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Brandon Barnett

Brandon Barnett is a partner and criminal defense attorney with Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC in Fort Worth, Texas. His law practice is exclusively focused on misdemeanor and felony criminal defense in Tarrant County and surrounding areas. He is also a military judge in the Marine Corps Reserve and a law professor at Texas A&M University School of Law.

Nov 04
Love3
Hernandez Racial Slur Error 2016

Murder Conviction Reversed for Prosecutor’s Use of Racial Slur

By Jury Trial, Trial Advocacy

Texas Prosecutor Uses the “N” Word During Closing Argument. Court of Appeals Reverses the Conviction.

Hernandez Racial Slur Error 2016In December of 2014, Appellant Luis Miguel Hernandez was convicted of the murder of Devin Toler, an African-American man. During the trial, Appellant claimed self-defense, arguing that Toler attacked him and that by killing him, he was defending himself from the attack. The prosecution, however, presented evidence that Appellant provoked Toler by his words, some of them racial slurs. The actual words of the alleged racial slurs were never presented to the jury in the testimony of any witness or otherwise. However, during closing argument, the prosecutor said the following:

“What were the words of provocation? I’ll tell you what the words of provocation were. [Appellant] called Devin and his family ‘niggas.’ That’s what it was.”

The defense attorney promptly objected to the prosecutor’s use of the racial slur as it was inflammatory and outside the evidence in the case. Ultimately, (after a heated bench conference) the judge sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the counsel’s comment, but did not specify which counsel or what comment the jury was to disregard. The defense did not move for a mistrial. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and sentenced Appellant to 14 years in prison.

See the majority opinion in Hernandez v. State (2nd Court of Appeals – Fort Worth, 2016)

What is a Proper Jury Argument?

On appeal to the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth), the Appellant challenged the judge’s failure to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor’s use of the “N” word. The court explained:

Proper jury argument falls into one of four areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) an answer to the argument of opposing counsel; and (4) a plea for law enforcement. Generally, error resulting from improper jury argument is subject to a harm analysis.

The appellate court held that not only were the prosecutor’s comments in using the “N” word error, but that the prosecutor’s comments constituted an “incurably prejudicial argument;” one that required a mistrial.

Is the “Incurably Prejudicial Argument” Waived if the Defendant Does Not Move for a Mistrial?

Texas courts have consistently held that to preserve error for an improper argument, the defendant must do 3 things:

  1. Make a timely and specific objection;
  2. Request and instruction to disregard if the objection is sustained; and
  3. Move for a mistrial if the instruction to disregard is granted.

Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1173 (1997)

In this case, the defense satisfied 1 and 2, but did not move for a mistrial. The appellate court was then presented with the issue of whether the improper jury argument objection is waived if the defense does not move for a mistrial.  Texas precedent says the issue can be waived for failure to move for a mistrial. But the court does not find this to be wise.

“Logically, this position makes no sense. An incurably prejudicial argument requires a mistrial. If the trial court does not grant the mistrial, the court has committed error that requires setting aside the conviction and re-trying the case. Respectfully, if the argument is so prejudicial that it has deprived the defendant of a fair trial, the injury is fundamental.”

The court provides further reasoning to depart from precedent, citing the tenuous political atmosphere surrounding race relations in America at the time of the trial.

The impact of the improper statement by the prosecuting attorney must be viewed in the context of the political atmosphere at the time of trial. The trial took place in early December 2014. On February 26, 2012, George Zimmerman, whose mother was from Peru, killed Trayvon Martin. Emotional discussions of Zimmerman’s ethnicity filled news commentary. Other killings made headlines. Among them was the death of Eric Garner while he was selling loose cigarettes in New York on July 17, 2014. The officer who killed him was Daniel Pantaleo. On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown was killed in Ferguson, Missouri. On August 11, 2014, Ezell Ford was killed in Los Angeles by two police officers, one of whom was Hispanic. And on November 23, 2014, twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was killed in Cincinnati, Ohio. Additionally, the Black Lives Matter organization was formed in 2013 in response to the acquittal of George Zimmerman in his trial for the murder of Trayvon Martin and was actively involved in protests nationwide.

With that, the Second Court held that the improper jury argument was not cured (and could not have been cured) by the judge’s “perfunctory” instruction to disregard and that the error was preserved for appeal. The court then reversed the case and remanded back to the trial court.

Dissent Agrees that the Error Was Prejudicial, But Would Not Depart From Precedent

Justice Sudderth dissented. She is not willing to depart from Court of Criminal Appeals’ precedent regarding the formal requirement to move for a mistrial. She writes:

Of all of the words in modern American English usage, including the slang and the vulgar, the “n-word” is of such infamy that it is generally referenced and understood only by its first letter. And with very few exceptions, such racially charged inflammatory language has no place in jury argument.

This is certainly the case when a prosecutor, using that language to secure a conviction, goes outside of the record to introduce it. Therefore, I agree with the majority that the prosecutor’s behavior was improper. It was inexcusable. It cannot be condoned. And the trial judge committed error in permitting it. Nevertheless, because we are constrained by precedent of the court of criminal appeals requiring preservation of this type of error, I am compelled to dissent.

It will be interesting to see whether the Court of Criminal Appeals will stick to their previous precedent or take this opportunity to change the law when it comes to an “incurably prejudicial argument” involving racial slurs.

Oct 31
Love2
Texas Burglary Own Home

Can You Burglarize Your Own Residence?

By Burglary

Can a Roommate Who is Not on the Lease be Convicted of Burglary of His or Her Own Residence?

Texas Burglary Own HomeThe Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that a roommate, who is not a co-tenant on the lease, could be convicted of burglary into his or her own residence. The key issue facing the Court was whether Appellant Dewan Morgan was an owner of the apartment he was residing in at the time of the criminal act.

In order to commit a Burglary of a Habitation, a person “without the effective consent of the owner (a) enters a habitation with intent to commit an assault or (b) enters a habitation and commits or attempts to commit an assault.” Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1). An “‘owner’ means a person who has title of the property, possession of the property, or a greater right to possession of the property than the person charged.” Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(35).

Morgan v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

The Facts – Trial Court Found Appellant was NOT Considered an Owner

Dewan Morgan moved in with his girlfriend, Regina, in November of 2012. Regina gave Dewan Morgan a key to the apartment, but did not add his name to the lease. She mostly paid the bills and expenses with occasional help from Appellant. Additionally, Appellant kept his personal items at the apartment.

On June 20, 2013, Morgan and Regina got into an argument. Regina did not want Morgan back in the apartment, so she locked the deadbolt from inside the apartment so that Morgan could not get in with his key. He knocked on the door and rang the doorbell, but Regina did not open the door. Morgan threw a rock into a side window, which broke the window, and then began kicking in the door. He was able to gain entry into the apartment, and when he went inside he grabbed Regina, pushed her to the bed, bit her on the side of her left breast, punched her, and choked her. The police arrived and arrested Morgan. The jury found Morgan guilty of Burglary of a Habitation – a 2nd Degree Felony.

The Court of Appeals Reversed and Found Appellant was an Owner and Could Not Commit Burglary

The Second Court of Appeals held that there was “no evidence of the absence of ‘the owners’ consent” because Appellant was a co-tenant, thus an owner of the apartment. The court erroneously relied on Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 21.08, which provides a definition of an owner for indictment purposes. Under that definition, the court held that because Appellant lived in the apartment and kept his belongings inside it, he was also an owner of the apartment. Additionally, there was no evidence that his tenancy was terminated, thus he had the right to occupy and control his apartment.

The Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses — Holds Appellant was Not an Owner and Did Not Have Effective Consent to Enter the Apartment

The CCA followed the Freeman standard to determine ownership: “A person’s ‘right to possession’ must be measured at the time of the accused’s alleged criminal act.” Freeman v. State, 707 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The Court also extended this application to effective consent and concluded that “if a person’s status as ‘owner’ is measured at the time of the criminal act, then so is giving, or removing, of the effective consent to enter.” Essentially, the Court takes a snapshot of the criminal action and determines effective consent in only that instance.

The CCA first analyzed who the owner of the apartment was. It quickly rejected reliance on Article 21.08 because it is “only applicable in evaluating the sufficiency of an indictment.” Instead, the Court looked to the Penal Code’s definition that was included in the jury charge, as noted above. The Court said the “Penal Code’s definition of ‘owner’ clearly indicates that a defendant who has some, but less, right to control a habitation than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for burglary.”

The key concern for the Court was whether Regina’s right to possess the property was greater than Appellant’s at the time of the criminal act. The Court considered that only Regina’s name was on the lease, that she paid the rent, and that she gave Appellant a key and she could take it away. Ultimately, Regina’s possession of the apartment was greater than Appellant’s, which did not give Appellant equal ownership rights. The Court held that at the time of the offense, Regina’s right to possess the apartment trumped Appellant’s and that only she was the owner at the time of the criminal act.

The CCA next analyzed whether there was no effective consent to enter. Again, the Court analyzed effective consent only in the snapshot of when the criminal act occurred. Even though Regina testified at trial that she did not intend to permanently withhold consent to enter and it was only temporary, the Court found that the temporary revocation of consent during the criminal act was “sufficient to establish the absence of effective consent.” When Regina locked Morgan out of the apartment during their argument, the Court found it clear that Regina did not want Morgan to enter the apartment. Thus, the CCA held that Morgan did not have effective consent to enter the apartment.

The CCA’s Snapshot Analysis – Evidence is Legally Sufficient to Support the Jury’s Guilty Verdict

The CCA considered the factors during the time of the crime and held that the jury was authorized to find that Regina was the owner of the apartment because she had a greater right to possession of the apartment than Appellant, and at the time Appellant entered the apartment, he did so without the effective consent of Regina and with the intent to assault her.

Oct 07
Love1
HL Hunt Mansion Dallas Hill v State

Dallas Oil Family’s Dismissal for Vindictive Prosecution Upheld on Appeal

By Criminal Defense, White Collar

How Far Does the Trial Courts Discretion Go in Determining Whether to Hold a Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing?

HL Hunt Mansion Dallas Hill v StateOn September 21st the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued a decision on the oil tycoon heir Albert Hill III’s criminal appeal. The question the Court faced was whether it was in the trial court’s discretion to conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Hill’s motions to quash and dismiss based on prosecutorial vindictiveness. The Court determined that it was within the trial court’s discretion to conduct such a pretrial evidentiary hearing and that discretion was not limited by the defendant meeting “a certain threshold evidentiary requirement.”

Court Opinion: State of Texas v. Albert Hill (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

The Facts | Trial Court Finds Dallas DA’s Actions Improper

Appellant Hill is the great-grandson of legendary Dallas oil billionaire H.L. Hunt and the events surrounding the indictment dealt with a multi-million dollar trust litigation between Hill and his father. Hill and his wife Erin were indicted in 2011 for making false and misleading statements in order to obtain a $500,000 mortgage from Omni American Bank. The indictment came shortly after Hill won in the trust litigation against his father. Prior to the indictment (but after Albert Hill’s victory in the trust litigation) Hill’s father’s attorney, Michael Lynn delivered a memo to the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office which alleged various offenses committed by Hill and his wife. Hill challenged these charges by filing a motion to quash the indictment and a motion to dismiss. Hill argued that the District Attorney, Craig Watkins, was under the influence of his disgruntled father as well as Lisa Blue Baron, one of Hill’s attorneys in the trust litigation case that had just filed a lawsuit against Hill seeking several million dollars in legal fees.

Some items of interest that the court noted were:

  • Lisa Blue Baron exchanged several phone calls and text messages with Watkins leading up to the indictment;
  • Michael Lynn’s law partner donated $48,500 to Watkins’ campaign prior to the indictment;
  • Lisa Blue Baron made a $100,000 donation to SMU LAW in Watkins’ honor after the indictment;
  • Lisa Blue Baron also held a fundraising event for Watkins’ campaign at her house and made a $5,000 donation to the campaign.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Hill’s motions and granted both the motion to quash and the motion to dismiss.

The Court of Appeals Reversed the Trial Court’s Decision

The Fifth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissals holding that the trial court “erred in conducting a hearing on Hill’s motion to dismiss.” The State argued that the trial court should not have held a pretrial evidentiary hearing because Hill failed to prove, with evidence, a prima facie case of prosecutorial misconduct and vindictiveness. The Court of Appeals stated that before a pretrial evidentiary can be held for a defendant claiming a violation of his constitutional rights, the defendant must “present facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt about the constitutionality of his prosecution.” The Court of Appeals found that Hill did not sufficiently meet this standard.

The Court of Criminal Appeals Disagrees with the Court of Appeals, holds that Trial Courts Have Sound Discretion to Conduct a Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing

1. Article 28.01 – The CCA points to Article 28.01 in determining that the trial court had the discretion to hold a pretrial hearing on Hill’s motions to quash and suppress. Article 28.01 §1 provides that a trial court “may set any criminal case for a pre-trial hearing” and that some of things that the pre-trial hearing shall be to determine is the “pleadings of the defendant,’ ‘exceptions to the form or substance of the indictment,’ or discovery.’” Article 28.01 §1(1), (2), (4), (8). Additionally, while Article 28.01 does not expressly provide for an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss like it does for a motion to suppress, the Court determined that it would be a misapplication of the rules of statutory construction to decide that oral testimony cannot be used in a pretrial hearing to resolve any other issue raised.

2. Case Law – The Court supported its Article 28.01 decision with the Court’s decision in Neal v. State which held that a defendant is required to “preserve a complaint of vindictive prosecution by filing a pretrial motion to quash and dismiss.” 150 S.W.3d 169. With that decision in mind the Court said “it would make no sense to limit the trial court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing on such motion.”

The State pointed to federal case law that provided defendant must make a prima facie case that raised a reasonable doubt. However, these cases dealt with the issue of whether the trial court erred by denying a pretrial hearing. Thus, the Court stated that this case law is not on point in Hill’s case and thus are not controlling on this issue, and do not persuade the Court to hold otherwise.

Decision of the Criminal Court of Appeals | The Trial Court’s Discretion is Not Limited

The CCA determined that Article 28.01 has no limiting factor on the judge’s discretion to hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing based on any threshold evidentiary standard. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in conducting the pretrial evidentiary hearing in Hill’s case but instead acted within its bounds of sound discretion.

Sep 28
Love6
Texas Sex Offender Registration

Which Crimes Require Sex Offender Registration in Texas?

By Sex Crimes

Texas Sex Offender RegistrationIt’s no secret that there are certain offenses that require individuals to register themselves on the sex offender registry. However, what are those offenses? How long is a person required to register?

What Offenses Require Sex Offender Registration in Texas?

In Texas there are over 20 offenses that require registration as a sex offender. Additionally, registration could be required as a condition of parole, release to mandatory supervision, or community supervision. Further, even if a person was convicted for a crime outside of Texas you might be required to register as a sex offender if the elements of that offense are substantially similar to an offense under Texas law that requires registration.

Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure these are called “reportable convictions or adjudications.” Article 62.001(5) of the Code defines these to be a conviction or adjudication, which includes deferred adjudication, that is based on various offenses outlined in the section.

How Long Does a Person’s Duty to Register as a Sex Offender Last?

Many of the offenses requiring registration as a sex offender have a lifetime registration requirement but some have a “10-year” requirement. The 10-year requirement depends not only on the alleged offense but also on how the case is disposed. If the duty was based on an adjudication of delinquent conduct (defined by Tex. Fam. Code §51.03) then the duty to register ends on the 10th anniversary of the date on which the disposition was made or the date of completion of the terms of the disposition, whichever is later. If the duty is based on a conviction or deferred adjudication, then the duty to register ends on the 10th anniversary of the date the person is released from a penal institution, or is discharged from community supervision, or the court dismisses the criminal proceedings, whichever date is later.

Additionally, there is a 10-year requirement for persons, who would otherwise be subject to lifetime registration requirements, who were a juvenile at the time and their case was transferred to a criminal district court pursuant to Section 54.02 of the Texas Family Code. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 62.101(b). Under this requirement the duty to register ends 10th anniversary of the date the person is released from a penal institution, completed probation, or the date the court dismisses the charges against them, whichever date is later. Id.

Below is a chart that lists offenses requiring registration and the applicable time period the law requires a person to register.

Sex Offender Registration Requirements in Texas

LENGTH OF REGISTRATION SEXUAL OFFENSES

Lifetime Registration

See Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 62.101(a), 62.001(5), (6)
  • Continuous sexual abuse of a young child or children. TPC 21.02
  • Indecency with a young child under. TPC 21.11(a)(1)
  • Sexual assault. TPC 22.011
  • Aggravated sexual assault. TPC 22.021
  • Aggravated kidnapping under TPC 20.02(a)(4) with intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually
  • Burglary under TPC 30.02(d) if offense was committed with the intent to commit one of the above listed felonies
  • Sexual performance by a child. TPC 43.25
  • An offense under the laws of another state, federal law, the laws of a foreign country, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice if the offense’s elements are substantially similar to the above felonies.
  • Trafficking of a person under TPC 20A.02(a)(3), (4), (7), or (8)
  • Prohibited sexual conduct. TPC 25.02
  • Compelling prostitution under 43.05(a)(2)
  • Possession or promotion of child porn. TPC 43.26
  • Indecency with a young child under TPC 21.11(a)(2) if the person received another conviction or adjudication that requires registration
  • Unlawful restraint, Kidnapping, or Aggravated kidnapping if there was an affirmative finding that the victim or intended victim was younger than 17 and the person receives or has received another conviction or adjudication that requires registration. TPC 20.02, 20.03, 20.04
  • Obscenity under TPC 43.23(h)

10-Year Registration

 

See Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 62.101(c), 62.001(5)
  • Indecency with a young child in a manner not listed under lifetime registration. TPC 21.11
  • Unlawful restraint, Kidnapping, or Aggravated kidnapping if there was a finding that the victim or intended victim was younger than 17. TPC 20.02, 20.03, 20.04
  • An attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit one of the above listed offenses in this chart
  • Online solicitation of a minor. TPC 33.021
  • Prostitution under TPC 43.02(c)(3)
  • Second indecent exposure under TPC 21.08 or an offense with substantially similar elements under the laws of another state, federal law, the laws of a foreign country or the Uniform Code of Military Justice but not if the second resulted in deferred adjudication.
  • An offense of the laws of another state, federal law, the laws of a foreign country or the Uniform Code of Military Justice that contains elements that are substantially similar to the elements of the offenses described above, but not if the offense resulted in deferred adjudication.

What Exactly Does the Duty to Register Require?

A person required to register must register with the municipality or county where they reside or intent to reside for more than seven days. Among other things the registration must contain the type of offense the person was convicted of, the age of the victim, and a recent color photograph of the person. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 62.051. If the person spends more than 48 hours in a different municipality or county three or more times in a month they must provide the local authority with certain information. Art. 62.059. In addition to registering, the person must comply with a request for a specimen of their DNA. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 62.061; Government Code §411.1473. Also, if the Department of Public Safety has assigned a person a numeric risk level of 3, public notice must be given of where that person intends to live. Art. 62.056. Further, there are restrictions on type of employment for certain registrants. Art. 62.063.*

As you can see there are many consequences that come with a conviction, deferred adjudication or adjudication for delinquent conduct for one of the above listed offenses and there are additional requirements that could be imposed depending on the particular alleged offense. These very specific requirements provided under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure must be followed so that a person does not violate the registration requirements and face additional criminal consequences ranging from a state jail felony to a first degree felony. Art. 62.102. If it has been alleged that you committed one of these offenses, it can be extremely overwhelming but also important to understand what lies ahead for you. Contact our criminal defense attorneys today to ensure that you fully comprehend what is being alleged, what consequences could be attached, and what your options are in your specific situation. Additionally, contact us if you are currently required to register and have questions about what duties are required of you.

*Note this blog does not provide all requirements and additional requirements for certain offenses. To find all requirements see Article 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

Sep 21
Love1
Bail Not Excessive 8th Amendment

“Excessive Bail Shall Not Be Required” | Bail is Not Intended to be Punishment

By Bail Bonds

Bail Not Excessive 8th AmendmentJust the other day, I read something written by one of our local mayors calling for bail reform because a certain person had been released on what she believed was an insufficient bail amount. This got me thinking about our system of bail in Texas and the real purpose behind the system. I doubt I’ll ever convince the mayor that we ought not to punish people before they’ve had their day in court, but I thought it best to lay out the history and purpose of bail in case she ever wants to know.

The purpose of bail in the criminal justice system has been convoluted throughout the years, leaving many people with a fundamental misunderstanding about what bail actually is and the purpose behind it. Often people think bail is just another form of punishment (i.e. “Let’s lock him up and throw away the key!”), when in reality it should be the exact opposite. The use of bail allows a defendant to be released and have the ability to prepare the best defense possible for trial. At the moment that bail is set, the person is presumed innocent. So what exactly is bail? What is the overarching purpose? How is the amount of bail determined?

What is Bail?

Under both the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution, generally, criminal defendants have a right to bail and to be free from excessive bail. Tex. Const. art. I §11, §13. With that, while all non-capital crimes are eligible for bail, bail can be denied in several situations under the Texas Constitution and it is at the judge or magistrate’s discretion whether to grant bail where defendant has been charged with capital murder. Tex. Const. art. I, §11; Bill of Rights; Judiciary Act of 1789.

Bail is the guarantee given by the defendant that he will appear at his court settings. Bail includes both bail bonds and personal bonds. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 17.01. A bail bond is a written undertaking by the defendant ensuring his appearance. Art. 17.02. There are a few different ways to go about getting a bail bond:

  1. The defendant can have a family member or friend sign the bond as their surety, accepting responsibility for the amount if the defendant does not appear;
  2. A defendant can go through a commercial bail bondsman and have them be their surety; or
  3. The defendant can pay the court cash in the amount of the bond. Id.

A personal bond is when there is no surety and no money paid when the defendant is released and the defendant will be responsible for a set amount if they do not appear. Art. 17.03.

What is the Purpose of Bail?

Congress stated that, historically, the sole purpose of bail was to secure defendant’s presence in court. 110 H.R. 2286. The purpose remains the same, to reduce flight risk but also to give the defendant the best opportunity to prepare for trial. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). Essentially, the idea behind bail is that if a person puts down a chunk of money they are less likely to flee. Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). In no way should bail be a form of punishment for the defendant and the Eighth Amendment makes it clear that bail shall not be excessive. Further, being released on bail does not prove guilt nor affect the presumption of innocence. A person remains innocent until proven guilty when granted bail. United States v. Houston, 26 F. Cas. 379.

How is Bail Set in Texas?

In Texas, a court, judge, or magistrate setting bail should use their discretion under the Texas Constitution and the rules provided in Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Code sets out 5 rules in determining bail for a defendant:

  1. The bail set must be “sufficiently high” so as to reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance in court.
  2. Bail must not be an “instrument of oppression.” Which essentially means bail is not to be a form of punishment.
  3. The nature and circumstances of the offense are to be considered.
  4. The defendant’s ability to make bail will be considered.
  5. The future safety of the community and victim of the alleged offense must be considered.

The court is also allowed to look to other factors including criminal history, family ties, and links to the community. Gonzalez v. State, 996 S.W.3d 350. If bail is set in an amount that the defendant cannot make, the court will hear evidence on that issue and will lower it if the amount was found improper or excessive under the rules and/or the Constitution. If the court refuses then the defendant can also appeal before trial. Id.

Bail in Tarrant County

If you were to compare the standard bail amounts from county to county across Texas for similar criminal allegations, you would probably find that Tarrant County is on the lower side. Johnson County and Parker County might set a higher bail amount for the same or similar case. This does not mean that Tarrant County’s bail system needs to be reformed. Clearly, if Tarrant County began to experience more folks not showing up for court, then the bail might go up (and it does in each individual case, when the defendant proves himself to be unreliable in appearing for court). Before any public officials begin calling for reform in Tarrant County, I would suggest that we determine whether, in fact, the system is broken, or if, perhaps we are trying to subject a defendant to pretrial punishment with excessive bail.

Sep 16
Love1
Texas Hate Crimes

Hate Crimes in Texas | Statistics and Impact of Texas Hate Crimes

By Hate Crimes

Texas Hate Crimes

Texas Hate CrimesOne of the highest-profile hate crimes in the nation to occur in recent years involved the unprovoked massacre of a historic South Carolina church carried out by Dylann Roof.  Shortly, thereafter, there was the largest mass shooting in American history that occurred in Orlando at a gay night club.  These terrible incidents opened up the flood gates for a national dialogue on the real prevalence and impact of hate crimes in the nation.

In the state of Texas, hate crimes are no less of an issue than any other area of the nation, and their investigation remains a top priority for investigators and social interest groups working against them. The available statistics on hate crime frequency in Texas illustrate the ongoing need for officials to continue their heavy investment of effort in working against discrimination-motivated victimization based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and all other personal identifiers.

Legal Definition of Hate Crime in Texas

Under Article 42.014 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a hate crime occurs if the:

defendant intentionally selected the person against whom the offense was committed or intentionally selected property damaged or affected as a result of the offense because of the defendant’s bias or prejudice against a group identified by race, color, disability, religion, national origin or ancestry, age, gender, or sexual preference. 

The FBI defines a hate crime as “a criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity.”

Out of all the FBI Civil Rights program’s priorities, hate crimes are the highest on the program’s list. The FBI considers those who perpetuate and preach intolerance and hatred to be catalysts for terrorism, and the Bureau treats them as such.

The Texas Hate Crimes Act, recorded in Chapter 411.046 of the Texas Government Code, categorizes any crimes that are perceivably motivated by “prejudice, hatred, or advocacy of violence” as hate crimes. Like the FBI’s classification determiners, these crimes are linked to any prejudices directed at gender, gender identity, religion, disability, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability and religion.

The following statistics collected by the Texas Department of Public Safety are the most recent available for comprehensive insight into hate crime prevalence, locations, offenders, victims and offenses in the state of Texas.

What is the Penalty for a Hate Crime Offense in Texas?

In a criminal case, if the judge or jury makes an affirmative finding that the offense is a Hate Crime, Section 12.47 of the Texas Penal Code outlines the punishment enhancement.  For offenses other than a Class A Misdemeanor or First Degree Felony, the underlying offense is enhanced to the next higher category of offense. For instance, if the offense is a Class B Misdemeanor and the jury returns an affirmative finding that the offense was motivated by prejudice toward the victim’s race, the offense is increased to a Class A Misdemeanor.  First Degree Felonies are not enhanced under Section 12.47 because they already carry a penalty range of 5-99 years in prison. If the underlying offense is a Class A Misdemeanor, it will remain a Class A Misdemeanor but the minimum jail sentence is increased to 180 days. Enhancements for hate crimes are limited to offenses under Title 5 of the Texas Penal Code, or Section 28.02, 28.03, or 28.08, Texas Penal Code.”

Texas Hate Crime Volume

The Texas DPS reported that there were 166 reports of hate crimes in 2014. The hate crimes involved 198 offenders and 190 victims. The most common bias was race and ethnicity, the second most common bias was sexual orientation, and the third most common bias was religiously-motivated. The 2014 figure on hate crime reports was a 23 percent increase from the 2013 figure.

Texas Hate Crime Locations

The DPS reported that hate crimes most commonly occurred in residential homes, at 30.4 percent. Next to residences, the second-most frequent places for hate crimes to occur were roads/highways/streets/alleys, at 16.1 percent. The third most frequent areas for hate crimes to occur were parking lots and garages, at 12.5 percent.

Texas Hate Crime Offenders

The DPS hate crime report’s data on offenders showed that the 198 hate crime offenders were 67.7 percent white, 18.7 percent black, 1.5 percent Asian, 1.0 percent multiracial, and 11.1 percent unknown. The information on Texas hate crime offender demographics was analyzed with the understanding that hate crimes can be perpetuated by different offenders sharing the same race.

Texas Hate Crime Victims

The DPS report’s data on hate crime victims categorized the victims based on the following categories: individual, business, financial institution, government, religious organization, society/public, “other”, and unknown. Individuals were the most frequent victim type, at 84.2 percent. The second most frequent victim type was “business”, at 8.4 percent, followed by government and religious victims at 3.2 percent.

Specific Texas Hate Crime Offenses

The most common type of hate crime offense was simple assault, at 15 percent. The second most frequent hate crime offense was vandalism, at 25.7 percent, followed by intimidation at 18.6 percent.

History of Nationwide Hate Crime Investigation by the FBI

The FBI has historically investigated hate crimes in which the offending party was motivated by the national origin, religion, or ethnicity of the victim. The role of the FBI in hate crime investigation was notably increased after the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the past, investigators were restricted to cases in which the victim of a hate crime was engaging in an activity under federal protection.

After the 2009 Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, investigators gained a freedom to investigate hate crimes without as much red tape. In addition, the 2009 act also gave investigators clearance to freely investigate hate crimes committed out of a bias against the sexual orientation, gender, disability or gender identity of the victim.

Conclusion

Though the time and manpower investment in hate crime investigation remains heavy, the need for vigilance remains high. According to the FBI’s 2015 report, there were 5,479 hate crime incidents nationwide in 2014; these incidents involved 6,418 offenses to the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, creating 6,727 victims nationwide. Though the figure was down from the 2013 rate, in which there were 5,928 incidents and 6,933 offenses, the issue remains a top priority for investigators in Texas and the nation at large all year round.

Sep 06
Love8
Lautenberg Amendment Federal Gun Ban

The Lautenberg Amendment Federal Gun Ban on Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Cases

By Domestic Violence

What is the Lautenberg Amendment?

Lautenberg Amendment Federal Gun BanThe Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act enacted in the Fall of 1996 provides that those with a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence cannot use, possess, or transport a firearm or ammunition.

Senator Frank Lautenberg was the chief sponsor of this amendment. The purpose behind this amendment is to keep firearms out of homes where a domestic violence relationship exists. Lautenberg presented it with the idea that domestic violence and firearms are a deadly combination and enacting this amendment would lessen the likelihood of a victim to die during a domestic violence episode. 142 Cong Rec S 11872. Additionally, since there was already a firearm ban in place for felony convictions, this Amendment combats the devastating loophole that previously allowed persons with misdemeanor convictions of domestic violence to fall through the cracks and be permitted to own firearms. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415.

When Does the Lautenberg Amendment Apply?

The Lautenberg Amendment will not have any impact until a person has a misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). That is, a misdemeanor that

“has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”

18 U.S.C. § 921(33).

A defendant will not be considered convicted unless they were represented by an attorney or “knowingly and intelligently” waived that right and the case was prosecuted at a jury trial or the defendant “knowingly and intelligently” waived that right by a guilty plea or otherwise properly waived that right. Id.

If you have been charged with a qualifying misdemeanor conviction, the amendment has no impact on you until you have received a final conviction. However, if you are subject to a protective order, the Gun Control Act and the State of Texas separately provide that you cannot use, possess, or transfer firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(8); Tex. Fam. Code § 85.022(b)(6); Tex. Pen. Code § 46.04(c).

In Texas, if you have disposed of your case through deferred adjudication, which is not a final conviction, and you successfully complete the deferred adjudication, the amendment will not impact you since the statute requires a conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 921(33). Additionally, the conviction element of this statute will not be satisfied if the conviction is expunged, set aside, or the defendant has been pardoned. Id.

What Impact Does the Lautenberg Amendment Have on the Military Defendant?

Prior to the Lautenberg Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) provided a military and law enforcement exception to the Gun Control Act. The Lautenberg Amendment contains no similar exception.

What this means for the military defendant that gets a conviction is that his service could be compromised since they can no longer use, possess, or transfer a firearm. This conviction can impact their ability to re-enlist, cause a transfer to a military occupational specialty (MOS) that doesn’t require the handling of firearms, and affect the ability to be deployed. Many servicemembers that receive a domestic violence conviction will be processed for administrative separation.

According to the Supreme Court, What Cases are Considered Misdemeanor Convictions of Domestic Violence?

In Voisine v. United States, the Supreme Court clarified that the federal firearm ban under the Lautenberg Amendment applied to every case where the underlying conduct was an act of domestic violence, regardless of whether the state court made an affirmative finding of domestic violence (or family violence in Texas). This means that persons with misdemeanor convictions anywhere from a Class C simple assault* to a Class A assault with or without a domestic violence finding are banned from using, possessing and transferring firearms if their victim was one with whom they had a domestic relationship.

Voisine v. United States dealt with two domestic violence-related cases from Maine where both defendants’ previous convictions were based on reckless conduct, not intentional or knowing conduct. Thus, they argued that the Lautenberg Amendment didn’t apply to them. The Supreme Court ruled that the firearm ban did apply to them for two reasons:

  1. Reckless use of force is use of force the same as if it was intentional or knowing; and
  2. The legislative history and plain language of the statute lead to such a conclusion.

Looking to the statutory definition of an applicable misdemeanor conviction provided above, there is no specific mental state required. The definition provides that the Amendment applies to any misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal law that was committed by a person through use of physical force against a victim with whom they have a domestic relationship.

*Class C is the same level as a traffic ticket.

Texas Specific Firearm Bans for Domestic Violence Convictions

In Texas, a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving family violence cannot possess or transfer a firearm or ammunition for 5 years after they are released from confinement or after they have completed and been released from community supervision following the conviction. Tex. Pen. Code § 46.04(b).

The Texas Family Code defines family violence as “an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault.” Tex. Fam. Code § 71.004. Additionally, under Section 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code an assault involving the person’s family or household occurs if the person causes bodily injury to another, threatens a person with “imminent bodily injury,” or causes physical contact with someone that they know or should know would find “offensive or provocative.” From these definitions you can see that a misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence in Texas expands the qualifying convictions beyond those that qualify under the Lautenberg Amendment.

If a person is convicted of a misdemeanor offense of family violence the court must notify them that it is against the law for them to possess or transfer firearms or ammunition. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.0131. Additionally, if a defendant decides to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for a misdemeanor involving family violence the court must, before accepting the plea, admonish the defendant with the following:

“If you are convicted of a misdemeanor offense involving violence where you are or were a spouse, intimate partner, parent, or guardian of the victim or are or were involved in another, similar relationship with the victim, it may be unlawful for you to possess or purchase a firearm, including a handgun or long gun, or ammunition, pursuant to federal law under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(9) or Section 46.04(b), Texas Penal Code. If you have any questions whether these laws make it illegal for you to possess or purchase a firearm, you should consult an attorney.”

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 27.14.

Texas law does not require the defendant to surrender firearms or ammunition once the possession is prohibited. Neither does Texas law specifically authorize or require the removal of firearms or ammunition from the scene of a domestic violence incident.

In short, Texas law provides a prohibition of gun possession for five years after release from confinement or probation in more circumstances than under the Lautenberg Amendment. However, if your conviction is also a qualifying conviction under the Lautenberg Amendment then your right to possess a firearm is indefinitely prohibited. If you find yourself in that situation your only option to restore your firearm rights is to request a full pardon and restoration of civil rights in your pardon paperwork.

Are You Currently FacingDomestic Violence Assault Charges in Tarrant County?

Whether you have already been convicted or are currently facing charges of assault it is extremely important to know the heavy consequences that are attached to convictions where the underlying conduct is considered domestic violence. There are many misconceptions out there on whether federal firearm ban applies to a specific assault case. It is important that you know for a fact whether it applies to you so that you don’t risk violating federal law. If you are facing charges for an offense involving family violence under Texas law, contact our criminal defense team and schedule a free consultation to discuss and determine what consequences you are facing and whether the federal and/or Texas firearm ban applies to you.

Sep 03
Love2
Probable Cause Affidavit Franks Hearing

Challenging the Probable Cause Affidavit | Franks Hearing Requirements

By Fraud

Problems with Probable Cause: Law Enforcement Allegedly Used Conflicting Third Party Statements as the basis for a Search Warrant

Probable Cause Affidavit Franks HearingEvidence obtained by a valid search warrant can be used at trial. But what if the search warrant was based on information provided by a third party who later recants the information he provided? Further, what if law enforcement mischaracterized the evidence when presenting it to the magistrate in the application for the warrant? What legal remedy, if any, exists to support defendants who find themselves in this situation? The Fifth Circuit heard United States v. Minor in August, this article summarizes the Court’s surprising holding.

See the full text of the 5th Circuit’s decision in United States v. Minor (USCA 5th Cir. 2016)

US v. Minor – Rogue Bank Employee Hatches Identity Theft Scheme

Anthony Minor and his friend Katrina Thomas, a Fannie Mae employee, hatched a plan to steal the identities of numerous Fannie Mae clients with the intention of using the personal information to obtain entry into checking and savings accounts. Thomas created a list of client names and personal information while at work, and then provided Minor with the information. Minor was successful in using the data to steal money from those individuals’ bank accounts by contacting banks, pretending to be the individual, and transferring funds to Minor’s personal account.

During the time of these crimes, Minor was frequenting a hotel. Eventually, law enforcement began investigating Minor; the lead investigator assigned to the case was Albert Moore. In a warrant affidavit, Moore states that Will Crain, the director of security at the hotel, reported to law enforcement that he had seen Minor with expensive merchandise. That statement was used to establish probable cause for obtaining a search warrant. Law enforcement used the search warrant to search Minor’s dwellings, and the search rendered evidence of the crimes. Minor was arrested on numerous bank fraud charges.

Minor Goes to Trial on Federal Fraud Charges

At trial, a jury found Minor guilty of bank fraud, aiding and abetting bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, using or trafficking in an unauthorized access device, aggravated identity theft, and aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft. Minor was sentenced to 192 months’ imprisonment, a sentence that incorporated a six-level enhancement, but was set well below the federal Sentencing Guidelines recommendation at the trial judge’s discretion.

Minor appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the search warrant contained false information and that he is entitled to a Franks Hearing to establish the facts surrounding the statements used to support the finding of probable cause for the search warrant.

Minor Appeals to the Fifth Circuit Arguing Agents Lacked Probable Cause for Search Warrant

Minor appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing:

  1. that the trial court should have held a Franks Hearing to determine whether law enforcement improperly obtained a search warrant for his car,
  2. that even if Minor’s case does not meet the requirement for a Franks Hearing, that an exception be carved out specifically for his case, and
  3. that his sentence should not have included a six-level enhancement (more prison time).

Minor alleged that Crain, the hotel’s security guard, testified at trial that he did not see Minor carrying merchandise and therefore, law enforcement did not have probable cause to secure a search warrant.

Franks Hearing Requirements—A Supreme Court Precedent

In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court held that

“where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.”… [Further, if the] “allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by…a preponderance of the evidence…the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.”

Id. at 155-56.

Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Bank Fraud Crimes

“U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2014), provides that “if the defendant’s offense involved 250 or more victims, then § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) requires the court to increase the defendant’s offense level by 6 levels. U.S.S.G. §2.B1.1(b)(2)(C).

The Fifth Circuit Weighs In; Holds that the Affiant’s statements were not “deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth.”

The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on Supreme Court precedent with regard to the evidentiary appeal and deferred to the reasoning of the trial court with regard to sentencing.

As “Minor concedes that Agent Moore did not intentionally insert false information into the affidavit, or act with reckless disregard for the truth…and because Minor failed to make the requisite substantial preliminary showing, [Minor] is not entitled to a Franks hearing.” Secondly, “[Minor] asks us to hold that in a case where a law enforcement affiant is relying upon information….from other[s]…the challenger should not be required to meet the intentional or reckless requirement to proceed a Franks hearing.” Here, “Minor’s argument is meritless under any standard…[and he] has not cited any authority recognizing his proposed exception to Franks…we decline…to create a new exception to well-established Supreme Court precedent.

Further, the Fifth Circuit said, “we agree with the district court that Minor…actively employed the means of identification of over 250 victims in furtherance of their bank fraud scheme…with the object of unlawfully accessing those customers’ bank accounts without their consent.” Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirms the holding and sentence of the trial court.

Aug 13
Love187
United States Age of Consent Map

What is the Age of Consent in the United States?

By Sex Crimes

Is There a Uniform Age of Consent for all 50 States in the United States?

No, there is not a uniform age of consent. The “Age of Consent” is the minimum age at which a person may consent to participation in sexual intercourse. A person younger than the legal age of consent cannot legally consent to sexual activity. The age of consent in the United States ranges from 16 to 18 years old depending on the state, meaning that a person 15 years of age or younger cannot legally consent to sexual contact. Each state enacts its owns laws which set the age of consent.  If someone engages in sexual activity with a person younger than the age of consent in that state, the person could be charged with Statutory Rape or other offenses depending on the nature of the contact.

What follows is a map depicting the age of consent for all 50 states and a chart outlining the same.

*Note: This chart was current as of 2016, but could be subject to change over the years. Please do not rely on this chart to make any decisions that could impact your life. Check your own state’s age of consent laws to make sure you are fully informed, because ignorance of the law will not be a defense for you if charged with a child sexual offense.

United States Age of Consent Map

United States Age of Consent Map

United States Age of Consent Chart

STATE LEGAL AGE OF CONSENT
Alabama 16
Alaska 16
Arizona 18
Arkansas 16
California 18
Colorado 17
Connecticut 16
D.C. 16
Delaware 18
Florida 18
Georgia 16
Hawaii 16
Idaho 18
Illinois 17
Indiana 16
Iowa 16
Kansas 16
Kentucky 16
Louisiana 17
Maine 16
Maryland 16
Massachusetts 16
Michigan 16
Minnesota 16
Mississippi 16
Missouri 17
Montana 16
Nebraska 17
Nevada 16
New Hampshire 16
New Jersey 16
New Mexico 17
New York 17
North Carolina 16
North Dakota 18
Ohio 16
Oklahoma 16
Oregon 18
Pennsylvania 16
Rhode Island 16
South Carolina 16
South Dakota 16
Tennessee 18
Texas 17
Utah 18
Vermont 16
Virginia 18
Washington 16
West Virginia 16
Wisconsin 18
Wyoming 18

 

“Romeo and Juliet Law” in Texas | An Exception to the Age of Consent in Texas

As mentioned in the chart above, the age of consent in Texas is 17. Texas, as well as many other states, has created a so-called “Romeo and Juliet” law, an exception to the statutory rape and age of consent law. Romeo and Juliet laws are targeted toward teenagers and young adults who engage in sexual relations with someone under the age of consent (17 in Texas), but who are still close in age to the sexual partner. The Romeo and Juliet provision creates a close in age exemption and keeps these would-be offenders from being classified as sex offenders.

Under Texas law, if a person over the age of 17 has consensual sexual intercourse with someone under the age of 17, but there is also no more than a three-year age difference between the two partners, the Texas Romeo and Juliet law will not allow the older person to be charged with statutory rape or be classified as a sex offender.

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Aug 04
Love2
Deportation Crime Enhancement

Enhancement for Crimes Committed Deportation Illegal Reentry into the US

By Sentencing

Deportation Crime EnhancementWhat happens when someone who illegally enters the country commits a crime? Further, does it matter is that person was previously deported from the United States? Does federal law provide for sentencing enhancements to extend the prison terms for wrongdoers in this position? The answer is yes—and no. Read on to see how the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzes federal statutes and sentencing guidelines that could support such an enhancement for the defendant, but decides against doing so.

US v. Rodriguez (5th Circuit, 2016)

A 2002 Theft and Deportation Set the Stage

In 2002, Benito Sanchez-Rodriguez, an “undocumented immigrant,” was convicted in Florida for “Dealing in Stolen Property,” a violation of a state law. Pleading guilty at trial, Rodriguez was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, which was suspended for three years’ probation. Six months later, he was deported to Mexico because he had no legal status to remain in the US. Over a decade later, in 2014, Rodriguez was arrested for DWI in Texas. While under arrest, the federal government charged him will illegal entry into the US. Ultimately, Rodriguez was indicted on one count of illegal reentry into the US, a violation of federal statute 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1).

Rodriguez Faces Criminal Charges, Again

In August of 2015, Rodriguez plead guilty to the illegal entry indictment and the district court accepted his plea. Before the sentencing phase, a US Probation Officer prepared a “pre-sentence investigation report” (“PSR”), relying upon the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”). The PSR assigned Rodriguez base offense level of 8, which was raised by 8 additional levels because of the 2002 “Dealing in Stolen Property” conviction (an aggravated felony qualifier), for a total base offense level of 16. U.S.C. § 2LI.2(b)(1)(C). The PSR added that because Rodriguez took responsibility by entering a guilty plea, the total base offense level was reduced by 3, for a final total of 13. The PSR recommended that with a base offense level of 13, Rodriguez should face between 24 to 30 months in federal prison. Rodriguez objected both on the record and in writing, arguing that the 2002 conviction was not an aggravated felony qualifier, however, the district court adopted the PSR’s recommendations. Accordingly, he was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment.

Rodriguez Appeals to the Fifth Circuit, Argues Florida Statute Overbroad

Rodriguez now appeals to the Fifth Circuit for relief, arguing, that the 2002 conviction is not an aggravated felony qualifier for sentencing purposes because the Florida law “Dealing in Stolen Property” is overly broad. The Fifth Circuit must determine whether Rodriguez’s prior 2002 conviction qualifies as an “aggravating felony offense” under the USSG, because if so, he faces a longer prison term and could potentially set a precedent for the federal “aggravated felony qualifier” status of this Florida law.

Federal Law: Sentencing Enhancements

A defendant’s base offense level will be increased by 8 levels if the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the US after conviction for an aggravated felony, without regard to the date of the conviction for the aggravated felony. U.S.S.G. § 2LI.2(b)(1)(C); U.S.S.G. § 2LI.2 cmt. N.3(A); United States v. McKinney, 520 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 2008). An aggravated felony is defined as a “theft offense, including receipt of stolen property, or burglary offense, for which the prison term is at least one year.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).

Federal Cases: Determining Aggravated Felony Qualifiers

A “categorical approach” is used to determine whether a prior conviction is an offense under the USSG. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); United States v. Rodriguez-Negrete, 772 F.3d 221, 224-25 (5th Cir. 2014). Courts compare the elements of a statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the generic crime (the offense as it is commonly understood). United States v. Schofield, 802 F.3d 722, 727-28 (5th Cir. 2015). If the offense of conviction has the same elements as the generic crime, then the prior conviction may serve as the predicate, because anyone convicted under that law is guilty of all of the elements. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281, 2283 (2013).

Similarly, a “modified categorical approach” is used by courts to analyze the elements of a divisible statute (a criminal statute that is comprised of several varied offenses). In a two-step “modified categorical approach,” the court first reviews indictments and jury instructions, among other documents, to determine which part of a statute formed the basis of a defendant’s prior conviction. Next, the court compares the elements of the crime of conviction with the element of the general crime.

The Fifth Circuit Weighs In

Here, the Fifth Circuit adopted the modified categorical approach to analyze the case. Here, the “generic crime” is a theft offense—the “Dealing in Stolen Property” conviction from 2002. Because the provision does not clearly define “theft offense,” the Fifth Circuit applied the generic definition of theft, “a taking of property or an exercise of control over property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership.” United States v. Medina-Torres, 703 F.3d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 2012)(per curiam). Burke v. MuKasey, 509 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 2007).

The court examined the Florida statute reads, “Traffic means to (a) sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of property; (b) to buy, receive, possess, obtain control of, or use property with the intent to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of property.” Fla. Stat. § 812.012(8). Next, the Court reviewed Rodriguez’s charging document, which read, “Rodriguez knew or should have known that the property was stolen.” The Court examined Florida case law that showed that Florida applies the statute to conduct outside of the generic definition of theft—which created a problem when applying this conviction to the sentencing enhancement provision as outlined in the PSR. Without the enhancement provision, Rodriguez’s sentence would likely not have been as long with a lower base offense level. Accordingly the Fifth Circuit vacates the 27-month prison term and remands the case for resentencing only.