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Who Has The Burden of Proof?

By Traffic Offenses

Does the State or the Defense have the Burden of Proof?

 – 14th Court of Appeals (Houston) 2011

Carlos Arias was observed speeding by a police officer and pulled over. Arias was unable to provide proof of financial responsibility (proof of insurance), when asked by the police officer. Arias went to trial in the municipal court of record and after the close of State’s case-in-chief, Arias claimed that there were statutory exceptions to the requirement to establish financial responsibility and that the State had not negated them.  He appealed his conviction to the County Criminal Court at Law.

Generally, when a penal statute includes an exception as part of the statute itself, the State must negate the existence of the exception in the indictment of the offense and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant or defendant’s conduct does not fall within the exception. Failing to negate an exception is the same as failing to allege an essential element of the offense and renders the indictment void. However, when an exception is in a separate section from the provision that states the offense, it is not essential for the State to negate the exception. This is different from an exception and called a defense, which must be raised by the defendant.

An “Exception” or a “Defense”

The key distinction is who has the burden of proof—an exception means the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt or the defendant should be acquitted; a defense means a defendant bears the initial burden to produce some evidence that supports the defensive theory. Once the defendant produces such evidence, the State then bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  So, to be clear, the defense does not bear the “burden of proof,” but only a burden to produce some evidence of the defensive theory.  The burden then shifts to the state to disprove the defense.

The Court of Appeals found that no Texas court has determined whether the State must negate the exceptions to the financial responsibility requirement as an element of the offense or whether the exceptions are defenses that must be raised by the defendant. The Court of Appeals looked to the statute in the Transportation Code and decided if exceptions or defenses are listed. To do this they decided whether they are a necessary part of the definition or a description of the offense.

The Court first looks to the main code of “Requirement of Financial Responsibility.” They then found in a separate subsection, “Exceptions to Financial Responsibility,” which Arias relies on. The code only states that a person commits an offense if the person operates a motor vehicle in violation of the “Requirement of Financial Responsibility” section, but the exceptions are not mentioned.

The court finds that because they are not mentioned in the offense, the exceptions are therefore not a necessary part of the definition or description of the offense. This means that these are not exceptions that the State must negate, but merely defenses that the defendant has the option to bring evidence in to prove. Additionally, the State is not generally required to negate as an element of the offense matters “peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.” Here, these exceptions are things such as the character of the car, such as older than 25 years old. The court holds that under most circumstances, the defendant would be more likely than the State to know whether one of the exceptions applies.

This can be absolutely crucial for building your defense. An exception can get you acquitted if the State doesn’t prove beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas a defense is merely a chance to persuade the judge or jury. It appears that the key deciding factor is whether the “exceptions” are listed with the main code or are in a separate subsection.

Can a Rejected Plea Bargain Offer be Revived?

By Plea Bargain

Contrary to television portrayals, most criminal cases never reach trial. While it is difficult to put a number of it, I would say that 90 to 95% of criminal cases are resolved by dismissal or plea bargain. Our Fort Worth criminal defense attorneys put the interests of the client first and will always pursue a dismissal and sometimes attempt to reach a favorable plea deal with the prosecutor as an alternative to the uncertainty of trial.  But in some occasions, a trial is the only way to go. What follows is a recent case opinion from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals regarding a plea bargain situation gone wrong.

Rodriguez v. State (Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 2015)

On advice from counsel, Israel Rodriguez rejected a ten-year sentence plea bargain. Rodriguez was convicted and received eight life sentences.

Rodriguez filed for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel; he believed his attorney’s advice regarding the plea offer was wrong. Rodriguez asked that the State be required to re-offer the ten-year deal.

The judge granted a new trial and ordered the State to re-offer the deal. The judge proceeded to reject the deal.

After denying the ten-year deal, the judge informed Rodriguez he could withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial or accept a 25-year sentence. Rodriguez rejected the 25-year sentence and filed a recusal motion, arguing that the judge had demonstrated prejudice. The judge recused, and a new judge was assigned.

Rodriguez filed a motion to require the State to re-offer the ten-year deal. The new judge said the original judge’s recusal had “wiped the slate clean,” including the ten-year plea offer, but he would accept a new agreement if one were presented. The state offered a plea deal of 25 years, which Rodriguez accepted. The judge accepted the plea agreement and executed the judgments of conviction.

Rodriguez argued on appeal that he was entitled to the original ten-year offer and the court was required to accept it. The court of appeals considered three factors: (1) whether Rodriguez would have accepted the original offer; (2) whether the State would have been likely to withdraw the offer; and (3) whether the judge would have likely accepted the agreement.

The court of appeals concluded Rodriguez had suffered inadequate representation. The court’s solution was for the State to re-offer the ten-year deal and have a judge who had not recused herself accept or reject the deal. The court did not agree that the judge was required to accept the ten-year deal. The case was remanded for the State to re-offer the deal.

The State filed for review of the court of appeals’ decision, alleging four errors:

(1) The voluntarily recusal should not have been considered.

(2) Nothing in the record supported the possibility of the original judge accepting the ten-year deal.

(3) The second judge should not have been required to order the State to re-offer the ten-year deal.

(4) The judgment of conviction should not have been reversed.

The CCA considered the same three factors considered by the court of appeals. Although Rodriguez’s convictions were vacated, he was still entitled to a determination of whether he had received effective counsel. The CCA agreed with the court of appeals that Rodriguez had been harmed by following his attorney’s advice in rejecting the offer. No evidence suggested Rodriguez would have rejected the deal. The State was not likely to withdraw the offer because the passage of time had made the victims’ testimony at trial unreliable.

The CCA said the only question was whether the first judge would have likely accepted the ten-year deal. No intervening circumstances would have given the judge a basis to reject the deal. However, Rodriguez did have an extensive criminal history, and the police reports for his charges were particularly damning. But nothing in the record indicated the judge would have rejected the ten-year deal if it had been presented to her prior to the trial. The CCA thus rejected the State’s second allegation of error.

The State agreed the first judge would have likely accepted the ten-year deal prior to trial, but it argued the voluntary recusal was irrelevant. No evidence indicated any prejudice against Rodriguez. Requiring the State to re-offer the ten-year deal and then rejecting it were proper rulings and did not require recusal. On the State’s first allegation, the CCA said, the court of appeals had erred.

The CCA sided with the State on its third allegation, finding Rodriguez had received exactly what he requested–a new trial with a clean slate and a decision on a plea agreement by a judge. The second judge was not obligated to give Rodriguez what the first judge had already given—consideration of the ten-year deal. Therefore, there was no requirement that the State re-offer the ten-year deal. The CCA did not consider the fourth allegation because its decisions on the first three allegations made the fourth issue moot. The CCA reinstated the 25-year sentence offered by the State, agreed to by Rodriguez, and accepted by the second judge.

An individual facing criminal charges will be advised by his Fort Worth criminal defense attorney regarding whether to accept the deal. Although the decision is ultimately up to the defendant, bad advice that ultimately leads to a worse outcome than the deal offered may present an opportunity for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

Transporting Illegal Immigrants Requires Due Care

By Immigration

DWI Conviction Reversed: Shoulder Passing Legal in Texas

United States v. Muniz (5th Circuit, 2015)

In August 2010, Demi Muniz planned to drive a group of illegal immigrants from Houston to Los Angeles. Just before the trip, one of the passengers appeared lethargic and dehydrated. Muniz contacted the passenger’s wife in Mexico, informing the wife that her husband was ill. The wife told Muniz that her husband was diabetic and needed to go to a hospital. Muniz decided against taking the passenger to the hospital, instead continuing the journey. Along the drive, the passenger began shivering and sweating, and eventually became unresponsive. Muniz dropped the unresponsive passenger off at a rest stop, where he was found dead the next day.

At trial, the jury found that Muniz placed the passenger’s life in jeopardy, and that he died as a result of Muniz’s conduct. Muniz was convicted of conspiracy to transport and conceal illegal aliens, resulting in a person’s death. Incorporating sentencing enhancements, she was sentenced to 85 months in prison, followed by a two-year term of supervised release. Muniz appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, challenging the district court’s imposition of sentencing enhancements that called for a tougher punishment.

The language of the sentencing enhancements used by the district court, stated the enhancements be used in sentencing for actions that “intentionally or recklessly creat[ed] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury” and “caus[ed] another person’s death.”

First, Muniz argued that the district court’s imposition of the enhancements was improper because the manner in which she was transporting the passengers—riding in a van—was not dangerous and because she did not know that the passenger was gravely ill. The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying that reckless conduct includes “abandoning persons in a dangerous…area without adequate food, water, clothing, or protection from the elements.” Here, Muniz abandoned the passenger in an area without medical care.

The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from an earlier decision in United States v. Gomez-Cortez, where a sentencing enhancement did not apply because a passenger who died was not transported in a dangerous manner, and the mere fact that the defendant had been told that the passenger looked ill did not put her on notice that the passenger could not travel at all. 34 F. App’x 152 (5th Cir. 2002). Muniz likely knew the passenger was ill by his dehydrated appearance, by displaying symptoms of being hot and cold, and by the phone call with the passenger’s wife, stating the passenger was diabetic and needed medical attention.

Second, the Court of Appeals stated that district courts properly apply the sentencing enhancement if the defendant’s conduct is a “but-for cause” of a person’s death, consisting of both affirmative acts and omissions. United States v. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 401-02. Muniz decided not to seek medical treatment for the passenger, even though, as the district court determined, she was within close range of several medical facilities and that according to expert testimony, the passenger likely could have survived with medical care.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancements because Muniz’s failure to get medical aid for the passenger under these circumstances placed the passenger at a substantial risk of death or serious injury and caused his death.

A Federal criminal defense attorney in Fort Worth will understand the federal sentencing guidelines and sentencing enhancements for a variety of cases. As you can see from the case above, distinguishing previous case law precedent from the case above had a direct impact on establishing the criteria for sentencing enhancements for the defendant, sentencing enhancements that determined the length and severity of punishment. This essay does not replace legal counsel or advice.

Outcry Witness Statements Upheld by Fort Worth Court

By Sex Crimes

Hearsay Statements Admitted in Child Sexual Assault Trial. Affirmed on Appeal by Fort Worth Court.

Gonzales v. State – 2nd Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) 2015

Pablo Gonzales, Jr. was convicted on one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child and three counts of indecency with a child. He was sentenced to life in prison by the jury for the sexual assault case and twenty years imprisonment in each of the indecency cases.

The defendant lived in a house where drug use was rampant and people would come in, often leaving their children for him to watch.  One of the witnesses against him, given the pseudonym T.P., was the mother of two of the girls that claimed to be sexually abused by defendant. Generally, hearsay testimony, testimony from one person about what another person says, cannot be admitted into evidence against a defendant. Here, the trial court applied an exception to the hearsay rule for an “outcry witness.” An outcry witness is the first person a child tells about abuse that the child received and this testimony by the outcry witness can be admitted.

The defendant in this case argued that the outcry witness testimony should not be allowed into court because T.P. admitted that her memory was fuzzy as a result of her drug use. Defendant also argued that T.P.’s testimony satisfied few, if any, of the nonexclusive factors the court considers in determining the reliability of an outcry.

When Can an Outcry Witness Statement by Admitted Over Defense Objection?

Article 38.072 of the code of criminal procedure provides a mechanism that requires the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis if outcry witness testimony reaches the level of reliability required to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.

Indicia of reliability that the trial court may consider [under article 38.072] include (1) whether the child victim testifies at trial and admits making the out-of-court statement, (2) whether the child understands the need to tell the truth and has the ability to observe, recollect, and narrate, (3) whether other evidence corroborates the statement, (4) whether the child made the statement spontaneously in his own terminology or whether evidence exists of prior prompting or manipulation by adults, (5) whether the child’s statement is clear and unambiguous and rises to the needed level of certainty, (6) whether the statement is consistent with other evidence, (7) whether the statement describes an event that a child of the victim’s age could not be expected to fabricate, (8) whether the child behaves abnormally after the contact, (9) whether the child has a motive to fabricate the statement, (10) whether the child expects punishment because of reporting the conduct, and (11) whether the accused had the opportunity to commit the offense.

The defendant claimed that the outcry lacked reliability, specifically because of T.P.’s drug use and generally because it was short, lacked detail, and was uncorroborated. The 2nd Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) agreed that the statement was short, but pointed out that it was also very clear, specific, and unequivocal. A trial court’s decision to admit evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. A trial court has only abused its discretion if its decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.

The 2nd Court of Appeals went on explain that even if they concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony, such error would not rise to the level of constitutional error and should only be reversed if the error affected the Defendant’s substantial rights. The Court noted the victim testified at trial, and her testimony both corroborated T.P.’s testimony regarding the outcry and provided greater detail.  For this reason, the Court held that even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the outcry witness testimony, the error would be harmless.

Even if someone admits to their memory not being completely accurate due to prominent drug use, their outcry testimony can still be brought into court if the person who made the statements to them originally, corroborates them. This may make it extremely hard to overturn a conviction with the Court of Appeals because even if outcry testimony may be weak or lacks reliability, the Court will likely not overrule the case so long as others corroborate the testimony. This may also make it extremely hard to keep out any outcry statements.

Burglary of a Former Residence Leads to Capital Murder

By Burglary, Murder

Felony Murder Conviction is Affirmed on Appeal

Gardner v. State (14th Court of Appeals, Houston 2015)

Herbert Gardner and his ex-girlfriend dated for four years and lived together in his ex-girlfriend’s home. When the couple broke up on November 2, 2012, Gardner moved into a hotel. On December 23, 2012, his ex-girlfriend was found murdered in her home and Gardner was found nearby, badly injured. On the way to the hospital Gardner stated to the police officer, “I should not have shot her.” A jury found Gardner guilty of an elevated charge of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to mandatory life in prison.

Gardner appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing (1) that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he murdered his ex-girlfriend in the course of committing a burglary, an aggravating factor that elevates a murder charge to a capital offense with a heavier punishment; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove that when he entered his ex-girlfriend’s home, he committed or intended to commit a felony, theft, or assault, which also carries a heavier punishment in Texas. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both of Gardner’s arguments, affirming his conviction.

First, the language of the statute under which Gardner was convicted states, “A person commits burglary if, without the effective consent of the owner, he: (1) enters a building or habitation with intent to commit a felony, theft or an assault, or, (2) enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or an assault.”

Gardner argued that he had an equal right to possession of the property and could not be found to have entered without his ex-girlfriend’s consent because he had lived in the home for four years, that the neighbors saw him in the home on a regular basis, and that he used the residence as home address on his driver’s license. The State argued that Gardner lost his right to possession before the murder because he moved into a hotel, his name was not on the property deed, that the front window of the home was broken and blood-stained with Gardner’s blood, that his vehicle registration reflected a different address, and that there were not any items that suggested a male was living in her home at the time of the murder.

In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the Court of Appeals must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the trial court could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the Court of Appeals agreed with the State, that there was indeed sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that Gardner no longer lived with his ex-girlfriend and no longer had consent to enter the home at the time of the murder. Because the evidence was sufficient to prove the unlawful entry element of burglary, the Court of Appeals overruled Gardner’s first argument.

Second, the language of the statute under which Gardner was convicted states, “A person commits capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes an individual’s death while in the course of committing or attempting to commit burglary.” Gardner argued that the State wrongly used his murder to establish the murder requirement for capital murder and to establish the felony component of the underlying burglary. The State argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals—the court of last resort for criminal matters in Texas— has held in several cases that a murder occurring after a break-in can indeed serve as both the basis for the murder charge and the underlying felony required for burglary.

Under the legal doctrine of Stare Decisis, courts must follow the precedent established by the higher court from cases the higher court has heard from previous years. In criminal appeals, these prior cases serve as an example for lower courts to follow when making decisions about upholding or overturning convictions. Here, the Court of Appeals overruled Gardner’s second argument because the court is bound to follow precedent set forth by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State could use Gardner’s murder to establish the murder requirement for capital murder and to establish the felony component of the underlying burglary in order to elevate the murder to capital murder, which incurs a higher penalty in Texas.

In criminal appeals, the court is primarily responsible for ensuring that proper form and procedures are followed in the trial courts, rather than determining the facts of the case. The trial court is tasked with determining and recording the facts of the case, to be used later on appeal if necessary.

A criminal defense attorney in Fort Worth will understand the subtle nuances of the statutory language found in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and in legal doctrines, such as Stare Decisis. As you can see from the case above, statutory language and legal doctrine have a direct impact on establishing the elements of a crime, elements that may determine the severity of the penalty in the punishment phase of a trial. This essay does not replace legal counsel or advice.

Free Consultation with a Dedicated Team of Fort Worth Criminal Defense Attorneys

Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC is a proven and dedicated criminal defense law firm. With offices in Fort Worth, Keller, and Grapevine, our attorneys stand ready to defend your liberty and your future. Call our office at (817) 993-9249 to arrange a Free consultation of your criminal case today. Do not wait until it is too late.

Court Sets Aside Fraud Conviction Based on the Meaning of One Common Word in the Statute

By Fraud

What does it mean to cause someone to fraudulently execute a document?

Roger and Aaron Liverman filed separate mechanic’s lien affidavits with the Denton County clerk, claiming that they had worked on Katheryn Payne’s home and had not been paid. The county clerk filed and recorded the liens, which is the customary practice. The mechanic’s liens were determined to be fraudulent, and the Livermans were charged with securing the execution of documents by deception. The Livermans were convicted and placed on community supervision.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the Livermans’ convictions. The State appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the case turned on an interpretation of statutory language, the CCA reviewed the case de novo; in other words, rather than reviewing the reasonableness of the lower court’s decision, the CCA made its own independent decision based on the facts and the statute.

OpinionLiverman v. StateTexas Court of Criminal Appeals 2015

The language of the statute under which the Livermans were convicted states that a person commits a crime if, “with intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by deception causes another to sign or execute any document affecting property or service . . . .” The case before the CCA boiled down to three questions: (1) What does the term “execute” mean in the statute? If nothing was executed, there was no offense. (2) Did the Livermans’ action of filing the fraudulent liens meet the definition of execution? (3) Who actually executes a mechanic’s lien when it is filed? The offense involves deceptively causing “another” to sign or execute a document. If the clerk’s actions constituted execution, the Livermans might be guilty. If the Livermans executed the affidavits themselves by filing them, then they could not be convicted under the statute.

Arguments against Fraudulent Execution of a Document

The State and the Livermans put forward a number of arguments for their respective positions. The arguments involved comparing the “sign and execute” language of the statute with a related provision that uses the phrase “file and record;” consideration of the legislative intent and history when the statute was enacted; and which action actually perfected the liens. After reviewing the arguments and performing its own analysis, the CCA concluded:

(1) The term “execute” means more than just to sign a document and involves the broader act of bringing a document to its final, legally enforceable form.

(2) When the Livermans filed the affidavits with the clerk, the affidavits accomplished their role in perfecting the mechanic’s lien. Therefore, the act of filing the affidavits was equivalent to execution.

(3) Because Texas law requires the person claiming a mechanic’s lien to “file” the affidavit, then the Livermans did execute the affidavits by filing them. However, the CCA considered whether the clerk’s actions might also constitute execution. Although the county clerk is required by law to record or index a filed affidavit, the clerk’s failure to do so does not invalidate the lien. If the clerk’s action of recording or indexing can be omitted and the affidavit still be valid, then the clerk’s actions clearly did not “execute” the affidavits.

But, asked the Court, did the clerk “execute” the affidavits by accepting them when the Livermans filed them? The CCA answered in the negative. The statutory requirement to file the affidavit “with the county clerk” means that the clerk is simply the recipient of the filing and plays no role in its execution.

Because no action of the clerk executed the affidavits, the CCA held, the Livermans did not cause “another” to “execute” the documents as required for the offense of which they were convicted. The CCA agreed with the court of appeals, with the result of setting aside the Livermans’ conviction.

Many people will recall President Bill Clinton’s grand jury testimony in the Monica Lewinsky case. When asked why he wasn’t lying when the told his aides that there was nothing going on between him and Miss Lewinsky, the President said “[i]t depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.”

While many will find the President’s response amusing, a Criminal Defense Attorney in Fort Worth may see an opportunity. Although not nearly so salacious as the Monica Lewinsky affair, the Livermans’ case truly turned on what the meaning of the word “execute” is.

A Criminal Defense Attorney in Fort Worth will understand and appreciate the nuances of the statutory language and may succeed in acquittal by arguing that the law does (or does not) say what it seems to say.

Locked and Loaded: What You Need to Know About Texas’ New Open Carry Laws

By Open Carry

Texans love their guns and many folks in Texas are excited about the new “Open Carry” laws that were passed this year. Some people imagine a wild west where handguns are worn on the hips of everyone in town. Other are terrified that gun-related incidents will increase. Well, the new open carry laws do not come without their rules.

With the passage of House Bill 910, beginning January 1, 2016, Texans in possession of a concealed carry license (CHL) will be allowed to openly carry a holstered handgun. While “open carry” sounds simple enough, there is much more to it. This article explains some of the rules that Texans need to know if they plan to openly carry a handgun in 2016.

Who is eligible to openly carry a handgun?

Only CHL holders may open carry. Subchapter H of Chapter 411 of the Texas Government Code sets out the basic requirements for a person to be eligible to apply for a handgun license and openly carry a firearm.

To open carry in Texas, a person MUST:

1) Be a legal resident of the State of Texas for the preceding six months before applying for his or her handgun license;
2) Be at least 21 years of age*;
3) Have never been convicted of a felony;
4) Not be charged with the commission of:
• Class A or B Misdemeanor or equivalent offense
• the offense of Disorderly Conduct or equivalent; or
• a felony offense;
5) Not be a fugitive from justice for a felony, Class A or B Misdemeanor or equivalent offense;
6) Not be a chemically dependent person;
7) Not be incapable of exercising sound judgment with respect to the proper use and storage of a handgun;
8) Have not, in the prior five years before applying, been convicted of a Class A or B Misdemeanor or equivalent offense or of the offense of Disorderly Conduct or equivalent offense;
9) Be fully qualified under applicable federal and state law to purchase a handgun;
10) Have not been finally determined to be delinquent in making child support payments or collected by the attorney general;
11) Have not been finally determined to be delinquent in the payment of taxes or other money collected by the State;
12) Not be currently restricted under a court protective order or subject to a restraining order affecting the spousal relationship, other than a restraining order solely affecting property interests;
13) Have not, in the 10 years preceding the date of application, been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct violating a penal law of the grade of felony; or
14) Have not made any material misrepresentation, or failed to disclose any material fact, in an application submitted pursuant to Section 411.174. (Perjury).

*The age restriction is lowered down to 18 for honorably discharged military veterans who meet all other qualifications.

What types of firearms can be openly carried in Texas?

Currently, under Texas Penal Code Section 46.03, a person cannot carry, either openly or by concealment, a handgun unless that person is on the person’s own premise or inside of a motor vehicle that is owned or under the person’s control (the weapon must still be concealed if carried in a vehicle under 46.03 (a-1)). There is no language in Texas Penal Code 46.03 regarding firearms other than handguns. Therefore, there are no laws prohibiting openly carrying rifles and shotguns (subject to the “where” restrictions to be addressed below). The exception to Texas Penal Code 46.03 is that the provision doesn’t apply to those in possession of a license issued under Subchapter H, Chapter 411 of the Texas Government Code.

In addition to carrying a concealed handgun under Subchapter H, the new House Bill 910 now grants the opportunity for Texans in possession of a concealed carry to openly carry a holstered “handgun.” A “handgun” is defined by Texas Penal Code 46.01 (5) as “any firearm that is designed, made or adapted to be fired by one hand.” Shotguns can be openly carried now in addition to holstered handguns as long as a person is in possession of a license granted under Subchapter H, Chapter 411 of the Texas Government Code.

How can handguns be openly carried?

Use a holster. Under Texas Penal Code 46.15(b) (6), a person carrying a valid CHL may carry a handgun either in a concealed manner or in a shoulder or belt holster. Under these new provisions, if the handgun is carried any other way, a person would be unlawfully carrying the handgun.

Where can handguns be openly carried?

In general, even if a person possesses a CHL, Texas Penal Code 46.03 strictly prohibits the carrying of a handgun or firearm from the following places:
1) School or educational institutions;
2) An election site during regular or early voting;
3) Government or court offices;
4) At a racetrack;
5) Airports (in the restricted section); or
6) Within 1,000 feet of premises of an execution site on the day of an execution.

In addition to the locations listed above, Texas Penal Code 30.06 prohibits individuals, and creates a criminal offense of trespass, for those who hold a license to carry a handgun when notified that their presence on the property with a handgun is expressly forbidden. To provide notice, a property owner must display written notice on the property that specifically complies with the notice requirements of Texas Penal Code 30.06.

With the new Open Carry law, those that wish to prohibit others from carrying a handgun on their premises, must also post a notice in accordance with section 30.07 of the Texas Penal Code.  This notice is in addition to the 30.06 sign.

Conclusion

The term “open carry” has been loosely thrown around as new legislation has been debated and ultimately passed regarding openly carrying handguns. It is important to remember that “open carry” isn’t a free-for-all regarding handguns. “Open Carry” is still highly regulated and a person considering openly carrying a handgun should be familiar with all of these new laws and regulations, so that they do not end up needing our services.

Luke Williams is a criminal defense attorney with Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC in Fort Worth, Texas.

Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC
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DWI Intox Manslaughter Case Reversed Due to Drunk Victim

By DWI

Causation Difficult to Prove In DWI Intoxication Manslaughter Case | Fort Worth DWI Attorneys

One of the key issues in any criminal case is causation. In order to be found guilty of a crime, a defendant’s actions must be found to have been the cause of the criminal act. While causation may seem like a simple thing to prove, causation may depend as much on the actions of the victim as on the actions of the defendant.

Saenz v. State (14th Court of Appeals, August 2015)

FACTS: Monika Saenz was driving her truck around 3:00 a.m. when she struck Jose Torres, Jr., killing him. Blood drawn over an hour after the accident yielded a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .172 for Saenz. The autopsy of Torres determined that his BAC was also .172 at the time of the accident and that he had used marijuana and cocaine prior to his death.

Saenz was convicted of intoxication manslaughter and accident involving injury or death. There was no question as to whether Saenz’s truck hit Torres. Saenz’s only defense was concurrent causation: If Torres’ conduct was clearly sufficient to produce the accident that resulted in his death, and Saenz’s conduct was clearly insufficient to produce that result, then Saenz should be acquitted under the theory of concurrent causation.

Saenz pointed to many features of Torres’ conduct that were sufficient to cause the accident. He was walking in the road in dark clothes while intoxicated in the middle of the night; there was no evidence that Saenz’s car ever left the roadway; Torres was walking on the wrong side of the road; and Saenz was not speeding at the time of the accident. Saenz’s position was that her driving while intoxicated was insufficient to cause Torres’ death because even a sober driver would have struck and killed Torres given his conduct.

As part of her concurrent causation defense, Saenz attempted to admit evidence of Torres’ .172 BAC. However, the medical examiner refused to state his opinion that Torres’ .172 BAC would have affected his normal use of physical or mental faculties. As a result, the trial court did not allow admission of the evidence regarding Torres’ BAC.

On appeal, the Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals questioned why the medical examiner would refuse to concede that a BAC of more than twice the legal limit for driving may have affected Torres’ use of his mental or physical faculties. Furthermore, the Court noted that the standard for public intoxication is that an individual is intoxicated to the degree that he may endanger himself or others. According to the Court, the evidence of Torres’ .172 BAC may have led the jury to conclude that Torres was a danger to himself while walking in the middle of the road in the dark. Further, the Court held, the BAC evidence might have provided a possible explanation to the jury for why Torres failed to move from the roadway when the vehicle appeared.

After finding that the evidence of the victim’s BAC should have been admitted, the Court addressed the question of whether the failure to admit had harmed Saenz’s case. According to the Court, Torres’ BAC evidence was essential Saenz’s defense, and excluding the evidence denied Saenz the opportunity to properly present her concurrent causation defense. Because the Court determined that exclusion of evidence of the victim’s BAC was error that may have contributed to the conviction or punishment, the Court reversed the conviction for intoxication manslaughter and remanded the case for a new trial.

This case illustrates the complexity of the current causation defense, which is used in cases other than criminal cases, particularly property insurance cases. A Fort Worth Criminal Defense Attorney will be familiar with the concurrent causation defense and may be able to obtain an acquittal for his or her client by showing that the criminal act would have occurred even if the defendant had done nothing wrong because the victim’s conduct would have caused it.

Court Rejects Blood Alcohol Content Evidence by Unqualified Expert in DWI Case

By DWI

Rejecting the “Science” of Retrograde Extrapolation in Texas DWI Cases

Most people are familiar with the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) level for DWI: 0.08.  Most people, however, are not familiar with “retrograde extrapolation” and the role it plays in determining BAC. A Fort Worth Criminal Defense Attorney will understand the importance of retrograde extrapolation in a DWI case as evidenced by a recent decision from the Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals.

VELIZ v. STATE (14th Court of Appeals, Houston, 2015)

FACTS: Houston Police Officer Joel Quezada arrested Luis Veliz shortly after midnight. Veliz admitted to having two beers to drink. After Officer Quezada obtained a search warrant, Veliz’s blood was drawn at 3:32 a.m. Veliz’s BAC was .081.

At Veliz’s trial, a criminalist from the police crime laboratory testified that, based on the .081 BAC at 3:32 a.m., Veliz’s BAC at the time of the stop would have been between 0.095 and 0.124. The jury found Veliz guilty of DWI.

On appeal, Veliz argued the criminalist’s testimony regarding his BAC was not admissible. This is where retrograde extrapolation became important.

The issue in a DWI case is the BAC at the time the defendant was driving. The blood sample is often obtained hours after the arrest. The process for estimating a BAC at the time of arrest based on a blood sample drawn later is known as retrograde extrapolation: a BAC at one point in time (3:32 a.m. for Veliz) is used to estimate the BAC at a time in the past (12:05 a.m. for Veliz).

Mata Factors Must Be Proven In Order to Apply Retrograde Extrapolation in Texas DWI Cases

Texas case law allows retrograde extrapolation testimony if the expert witness understands how to apply and how to clearly explain the process. In assessing such testimony, courts consider the time between the offense and the blood test, how many tests are administered and at what intervals, and any characteristics of the individual that were considered, including weight, gender, drinking pattern, tolerance for alcohol, amount of alcohol consumed, type of alcohol consumed, time of the last drink and what food was consumed. These are known as the Mata factors, based on the case in which they were first applied.

The Mata factors are important because different individuals’ bodies absorb and eliminate alcohol at different rates. And calculating a BAC retroactively requires knowing whether the individual was in the absorption phase (increasing BAC) or in the elimination phase (declining BAC). While not every factor must be known, Texas case law requires that if only one test is performed some time after the alleged offense, retrograde extrapolation is reliable only if many of the factors are considered.

The Court found the criminalist did not know many of Veliz’s relevant characteristics–his drinking pattern, the time of his first or last drink, or whether he had eaten recently. The criminalist testified she did not know the Mata factors for retrograde extrapolation. She also testified–incorrectly–that all she needed to perform a retrograde extrapolation was the time of the stop and the time of the blood draw. Because the criminalist did not understand and could not explain the subtleties of retrograde extrapolation, the court reversed the verdict and remanded for a new trial.

Some people believe refusing a blood test when arrested for DWI is a good strategy because any delay will result in a lower (and unreliable) BAC. However, a Fort Worth Criminal Defense Attorney will advise that a BAC based on blood drawn several hours after the arrest can be used to calculate a BAC at the time of arrest that will be admissible in court if the retrograde extrapolation appropriately considers some or all of the Mata factors.

On the other hand, if an individual is on trial for DWI, his or her Fort Worth Criminal Defense Attorney should carefully question any BAC evidence, particularly if it is based on a blood draw that occurred some time after the arrest. Retrograde extrapolation is not an exact science, and a jury will be allowed to hear testimony only if the extrapolation is appropriately performed and explained.

Contact the Experienced Fort Worth DWI Attorneys at Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC. (817) 993-9249

Our Tarrant County DWI attorneys are experienced in the science behind DWI and retrograde extrapolation for determining BAC. If you have been arrested for DWI, please contact us today for a FREE consultation of your case. Call (817) 993-9249 and set up an office consultation in Fort Worth, Keller, or Grapevine.

How Jerry Seinfeld Violated Texas Theft Law

By Theft

Obscure Texas Laws | Fort Worth Criminal Defense Attorneys

No, I’m not talking about a Good Samaritan Law, but Texas does have some obscure laws on the books that you might not suspect.  We are hoping to bring some of them to your attention.  For the first obscure Texas law, we look to one of the most successful television shows in history.

For all of the Seinfeld fans out there, you probably remember the episode where Kramer tries to entice Jerry to have cable illegally installed by two Russians.  Well, Jerry’s actions would be a Class C misdemeanor Theft offense here in Texas punishable by a fine up to $500.

Section 31.12 – Theft of or Tampering With Multichannel Video or Information

Under this law:

[a] person commits an offense if, without the authorization of the multichannel video or information services provider, the person intentionally or knowingly makes or maintains a connection, whether physically, electrically, electronically, or inductively, to a television set, videotape recorder, or other receiver attached to a multichannel video or information system.

Based on his actions (or inability to stop Kramer), Jerry could be arrested and issued a Class C criminal citation.  Like all penal statutes, there is much more to it than that.  If you’re curious about whether you may have violated this one in the past (long before the statute of limitations ran out, of course), see the full text of the Texas Theft Statute and look for Section 31.12.

Contact Fort Worth Theft Attorneys

If you or a loved one are charged with any theft offense in Texas, don’t call Jacky Chiles.  Contact the experienced (and non-fictional) criminal defense attorneys at Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC by calling (817) 993-9249.