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Stack Sentence Concurrent Sentence

Stacking Sentences to Run Consecutively in Texas

By Brandon Barnett · Sentencing

The Importance Between Stacked and Concurrent Sentences

Stack Sentence Concurrent SentenceWhen a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes at the same trial, his sentences automatically run concurrently, unless there is an order for the sentences to be stacked (i.e. to run consecutively). When sentences are stacked, defendants are required to finish serving the sentence for one offense before they begin serving the sentence for another offense. So, if a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes, especially those with longer sentence ranges, the difference between stacking the sentences or running the sentences concurrently can be huge. Thus, it is very important to know when sentences must run concurrently, when sentences can be stacked, and who makes those decisions.

Who Decides Whether to Stack a Defendant’s Sentences or Run Them Concurrently?

In Texas, defendants have the right to elect to have the jury or a judge assess punishment. However, even when the jury assesses a defendant’s sentences in a case with multiple charges, it is up to the judge of the court to determine whether the sentences will be stacked or whether the sentences will run concurrently.

The trial court’s authority to stack sentences is derived primarily from article 42.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Under this article, when a defendant with multiple convictions is sentenced, the court must include in the subsequent judgment or judgments whether the sentences will run concurrently or consecutively. This general rule allowing stacking or concurrent sentences applies whether the sentences have been imposed or suspended. As a result, the trial court has broad discretion when pronouncing whether the sentences will be stacked or run concurrently. Nevertheless, there are certain occasions when the judge cannot stack a defendant’s sentence.

When is the Judge Prohibited From Stacking a Defendant’s Sentences?

Generally, when a defendant is found guilty of more than one offense arising from the same criminal episode and prosecuted in a single criminal action, the sentences must run concurrently (i.e. if a person is prosecuted in the same trial for DWI and Unlawful Carrying of a Weapon). However, there are exceptions to this rule that will allow for stacking. For example, if a defendant moves to sever his cases that arose from the same criminal episode, he runs the risk of having his sentences stacked. In addition, case law has permitted multiple convictions, arising out of the same criminal episode, for intoxication manslaughter and certain sex offenses under section 3.03(b) of the Texas Penal Code to be stacked.

What Criteria Does the Trial Court Use to Determine Whether to Stack a Defendant’s Sentence?

Trial Courts tend to consider the same factors used for determining the severity of a defendant’s sentence when deciding whether or not to stack sentences. For example, judges may consider:

  • whether the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other;
  • whether the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence;
  • whether the crimes were committed at different times or separate places; and
  • other aggravating or mitigating factors such as a defendant’s past record.

Are There Certain Circumstances When a Judge is Required to Stack Sentences?

Yes, but only in one scenario. As provided in Article 42.08, if a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while the defendant was an inmate in TDC and the defendant has not completed the sentence he was serving at the time of the offense, the judge shall order the new sentence be stacked—to begin immediately upon the completion of the defendant’s previous sentence.

Can the Judge Stack a Probation Sentence with a Prison Sentence?

Yes. In Texas, a judge can choose to stack a probation sentence with prison sentence, but the judge must order the confinement sentence to run first and the probation thereafter.

In Conclusion . . .

To determine whether your case involves offenses that may be stacked, you should consult with your attorney. Stacking sentences is rare, but you should still seek proper legal advice when charged with multiple offenses. If you find yourself in this situation and need an attorney, give us a call.

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Confrontation Clause violation when victim does not testify? McDowell v. State (2018)

Confrontation Clause Violation When Accuser Does Not Appear at Trial

By Brandon Barnett · Confrontation Clause

Tarrant County Trial Court Admits Testimony in Violation of the Confrontation Clause

The Second Court of Appeals recently released a memorandum opinion, which reversed a defendant’s conviction due to a confrontation clause violation. The issue was whether the trial court (Criminal District Court Number 1, Tarrant County) erred in allowing an officer to testify about certain statements the alleged victim made regarding a prior assault allegation.

McDowell v. State—2nd Court of Appeals (2018)

The Facts—Defendant Was Convicted for Felony Domestic Violence

On August 21, 2016, officers were alerted to a domestic disturbance in progress. When officers arrived at the scene they made contact with the victim and the victim’s friend who had reported the disturbance. While talking with the two females, officers noticed multiple bruises on the victim and learned that the suspect (i.e. Defendant), who had allegedly assaulted the victim, was still inside the home. Officers subsequently entered the residence and arrested Defendant.

At trial, dash-cam video showing the accusations made by the two females was admitted. In addition, one of the officers testified to additional statements made by the victim suggesting that the defendant had a history of violence. These additional statements, however, were not included in the dash cam video. Defendant objected to these statements under Crawford because the victim did not appear at trial. Nonetheless, the trial court allowed the out-of-court statements to be admitted over objection.

In addition to the officer’s testimony regarding the hearsay statements, the jury heard from two other witnesses about the cycle of domestic violence. The State then referenced this testimony in relation to Defendant’s history of domestic violence during closing arguments. As a result, Defendant was convicted. Defendant later appealed his conviction arguing that the trial court erred when it allowed the officer to testify to the victim’s statements in violation of the confrontation clause of the 6th Amendment.

Court of Appeals Reverses and Remands Case—Holding the Trial Court Erred in Admitting the Officer’s Testimony

Generally, the Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who does not appear at trial. In determining whether certain statements were testimonial in nature, “the Court looks to see whether circumstances were present at the time the statements were made that would indicate the existence of an ongoing emergency.” If such circumstances existed, the statements are admissible.

Here, the victim did not appear at trial. As such, the Court of Appeals attempted to analyze whether the victim’s statements were testimonial in nature by determining whether they were made during the ongoing emergency. However, the Court was unable to do so because there was no evidence from the State regarding when these statements were made. The Court concluded that without knowing the timing at which the statements were made, there was no way to determine the existence of an ongoing emergency. The Court explained that once there is an objection to the admission of evidence on confrontation grounds the burden shifts to the State. Here, the State was silent in regard to the confrontation objection. And, without the State providing more evidence, the Court could not conclude that the statements were nontestimonial. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred in admitting the statements.

The Court then conducted a harm analysis to determine whether the error impacted the jury’s verdict, which would require a reversal. In making its determination, the Court noted that the majority of the officer’s testimony was based on the inadmissible statements. These statements portrayed a history of violence rather than just one instance. Further, the other witnesses’ testimony hinged on these inadmissible statements. Thus, because the inadmissible statements were a crucial part in establishing the elements of the offense, the Court could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error did not contribute to Defendant’s conviction and, therefore, a reversal was required.

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Organized Retail Theft Lang

Organized Retail Theft: Does it Take Two to Tango? | Lang v. State (2018)

By Pricer · Theft

Organized Retail Theft LangThe Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion on the applicability of Texas’ organized retail theft statute. The issue facing the court was whether the statute defining the offense of organized retail theft permits a conviction for ordinary shoplifting by a single actor rather than requiring a group or collaborative effort.

CCA Opinion: Lang v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

The Facts—Defendant Stole Merchandise from HEB and Was Convicted Under Texas’ Organized Retail Theft Statue.

Defendant was shopping at HEB when an employee noticed her placing merchandise into reusable shopping bags. Some of the bags were inside of Defendant’s cart and one was tied to the side of her cart. The employee thought this behavior was unusual, so she kept an eye on Defendant. When Defendant went to check out, the employee observed her place all but one of the reusable bags onto the conveyor belt—leaving the bag that was tied to the side of the cart untouched. After paying, Defendant began to leave the store. Defendant was subsequently stopped by employees and questioned about the bag that was tied to her cart, which was full of unpaid merchandise. The unpaid items totaled $565.59, whereas the paid-for merchandise totaled only $262.17. At that time, the store called the police and Defendant was eventually arrested, charged, and convicted of organized retail theft.

Defendant appealed her conviction arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her conviction. More specifically, Defendant claimed that the offense of “organized retail theft” could not be committed by a single actor because the statute requires group action or collaborative effort. The court of appeals rejected this argument for the reasons listed below.

Court of Appeals Affirms the Trial Court’s Decision—Claiming that Organized Retail Theft Does Not Require Multiple Actors.

In making their decision the court of appeals looked to the statute’s language, which provides that a person commits an offense if she “intentionally conducts, promotes, or facilitates an activity in which the person receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of: (1) stolen retail merchandise; or (2) merchandise explicitly represented to the person as being stolen retail merchandise.” The court contended that nowhere in the statutory language was there explicit terms requiring group behavior. As a result, the court held that the language was not ambiguous and used plain meaning to interpret the statue.

Using dictionary definitions, the court concluded that the statutory terms “conducts, promotes, or facilitates,” did not require multiple actors. The court also explained that reading those statutory terms in context, established that what is conducted, promoted, or facilitated is an “activity,” not another person. Thus, “leaving the store after stealing the retail merchandise” was sufficient activity to meet the elements required by the statute. Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction and another appeal ensued.

Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses and Remands Case—Determining that Organized Retail Theft Requires Multiple Actors.

On appeal Defendant maintained that the offense of organized retail theft could not be committed by a single actor. She did not dispute the facts, rather, as a matter of law, she disputed whether the facts were adequate to establish the offense of organized retail theft. To evaluate this argument the Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed the statute’s language and compared it with the court of appeals’ analysis and Defendant’s argument. In doing so, the Court determined that the language could reasonably be interpreted in more than one way, and therefore, extra-textual sources, such as legislative history must be considered.

To make this determination the Court looked at the statute’s use of the past participle of steal (e.g., “stolen”). The court explained that use of “stolen” indicated that the “activity” covered by the statute takes place with respect to items that have already been stolen. Thus, the question then becomes “what type of ‘activity’ suffices to satisfy the statute’s requirements.” “Is it enough, as the court of appeals suggested, for a person to shoplift items of retail merchandise and then attempt to leave the store with the stolen items, thereby conducting an activity (leaving the store) in which the person possesses the retail merchandise she has just stolen?” Or, as Defendant suggested, does the statute require proof of some activity distinct from the type of conduct associated with shoplifting? In other words, “does the statute require proof of something more than the mere continued possession of the stolen retail merchandise during an attempt to leave the store?” Not immediately knowing the answer to these two reasonable interpretations, the Court decided it had to look to legislative history to help find the right answer.

After examining the statute’s legislative history, the Court found that the organized retail theft statute was intended to reach conduct distinct from that of ordinary shoplifting. To support its decision, the Court cited the statute’s bill analysis and a senate research report. Both pieces of legislative history similarly stated that organized retail theft is a highly organized criminal activity, dependent on multiple actors, and organized by a central figure. Further, the sources stated that organized retail theft is distinct from ordinary shoplifting in that it involves professional theft rings that move quickly across state lines in order to steal and move large amounts of merchandise—requirements that are clearly not present during ordinary shoplifting.

As such, when considering the legislative history in conjunction with the ambiguous statutory language, the Court concluded that it supports the notion that the organized retail theft statute was not intended to apply to the conduct of an ordinary shoplifter acting alone but rather to multiple actors involved in highly organized theft rings. Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the case.

Keller, P.J., filed a concurring opinion.

Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

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Attorney Duty Not to Concede Guilt Turner

Attorneys Have a Legal Obligation Not to Concede Guilt

By Pricer · Ineffective Assistance

Attorney Duty Not to Concede Guilt TurnerThe Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion regarding an attorney’s obligation not to concede their client’s guilt. The issue before the Court was whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial on direct appeal because his defense counsel conceded his guilt at trial against his wishes.

Turner v. State—Court of Criminal Appeals (2018)

The Facts—Defense Counsel Conceded Client’s Guilt Against His Wishes.

In the underlying case, defense counsel was appointed to represent Defendant for capital murder. Defendant had been charged with killing his wife and mother-in-law. Based on overwhelming evidence against Defendant, counsel insisted he admit his guilt and concentrate on obtaining a life sentence in order to avoid the death penalty. Defendant, however, did not want to admit guilt and made it readily apparent to counsel. Defendant also disputed counsel’s mitigation investigation in regard to his trial. Counsel responded to this claim by stating that Defendant did not have a voice in the matter that would override their voice or their tactics. Counsel further stated that Defendant was only allowed to decide whether to plea and whether to testify.

Against Defendant’s wishes, counsel told the jury in opening statements that the evidence would show Defendant killed his wife in a jealous rage, and it would also show that the grandma’s death was accidental. Counsel further told the jury that the facts of the case did not support the offense of capital murder, that Defendant was in denial about having committed the crime, and that the proper verdict was the lesser-included offense of murder. Defendant, however, maintained his innocence throughout trial and denied any involvement in the murders.

Even after Defendant testified to his innocence, counsel still conceded that Defendant was guilty in closing arguments. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals looked to a recent United States Supreme Court decision, McCoy v. Louisiana, to assess its impact.

McCoy v. Louisiana—Supreme Court Holds the Sixth Amendment Guarantees a Defendant “the Right to Insist that Counsel Refrain from Admitting Guilt.”

Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of an attorney conceding their client’s guilt without their consent. In McCoy, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, and the State was seeking the death penalty. Based on overwhelming evidence in that case, defense counsel advised the defendant he planned to concede guilt to avoid the death penalty. The defendant was irate and told his attorney “not to make that concession.” Against these demands, defense counsel conceded guilt in opening statements. Even so, the defendant maintained his innocence throughout trial.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant “the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experience-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty.” The Court further stated, “When a client expressly asserts that the objective of ‘his defense’ is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt.” The Court explained that a defendant’s choice to maintain his innocence is an “objective of representation, not merely an issue of trial tactics.” As such, the decision is one for the client, not the attorney.

With this decision, the Supreme Court concluded that the error was structural in nature and, therefore, required an automatic reversal. The Court explained that the issue was not one of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel because the issue was concerning “a client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence.”

Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses and Remands Case—Finding Counsel Committed a McCoy Violation by Conceding Guilt Against the Defendant’s Wishes.

In reviewing McCoy, the Court of Criminal Appeal held it was applicable. The State, however, argued that the defendant failed to timely object and preserve the record in order to show a McCoy violation. The Court disagreed with the State by explaining that a defendant should not be expected to object with the precision of an attorney. Rather a defendant can make a McCoy claim by presenting expressing his innocence.

Here, there was no question that the defendant wanted to maintain his innocence. During his testimony, he stated so explicitly. And, despite the defendant’s testimony disagreeing with counsel’s strategy, they continued to concede guilt in closing arguments. Further, as stated above, counsel believed the only decisions Defendant was entitled to make were “whether to plea and to testify.” Thus, solidifying the Court’s conclusion that counsel knew they were acting against Defendant’s wishes. And, moreover, that they believed they were not required to follow his wishes.

Based on the above facts, the Court determined that the defendant adequately preserved his McCoy claim and there was in fact a violation. And, even though counsel’s strategy to concede guilt was more rational than Defendant’s theory, whether to concede guilt is one of the few rights that the defendant alone must determine under the Sixth Amendment. It’s a decision reserved for the client, not the attorney. As a result, the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

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Mau Deferred Adjudication Jury Verdict

Can a Judge Grant Deferred Adjudication After a Jury's Guilty Verdict?

By Pricer · Jury Trial

Mau Deferred Adjudication Jury VerdictThe Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion on a petition for writ of mandamus. The two issues facing the court were (1) the nature of a misdemeanor trial after a defendant pleads guilty to a jury; and, (2) whether a trial court has the ability to defer an adjudication of guilt after a jury finds a defendant guilty. The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to grant mandamus relief on the first issue but, for the reasons discussed below, it granted mandamus relief for the second issue.

Majority Opinion: In re State ex rel. Mau, (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

The Facts—The Trial Court Instructed the Jury to Return a Verdict of Guilty and Then Entered an Order Deferring Guilt.

The underlying case involved a defendant who was charged with the misdemeanor offense of assault bodily injury of a family member. The defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial for this offense, and the State never gave written consent to waive a jury trial. As a result, the case proceeded to a jury trial upon the defendant’s plea of not guilty. During trial, however, the defendant changed his plea to guilty, and the trial court retired the jury with an instruction that it return a verdict of guilty on the basis of the defendant’s plea, and it did.

After the defendant was found guilty, the trial court did not submit the issue of punishment to the jury. Instead, it dismissed the jury. There were no objections to the jury’s dismissal. However, the State did bring to the court’s attention that the defendant had not been properly admonished prior to pleading guilty. At that point, the court admonished the defendant without objection. Only at this point—after the jury had already returned a verdict of guilty—did the defendant waive his right to jury trial. The State, however, never consented in writing, before the entry of the guilty plea, as required by Article 1.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result, when the trial court deferred guilt, the state sought a writ of mandamus.

The State argued to the court of appeals that the trial court lacked the authority to defer the adjudication of the defendant’s guilt, and the court of appeals denied relief. After being denied, the State, again, sought mandamus relief with the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Court of Criminal Appeals Granted Mandamus Relief—Holding the Trial Court Was Without Authority to Enter an Order of Deferred Adjudication.

In its argument to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State maintained that the trial court lacked authority to defer guilt and argued that the trial court had a ministerial duty to enter judgment on the jury’s verdict. The State explained that by allowing the trial court to defer the defendant’s guilt, after the jury had rendered its verdict, would essentially nullify their statutory discretion to consent to a jury waiver.

In maintaining its position, the trial court relied on a court of appeals opinion, State v. Sosa, 830 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, pet. ref’d).

The issue in Sosa was whether the judge, having found the defendant guilty on his plea of not guilty in a bench trial, could thereafter withdraw the courts finding of guilt and assess deferred adjudication. The Court of Criminal Appeals allowed this because there was no authority that barred the trial judge’s discretion or the procedure in a bench trial. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that the same could not be said about a jury’s verdict of guilty.

“By its very terms, the statutory option authorizing deferred adjudication is limited to defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere before the trial court after waiving trial by jury.”

Here, at the time that the defendant pled guilty to the jury, he did not waive his right to a jury trial nor did the State consent to a waiver. Without such a waiver, the trial court was bound to resolve the issue of guilt by a jury trial and, further, the trial court then had a ministerial duty to enter judgment on the jury’s verdict. As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted mandamus relief.

Takeaways . . .

While a defendant can always change his or her plea, the trial court cannot abrogate a jury’s finding of guilt by placing a defendant on deferred adjudication. At this point in the trial, the only way to defer guilt would be to grant a motion for new trial. However, this motion for new trial must have a legal basis, and deferred adjudication, alone, is insufficient.

However, a defendant may be placed on deferred adjudication after a jury trial has begun, but before a verdict has been returned if the defendant properly submits to the court, a waiver of his or her right to a jury trial, and the State agrees accordingly. The State may consent, at any time, but the consent must be in writing and filed appropriately. If the defendant waives this right and the State follows the aforementioned steps, then the judge can dismiss the jury, accept the defendant’s plea, and subsequently place the defendant on deferred adjudication.

Alcala, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Newell, J., filed a concurring opinion.

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