Reasonable Suspicion to Stop and Frisk Upheld | Furr v. State (2016)

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Upholds a Stop and Frisk Case

Stop and Frisk Furr v. State 2016Furr v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

On September 21st the Criminal Court of Appeals decided Furr v. State. In Furr, the Court held that an anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to establish reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Appellant Furr. To support the stop and frisk, the court noted that Appellant:

  • watched the officer as he drove by,
  • repeatedly looked at the officer as he walked away,
  • was nervous, anxious and sort of out of it,
  • appeared under the influence of drugs, and
  • did not initially respond as to whether he was armed.

Further, the Court stated it is not per se objectively reasonable for a police officer to execute a pat down of a suspect for weapons simply because they are accused of drug possession.

The Facts of Furr v. State

Corpus Christi Police Department received an anonymous tip that two men were doing drugs on a particular street corner, one dressed in all black and the other in a black shirt carrying a brown backpack. In response, an officer drove past the street corner. He observed two men that fit the description from the tip and noticed in his rearview mirror that the men were watching him as he drove by. The officer then approached the two men but one of the men, Furr, walked away into the nearby shelter, repeatedly looking over his shoulder at the officer. The officer described Furr’s actions as furtive, “like he was trying to get away.”

When another officer arrived, the officers made contact with Furr. Furr was described as nervous, anxious, evasive, and was sweating excessively. Furr did not respond when the officers initially asked if he had any weapons on him. Officers said he appeared “kind of out of it” and “like he was under the influence of a drug. As a result, for safety reasons, officers frisked Furr for weapons and found a glass crack pipe in Furr’s front pocket. When removing the pipe, the officer also found two syringes, and after arrest, two small balloons of heroin.

Furr was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal after his motion to suppress was denied. Furr argued on Appeal that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him and that the trial court erred by not granting the Motion to Suppress the search.

The Court of Appeals Affirmed the Trial Courts Decision

The court of appeals held that Furr’s nervousness coupled with the observation that he seemed to be under the influence of a drug sufficiently corroborated the tip to support the investigative detention and that Furr’s failure to initially respond about being armed coupled with the other circumstances justified the frisk.

The Criminal Court of Appeals Concluded that there Was Reasonable Suspicion to Detain and Frisk Furr.

1. The Analysis of the Detention

In order to detain a person, the police officer must have reasonable suspicion based on “specific articulable facts, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Anything that happens or that is observed before the detention will be considered in determining whether the officer indeed had reasonable suspicion to detain Furr.

Furr argued that the anonymous tip alone was not enough.  The Court, however, explains that if there had only been the anonymous tip, it would not have established reasonable suspicion, but here there was more. The Court identifies several independent observations:

  • Furr and the other man were at the specified location and matched the informant’s description.
  • The area was a “high drug, high crime” area.
  • Furr and the other man watched the officer as he drove past
  • When the officer approached the two, Furr walked away “furtively.”
  • When the officers came upon Furr in the shelter he was sweaty, nervous, anxious, and appeared out of it as if he was under the influence of a drug.

Thus, the reasonable suspicion here was not solely based on the informant’s tip, but instead that tip was corroborated by independent observations made by the police officers. Looking at the totality of these circumstances, the Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Furr and investigate the information from the anonymous tip that Furr and the other man were using and possessing a drug.

2. The Terry Frisk

The Court rejected the State’s request to adopt a rule that it is, “per se, objectively reasonable for the police to pat down a suspect for weapons if they are accused of possessing drugs,” because reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect cannot be established by accusations of drug possession alone.

The Court further rejects the State’s argument that the officer was objectively justified in patting Furr down for weapons because this was outside of a homeless shelter for two reasons: 1) Nothing in the record shows that the shelter was a homeless shelter; and 2) Even if it was a homeless shelter, the Court does not see a correlation between being armed and dangerous and being at a homeless shelter.

Even so, the Court ultimately agrees with the court of appeals that reasonable suspicion was established here because the anonymous tip was corroborated by all of the circumstances surrounding the officers’ interactions with Furr. Specifically, the Court noted the tip, personal observations by the officers and the high drug, high crime area would warrant a belief that the safety of officers and others was in danger.

DISSENT – Stop and Frisk Should Have Been Held Unlawful

Judge Meyers dissented from the majority and opined that the stop and frisk of Furr was unlawful and that the motion to suppress should have been granted. Judge Meyers concluded that neither Furr’s action of looking over his shoulder or the anonymous tip, alone or combined, were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Thus, there was no need to analyze the legality of the frisk. Judge Meyers believes that the majority made its decision “not based on law but on the feeling that Furr should not get relief.”