any conviction can appear on a background check. It deserves a careful defense.

Talk to a Fort Worth Criminal Defense Lawyer

A failure-to-identify charge often turns on precise timing: when you were detained, when you were arrested, what was asked, and what you said. Video and police reports need to be reviewed carefully.

Call HLAW at (817) 993-9249 or contact us online for a free consultation about your Dallas-Fort Worth criminal case.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change, and every case depends on its specific facts.

Does an Officer’s Testimony That a Person was “Acting Suspicious” Establish Reasonable Suspicion to Support a Terry Stop?

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently handed down an opinion concerning the reasonable suspicion standard required for law enforcement officers to conduct a Terry stop—an exception to the warrant requirement. The issue facing the Court was whether merely “acting suspicious” is enough to establish reasonable suspicion to justify a law enforcement officer to initiate a Terry stop.

United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2017)

The Facts — District Court Found the Terry Stop to be Lawful Based On the Defendant's Demeanor, Remarks, and for Officer-safety Reasons

While on patrol in a marked police car, two officers observed Monsivais walking down the side of the I-20 interstate away from an apparently disabled truck. The officers stopped in front of Monsivais and activated the car’s emergency lights in order to ask Monsivais if he needed roadside assistance. As Monsivais approached, he ignored the officers and walked past their patrol car. At this point, the officers exited their vehicle, and asked Monsivais where he was going and if he needed any help. Monsivais told the officers he was heading to Fort Worth (even though his vehicle was pointed towards Abilene). During questioning, Monsivais appeared nervous and repeatedly placed his hands in his pockets; however upon the officer’s request, Monsivais removed his hands. Additionally, Monsivais responded politely to all of the officers’ questions. After approximately four minutes, one of the officers advised Monsivais that he was going to pat Monsivais down for weapons because of his behavior, inconsistent statements and for officer safety reasons. Shortly thereafter, Monsivais told the officer that he had a firearm in his waistband. The officer seized the firearm and Monsivais was later charged with possession of a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States.

Monsivais filed a motion to suppress the firearm and other evidence, arguing that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment because he did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Monsivais was involved in criminal activity when he detained him. The district court denied Monsivais' motion to suppress, holding only that the “consensual encounter was transformed into a lawful Terry frisk due to the Defendant's demeanor, remarks, and for officer-safety reasons.”

The Court of Appeals Reversed the District Court’s Decision—Holding the Officers Lacked a Basis to Reasonably Suspect Monsivais of a Criminal Act

The Court first determined that the officer seized Monsivais for Fourth Amendment purposes when he told Monsivais that he was going to pat him down. At this point, the officer converted the roadside assistance “welfare check” into an investigative detention—otherwise known as a Terry stop.

“The Fourth Amendment generally requires officers to obtain a warrant before searching or seizing an individual.” However, pursuant to a narrow exception announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968), police officers may briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if under the totality of relevant circumstance they can point to “specific and articulable facts” that give rise to reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 2014).

Here, the Court found that while Monsivais’ behavior might not have been typical of all stranded motorists, the officers could not point to any specific and articulable facts that Monsivais had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime before seizing him.

The court explained that Monsivais’ nervous demeanor alone was insufficient to create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to justify a Terry stop. In fact, the Court gives little or no weight to an officer's statement that a suspect appeared nervous. United States v. Portillo–Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the Court held that evidence of Monsivais placing his hands in his pocket is of little significance. The Court noted that any number of people walking down the street might have their hands in their pockets. Additionally, the Court determined there were no inconsistencies in Monsivais’ story; and, even if there were, the inconsistencies would not connect Monsivais with any reasonably suspected unlawful conduct. Moreover, Monsivais’ choice to ignore the officers’ presence by merely walking past them, not fleeing, did not give rise to criminal activity.

In conclusion, the officer testified that he never suspected Monsivais was involved in any criminal activity, but rather that Monsivais was just acting “suspicious.” As such, the court found that the officer seized Monsivais without reasonable suspicion and that the evidence obtained from the unlawful seizure should have been suppressed.

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Upholds a Stop and Frisk Case

Furr v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

On September 21st the Criminal Court of Appeals decided Furr v. State. In Furr, the Court held that an anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to establish reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Appellant Furr. To support the stop and frisk, the court noted that Appellant:

• watched the officer as he drove by,
• repeatedly looked at the officer as he walked away,
• was nervous, anxious and sort of out of it,
• appeared under the influence of drugs, and
• did not initially respond as to whether he was armed.

Further, the Court stated it is not per se objectively reasonable for a police officer to execute a pat down of a suspect for weapons simply because they are accused of drug possession.

The Facts of Furr v. State

Corpus Christi Police Department received an anonymous tip that two men were doing drugs on a particular street corner, one dressed in all black and the other in a black shirt carrying a brown backpack. In response, an officer drove past the street corner. He observed two men that fit the description from the tip and noticed in his rearview mirror that the men were watching him as he drove by. The officer then approached the two men but one of the men, Furr, walked away into the nearby shelter, repeatedly looking over his shoulder at the officer. The officer described Furr's actions as furtive, “like he was trying to get away.”

When another officer arrived, the officers made contact with Furr. Furr was described as nervous, anxious, evasive, and was sweating excessively. Furr did not respond when the officers initially asked if he had any weapons on him. Officers said he appeared “kind of out of it” and “like he was under the influence of a drug. As a result, for safety reasons, officers frisked Furr for weapons and found a glass crack pipe in Furr’s front pocket. When removing the pipe, the officer also found two syringes, and after arrest, two small balloons of heroin.

Furr was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal after his motion to suppress was denied. Furr argued on Appeal that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him and that the trial court erred by not granting the Motion to Suppress the search.

The Court of Appeals Affirmed the Trial Courts Decision

The court of appeals held that Furr’s nervousness coupled with the observation that he seemed to be under the influence of a drug sufficiently corroborated the tip to support the investigative detention and that Furr’s failure to initially respond about being armed coupled with the other circumstances justified the frisk.

The Criminal Court of Appeals Concluded that there Was Reasonable Suspicion to Detain and Frisk Furr.

1. The Analysis of the Detention

In order to detain a person, the police officer must have reasonable suspicion based on “specific articulable facts, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Anything that happens or that is observed before the detention will be considered in determining whether the officer indeed had reasonable suspicion to detain Furr.

Furr argued that the anonymous tip alone was not enough.  The Court, however, explains that if there had only been the anonymous tip, it would not have established reasonable suspicion, but here there was more. The Court identifies several independent observations:

• Furr and the other man were at the specified location and matched the informant’s description.
• The area was a “high drug, high crime” area.
• Furr and the other man watched the officer as he drove past
• When the officer approached the two, Furr walked away “furtively.”
• When the officers came upon Furr in the shelter he was sweaty, nervous, anxious, and appeared out of it as if he was under the influence of a drug.

Thus, the reasonable suspicion here was not solely based on the informant’s tip, but instead that tip was corroborated by independent observations made by the police officers. Looking at the totality of these circumstances, the Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Furr and investigate the information from the anonymous tip that Furr and the other man were using and possessing a drug.

2. The Terry Frisk

The Court rejected the State’s request to adopt a rule that it is, “per se, objectively reasonable for the police to pat down a suspect for weapons if they are accused of possessing drugs,” because reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect cannot be established by accusations of drug possession alone.

The Court further rejects the State’s argument that the officer was objectively justified in patting Furr down for weapons because this was outside of a homeless shelter for two reasons: 1) Nothing in the record shows that the shelter was a homeless shelter; and 2) Even if it was a homeless shelter, the Court does not see a correlation between being armed and dangerous and being at a homeless shelter.

Even so, the Court ultimately agrees with the court of appeals that reasonable suspicion was established here because the anonymous tip was corroborated by all of the circumstances surrounding the officers’ interactions with Furr. Specifically, the Court noted the tip, personal observations by the officers and the high drug, high crime area would warrant a belief that the safety of officers and others was in danger.

DISSENT - Stop and Frisk Should Have Been Held Unlawful

Judge Meyers dissented from the majority and opined that the stop and frisk of Furr was unlawful and that the motion to suppress should have been granted. Judge Meyers concluded that neither Furr’s action of looking over his shoulder or the anonymous tip, alone or combined, were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Thus, there was no need to analyze the legality of the frisk. Judge Meyers believes that the majority made its decision “not based on law but on the feeling that Furr should not get relief.”

Frequently the public’s perception as to what officers can and cannot do during encounters is convoluted and even wrong. Many people are unaware of what their 4th Amendment rights actually afford them when it comes to contact with police officers. First, it’s important to know that an officer is completely free to approach whomever he wants and have a consensual encounter with someone whether or not he has a specific reason. However, an officer cannot detain you on a simple hunch, the police officer must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Then comes the question of what exactly is reasonable suspicion.

What is Reasonable Suspicion?

According to Fourth Amendment law, reasonable suspicion exists when there are specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from the facts, would lead a reasonable officer to believe crime was afoot. The police officer must have more than a hunch that a crime was in progress. If a police officer detains, frisks, or searches someone without reasonable suspicion that officer has violated the 4th Amendment and evidence coming from that unlawful detention must be suppressed.

The 4th Amendment in Action - Brodnex v State of Texas (2016)

In a case just decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, the Court overturned a conviction because it found the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, thus, violating the 4th Amendment.

In Brodnex v. State, the defendant was arrested and convicted of possession of a controlled substance. The arresting officer observed Brodnex and a female walking in an area known for narcotic activity around 2 a.m.. The officer approached the two individuals, asked them their names and what they were doing. When Brodnex identified himself, the officer asked him “Didn’t you just get picked up?” and Brodnex replied “Hell no.” The Officer then searched Brodnex and found a cigar tube with crack cocaine.

The Officer’s reasons for detaining Brodnex were:

• The time of day;
• The area’s known narcotic activity, and
• His belief, based on what other officers had told him, that Brodnex was a “known criminal.”

Brodnex filed a motion to suppress challenging both the stop and search. The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed.

The CCA Overturns the Conviction for Lack of Reasonable Suspicion

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that Brodnex was illegally detained because at the time of detention, under the totality of the circumstances, the facts apparent to the officer “did not provide him with a reasonable suspicion for the detention.” Therefore, the crack cocaine should have been suppressed. The court's holding relied on the fact that the officer had simply seen Brodnex walking, not doing anything that would suggest he was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity. Additionally, the court found that the officer’s limited personal knowledge of Brodnex’s criminal history was not enough to support the belief that Brodnex was lying about not being picked up.

Know Your Rights

This case explains that the officer must have sufficient information that links the suspect to a particular crime before reasonable suspicion exists. While the time of day and high-crime area are factors that Texas courts consider, those alone are insufficient to develop reasonable suspicion. Since reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances, it is often not completely clear as to whether a particular set of facts rises to the level of reasonable suspicion.

If you are facing criminal charges that resulted from a detention or search that might not have been supported by reasonable suspicion, any evidence found from might be able to be suppressed. Contact our criminal defense team today to discuss your case and determine whether a reasonable suspicion issue is present.

*To know your rights on the go, download our FREE Mobile App.

United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano, (5th Circuit June 27, 2013)

Border Patrol agents stopped Appellant as he was driving on Interstate 10, approximately 450 miles from the nearest United States-Mexico border crossing. The agents believed Appellant was transporting illegal aliens because he was driving an SUV; had both hands on the steering wheel, and he was not exhibiting the relaxed nature of most drivers. In addition, Appellant's speed dropped from 70 miles per hour to 60 miles per hours as the agents followed him, and when the agents pulled alongside Appellant, he stopped talking to the person in the passenger's seat.

The agents learned the car was registered to a woman; however, it had not been reported stolen, had no outstanding warrants or criminal activity associated with it, and had not recently crossed the border. During the stop, Appellant told the agents he was a Mexican national in the United States illegally. The government indicted Appellant for reentry without permission by an alien deported after conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).

At trial, Appellant moved to suppress his statements to the agents, arguing the stop could not be considered an extended border search and the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The district court agreed the stop was not an extended border search, but held the agents had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to support a Terry stop.

The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held the agents did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant. First, the stop occurred 450 miles from the nearest border crossing and there was no reason to believe Appellant had come from the border. Second, Appellant's driving posture speed change and the fact the SUV was registered to a woman was not indicative of criminal activity. Third, the SUV had not been reported stolen, had no outstanding warrants or criminal activity associated with it, and had not recently been documented as crossing the border. Finally, the agents could not identify anything about the SUV that rendered it more likely than other SUVs to be transporting illegal aliens.

Even though the agents violated the Fourth Amendment in stopping Appellant, the court still denied Appellant's motion to suppress. The court noted previous Fifth Circuit case law held an alien's INS file and identity are not subject to suppression when law enforcement officers learn of a deported alien's unlawful reentry after an allegedly unconstitutional stop.