Skip to main content
All Posts By

Brandon Barnett

Brandon Barnett is a partner and criminal defense attorney with Barnett Howard & Williams PLLC in Fort Worth, Texas. His law practice is exclusively focused on misdemeanor and felony criminal defense in Tarrant County and surrounding areas. He is also a military judge in the Marine Corps Reserve and a law professor at Texas A&M University School of Law.

Oct 24
Love0
Deadly Weapon Law in Texas

When is a Deadly Weapon Not a “Deadly Weapon?”

By Deadly Weapon

The Frustrating “Deadly Weapon” Issue

Deadly Weapon Law in TexasThe “deadly weapon finding” under Texas criminal law is an issue that leads most criminal defense lawyers to bang their collective heads against the courthouse wall. It seems that just about anything and everything is, has been, or will soon be, designated as a “deadly weapon” when the prosecution deems it helpful to securing a conviction and lengthier sentence. Here are some deadly weapons that we’ve seen recently: car, fist, baseball bat, walking stick, STDs, fire, fake gun, etc.

In the case below, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals finally ratcheted back the power of the State to enhance a case with a deadly weapon finding.  Kudos to the 1st Court of Appeals (Houston) for stepping out on this issue.

Question Presented:  To support a deadly-weapon finding, must the “exhibition” of the deadly weapon facilitate, in some manner, the felony offense? Or is it sufficient that the exhibition of the deadly weapon occurs simultaneously with the felony but is unrelated to its commission?

In Plummer v. State, the Houston Court of Appeals, First Judicial District, held that there “must be some facilitation purpose between the weapon and the associated offense to support a deadly-weapon finding.”

Sep 17
Love0

A Terry Stop With Guns Drawn, Unlawful Wiretapping, and Other 5th Circuit Fun

By Search & Seizure

Below are some case summaries from recent 5th Circuit (Federal) opinions.  Enjoy.

United States v. Abdo, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17251 (5th Cir. Tex. Aug. 19, 2013)

After receiving information from employees at a gun store and an army/navy surplus store, police officers believed Appellant planned to detonate a bomb and shoot service members stationed at Fort Hood, Texas.  When the officers encountered Appellant they drew their firearms, separated Appellant from the backpack he was carrying, handcuffed him and then placed him in the back of a police car.  Appellant admitted to the officers that he planned to attack soldiers at Fort Hood.  Appellant was then formally arrested and transported to the jail.

Appellant argued the district court should have suppressed evidence found at the time of his arrest and statements he made to the police.  Appellant claimed his detention at gunpoint and placement in a police car in handcuffs was a full arrest rather than a Terry stop, which was not supported by probable cause. The court disagreed.

Pointing a firearm and handcuffing a suspect does not automatically convert a Terry stop into an arrest.  Here, when the officers encountered Abdo, they knew he had purchased shotgun shells, an extended magazine for a handgun and a large amount of gunpowder in a manner that was not consistent with its normal use.  The officers also knew Appellant purchased an army uniform and asked for the kind of patches used at Fort Hood.

In addition, Appellant was carrying a large, overstuffed backpack on a very hot day and one of the officers had experience with terrorists using similar tactics of concealing explosives in backpacks and obtaining fake uniforms to facilitate an attack.  Under these circumstances, the officers acted reasonably in drawing their firearms and handcuffing Appellant while they effected a valid Terry stop, which was supported by reasonable suspicion. 

United States v. Garza, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17515 (5th Cir. Tex. Aug. 21, 2013)

While on roving patrol, a Border Patrol agent received a radio broadcast to be on the lookout (BOLO) for a suspicious looking older model pickup truck carrying plywood in the bed, parked at a gas station at the corner of FM 650 and Highway 83 near Fronton, Texas.  When the agent arrived at the gas station, he saw a pickup truck matching the BOLO description and got out of his vehicle to talk to the driver, later identified as Appellant.  As the agent approached, Appellant acted nervously, moving fast to replace the gas cap, tensing up and shaking while doing so and then quickly entered the pickup truck. Appellant attempted to drive away, but stopped when the agent activated the lights of his patrol car.

Appellant gave the agent consent to search the pickup truck and the agent found several people concealed underneath the plywood in the back of the truck who admitted they were in the United States unlawfully.  The agent arrested Appellant.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court held the agent had reasonable suspicion to stop of Appellant’s truck. First, FM 650 is a well-known smuggling road for narcotics and aliens because it is the only route in an out of Fronton, as this court has noted in the past.  Second, the agent had patrolled the border area regularly for over two and a half years and had investigated tips and made arrests in that same area for narcotics violations and alien smuggling.  Third, the agent encountered Appellant’s truck five miles from the border between the United States and Mexico, which supported the reasonable belief the vehicle had recently crossed the border. Fourth, upon arriving at the gas station, the agent knew Appellant’s vehicle did not belong to a Fronton resident and Appellant’s nervous, erratic behavior and unprovoked flight supported a finding of reasonable suspicion. Finally, based on his experience, the agent knew smugglers often used plywood to conceal contraband in their trucks.

United States v. North, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17808 (5th Cir. Miss. Aug. 26, 2013)

As part of a drug trafficking investigation, federal agents obtained a wiretap order on Appellant’s cell phone from a federal judge in the Southern District of Mississippi.  Information obtained from the interception of Appellant’s cell phone on May 9 and 16, 2009, led to Appellant’s arrest for possession of cocaine. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1986 authorizes the use of wiretap surveillance in criminal investigations.  Under Title III, a federal judge may enter an order authorizing the interception of cell phone communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held the “interception” includes both the location of a tapped telephone and the original listening post, and that a judge in either jurisdiction has authority under Title III to issue wiretap orders.

Appellant argued the district court in Mississippi lacked territorial jurisdiction to authorize the interception of the cell phone call on May 9, 2009, because when the agents intercepted the call his phone was located in Texas and the government’s listening post was located in Louisiana.  The court agreed.

The district court located in the Southern District of Mississippi lacked the authority to permit interception of cell phone calls made from Texas at a listening post in Louisiana. In addition, the court held suppression of the information obtained from the May 9, 2009, wiretap was warranted. Appellant further argued the agents failed to follow the minimization protocols during interception of the May 16, 2009, phone call between Appellant and a female friend who was not under investigation.  Appellant claimed the agents conducted uninterrupted monitoring of a one-hour telephone conversation that had no connection to the drug smuggling investigation.

The court agreed and suppressed the evidence obtained from the interception of the phone conversation.  The agents were authorized to spot-monitor Appellant’s cell phone conversations for no more than two minutes at a time.  However, the agents were authorized to continue monitoring if the conversation related to the drug smuggling investigation.  The court found the agents did not stop listening when it was made clear the conversation was not criminal in nature and they did not conduct subsequent spot checks by checking on the conversation to determine if it had turned to criminal matters.  Rather, the agents listened to the conversation for several minutes before dropping out for less than one minute at a time before resuming their near continuous listening.  Under these circumstances, the court held it was not objectively reasonable for the agents to listen for nearly one hour to a conversation that did not turn to criminal matters until the last few minutes.

Sep 16
Love0

Criminal Law Legislative Updates 2013

By Legislative Update

Below is a summary of the most recent Texas legislative updates 2013 as they relates to Criminal Law:

– In an attempt to reduce wrongful convictions in Texas, Senate Bill 1611 requires prosecutors to open their files to defendants and keep records of evidence they disclose. While the United States Supreme Court has long required prosecutors to disclose evidence that is “material either to guilt or punishment,” Senate Bill 1611 requires disclosure of not only all police reports and witness statements, but also any other evidence that is material to any matter regardless of whether such evidence is “material to guilt or punishment.”

– Senate Bill 344 allows courts to overturn convictions in cases where the forensic science that originally led to the verdict has changed. During an appeals process, Senate Bill 344 authorizes courts to grant relief on applications for writs of habeas corpus if there is currently available relevant scientific evidence that was not available at the time of conviction. The current relevant scientific evidence is only admissible if the evidence was not ascertainable through reasonable diligence at the time of trial.

– Senate Bill 1238 authorizes the Texas Forensic Science Commission to investigate unaccredited forensic disciplines such as arson, fingerprinting, breath-alcohol testing, ballistic examinations, and unaccredited entities.

– House Bill 1847 requires prosecutors to complete at least one hour of ethics training relating to the duty to disclose exculpatory and mitigating evidence.

– Under Senate Bill 825, an exoneree is permitted to file a grievance up to four years following release from prison against a prosecutor alleged to have violated the ethics rule regarding the duty to disclose. This bill further prohibits a private reprimand for such a violation.

– In an effort to reduce the possibility of a false confession being admitted at trial by a person who does not speak or understand English, House Bill 2090 requires that a written statement by an accused be in the language that he or she can read and understand before it can be admitted as evidence in a criminal proceeding.

– Upon a second conviction for a “sexually violent offense” against a child under the age of 14, House Bill 1302 requires an automatic life sentence in prison without parole. Furthermore, House Bill 1302 specifically prohibits registered sex offenders from working at amusement parks or seeking employment as cab, bus, or limousine drivers.

– Under Senate Bill 124, the offense of Tampering With A Governmental Record is enhanced from a Class A misdemeanor to a 3rd Degree Felony if the governmental record was a public school record, report, or state-mandated assessment instrument. If the actor’s intent was to defraud or harm another, the offense is enhanced instead to a 2nd Degree Felony.

– In an effort to address human trafficking, House Bill 8 enhances all Prostitution offenses from a Class B misdemeanor to a 2nd Degree Felony if the person solicited is younger than 18, regardless of whether the actor knew the age of the person solicited at the time of the offense. House Bill 8 also significantly alters the definition of the crime of Possession of Child Pornography. Accordingly, a person commits the crime of Possession of Child Pornography if they knowingly or intentionally “access with the intent to view” child pornography.

– If the underlying official proceeding in a criminal case involves family violence, Senate Bill 1360 enhances the penalty to the greater of a 3rd Degree Felony or the most serious offense charged in the criminal case. Senate Bill 1360 also provides a statutory forfeiture-by-wrongdoing provision, which specifies that a party to any criminal case, who causes a witness to be unavailable for trial through his wrongful acts, forfeits the right to object to the admissibility of evidence or statements based on the unavailability of the witness.

– Senate Bill 275 enhances the penalty for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in the death of a person from a 3rd Degree Felony to a 2nd Degree Felony. – Upon conviction for a 1st Degree Felony Engaging in Organized Crime offense, Senate Bill 549 enhances the minimum penalty from five to fifteen years in prison. In addition, there is an automatic life sentence without parole upon conviction of Engaging in Organized Crime if the underlying offense is an Aggravated Sexual Assault and the defendant is 18 or older and the victim was either younger than six; or if the victim was younger than 14 and the person caused serious bodily injury or placed the victim in fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or if the victim is younger than 17 and suffered serious bodily injury.

– House Bill 2539 places a duty on computer technicians to immediately report the discovery of an image on a computer that is or appears to be child pornography. It is a Class B misdemeanor offense if the computer technician fails to make such report.

– Senate Bill 12 suspends evidentiary Rules 404 and 405 in trials for certain sex offenses by allowing the admission of evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial regarding a separate enumerated sex offense that the defendant has committed. While evidentiary Rules 404 and 405 prohibit the use of evidence of a person’s character or character trait to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait, Senate Bill 12 allows such evidence for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant. Senate Bill 12 further requires the trial judge to make a determination that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt prior to the introduction of this evidence and outside the presence of the jury.

– Senate Bill 2 was passed in an effort to address the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders (those under the age of 18). This posed a unique issue for 17 year olds in Texas, who are treated as adults and not juveniles. Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 2, the only punishment available for an individual (17 and older) who was convicted of capital murder was either an automatic life sentence in prison without the possibility of parole or the death penalty. In an effort to address the unconstitutionality of this punishment on those younger than 18, Senate Bill 2 provides that an individual younger than 18 who is convicted of capital murder be punished with an automatic life sentence in prison with the possibility of parole.

– House Bill 434 expands the list of those who are authorized to draw blood from an individual during a DWI investigation. Under previous law, only a physician, qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse, or licensed vocational nurse was authorized to take a blood specimen at the request or order of a peace officer for purposes of intoxication-related offenses. Now, the list of those authorized to draw blood also includes emergency medical technicians and paramedics. This bill allows for a person’s blood to be drawn without having to transport the individual to a separate facility, such as a hospital, during an intoxication-related investigation.

– House Bill 1862 removes switchblade knives from Texas’ prohibited-weapons statute. There are no longer criminal consequences to possessing, manufacturing, transporting, repairing, or selling a switchblade knife.

– Senate Bill 821 brings Texas law up to date by adding “hot drafts” to “hot checks” statutes to allow prosecution of those who pay with hot drafts by adding “sight order,” along with checks, for purposes of theft by check to allow prosecution for insufficiently funded electronic transfers or “hot drafts.”

If you have a question about how these changes in the law might affect your criminal case, please call us at (817) 993-9249.

Aug 07
Love1

KNOW YOUR RIGHTS – Being Accused in Texas

By Criminal Defense

KNOW YOUR RIGHTS – Being Accused in Texas

Be informed. Be aware. Maintain your composure. Your Liberty is at stake. Every day, Texas citizens have interactions with Texas law enforcement. If you have an encounter with law enforcement it is extremely important that you realize that a police officer does not represent you and is not looking out for your legal interests. Only an attorney can do that. You must stay informed and aware of your rights in order to ensure that the Government does not abuse its power. Under the United States and Texas Constitutions and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, every citizen has the following rights:

  • THE RIGHT to be informed of the specific offense(s) alleged to have been committed.
  • THE RIGHT to remain silent. Any statement a person makes, oral, written, or non-verbal [nodding of the head] may be used as evidence against that person in a trial by the State of Texas in court or in other judicial proceedings.
  • THE RIGHT to an attorney for any offense other than a class c misdemeanor.
  • THE RIGHT to obtain an attorney of the person’s own choosing, at that person’s expense, for any offense.
  • THE RIGHT to consult with an attorney and to have a lawyer present during any interrogation.
  • THE RIGHT to terminate an interview or interrogation at any time.
  • THE RIGHT to refuse to give consent to search.
  • THE RIGHT against self-incrimination.

NEVER TALK TO OR FOLLOW THE ADVICE OF INVESTIGATORS  WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING THE ADVICE OF AN ATTORNEY

GENERAL ADVICE

A suspect has a legal, moral and constitutional right to remain silent and place the burden of overcoming the presumption of innocence and proving his or her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the officers, investigators, and attorneys for the government. A suspect should never make an oral, written, or non-verbal statement concerning suspected criminal conduct, even to close friends or relatives without first consulting an attorney. Your best friend can turn out to be your biggest problem at trial and your family members can sometimes be compelled to testify against you. Also, BEWARE of the fact that a routine law enforcement tactic is to monitor and record phone or personal conversations between a suspect and the alleged victim or other persons which may play a role in the case. Criminal investigators work to protect the interest of the government and not the interests of the suspect. ONLY a suspect’s personal attorney can and will work to protect the interests of the suspect. During an interview or interrogation, some officers or investigators may use the “good guy-bad guy” technique in which one acts rough and tough and the other one sympathizes and tries to “help” the suspect. The officers or investigators can legally lie to or deceive a suspect in an effort to get a statement, so be careful! These people are highly trained to elicit incriminatory statements from suspects. The safest thing to do is to simply refuse to talk (or even listen to) the investigators. The request for an attorney must be a clear, unequivocal insistence to speak to an attorney; Comments like “do I need an attorney” or “I think I want an attorney” are NOT sufficient to invoke the right to counsel and to terminate the interview. A suspect may be ordered by a judge to give certain samples (handwriting, hair samples, blood, etc). When possible, consult an attorney before doing so or as soon as possible afterwards, especially if ordered to do so over your objection. NEVER CONSENT to the taking of evidence, except for your fingerprints and photograph. Make the investigator get a search warrant. An investigator does not have authority to direct that a suspect produce evidence, except photographs and fingerprints. If a suspect finds that an appointment has been made for him/her with a physician, drug/alcohol counselor, social worker, or psychiatrist, the suspect should contact an attorney first because conversations between suspects and anyone other than his/her attorney(s) are not privileged or confidential under the law. Communications between a suspect and his/her attorney or agent for the attorney (paralegal) are privileged, unless the communication clearly contemplates the future commission of an illegal act.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

A suspect should NEVER CONSENT to a search of his/her person or property without first consulting an attorney. A suspect should make it perfectly clear to the authorities that he/she does not consent, but if the authorities persist, a suspect should never physically resist. There are many theories upon which a search may be legally justified and an attorney will examine he facts of the search at a later time to determine if law supported it. If a suspect legitimately consents to the search, however, there are no legal issues. IMPORTANT: A person who does consent to a search may withdraw that consent at any time during a search. IF YOU CONSENT TO A SEARCH, ANY EVIDENCE FOUND COULD BE USED AGAINST YOU! Force the authorities to get a lawful search warrant.

APPREHENSION, ARREST, AND CONFINEMENT

In many cases, investigators do not physically “arrest” a suspect. After questioning or contact by the investigators, the suspect is usually released. When confronted by investigators, a suspect should never run away or physically resist apprehension, arrest, or confinement, whether that person is innocent or guilty. He/she should always go along peacefully with the authorities, while asking that an attorney be made available before any questioning. Any resistance or flight, even if innocent, can be considered as evidence of guilt. Additionally, resisting apprehension can lead to additional charges being added and/or pre-trial confinement. Pre-trial confinement can occur under very limited circumstances, where the officer or investigator determines that the suspect is a “flight risk,” a danger to the community or to himself, or is likely going to continue the misconduct if not put into pre-trial confinement.

POLYGRAPHS

Polygraphs are frequently used by law enforcement personnel. Under no circumstance should a suspect agree to take a polygraph with the law enforcement agency without advice of counsel. Remember it is permissible for investigators to lie to the suspect, so a suspect could actually “pass” a polygraph, but be told by the examiner that he “failed” the polygraph; the fact that a person is actually telling the truth in no manner means that the polygraph will indicate no deception. Polygraphs are notoriously unreliable, so much so that they are inadmissible in court.

GOOD CONDUCT BEFORE TRIAL

Waiting for your trial date to arrive will be a very difficult time for you. It is extremely important however that you avoid any additional problems prior to trial. As difficult as it will be, you must maintain an excellent attitude at all times and strive to be a productive member of society.

Jul 23
Love1

Border Patrol Agents Violate Fourth Amendment in Terry Stop But Conviction Upheld

By Warrantless Search

United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano, (5th Circuit June 27, 2013)

Border Patrol agents stopped Appellant as he was driving on Interstate 10, approximately 450 miles from the nearest United States-Mexico border crossing. The agents believed Appellant was transporting illegal aliens because he was driving an SUV; had both hands on the steering wheel, and he was not exhibiting the relaxed nature of most drivers. In addition, Appellant’s speed dropped from 70 miles per hour to 60 miles per hours as the agents followed him, and when the agents pulled alongside Appellant, he stopped talking to the person in the passenger’s seat.

The agents learned the car was registered to a woman; however, it had not been reported stolen, had no outstanding warrants or criminal activity associated with it, and had not recently crossed the border. During the stop, Appellant told the agents he was a Mexican national in the United States illegally. The government indicted Appellant for reentry without permission by an alien deported after conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).

At trial, Appellant moved to suppress his statements to the agents, arguing the stop could not be considered an extended border search and the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. The district court agreed the stop was not an extended border search, but held the agents had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to support a Terry stop.

The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held the agents did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant. First, the stop occurred 450 miles from the nearest border crossing and there was no reason to believe Appellant had come from the border. Second, Appellant’s driving posture speed change and the fact the SUV was registered to a woman was not indicative of criminal activity. Third, the SUV had not been reported stolen, had no outstanding warrants or criminal activity associated with it, and had not recently been documented as crossing the border. Finally, the agents could not identify anything about the SUV that rendered it more likely than other SUVs to be transporting illegal aliens.

Even though the agents violated the Fourth Amendment in stopping Appellant, the court still denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. The court noted previous Fifth Circuit case law held an alien’s INS file and identity are not subject to suppression when law enforcement officers learn of a deported alien’s unlawful reentry after an allegedly unconstitutional stop.

May 30
Love1

Three Participants Does Not Automatically Constitute “Organized Crime”

By Organized Crime

Organized CrimeSome prosecutors and state investigators out there believe that if there are three participants in an alleged offense, then there is evidence of “Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity.”  Not so.  At least not every time.

As THIS ARTICLE from TDCAA explains, the State needs more if it wants to charge someone in Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity.

Says law school pal of ours, Ben Hoover:

“When it comes to proving an EOCA case in Texas, there is more required than just proving that three or more persons committed a crime or even multiple crimes. The law requires proof of an ongoing course of criminal activity.”

Ben provides several good case references in the article which give examples of fact scenarios where the courts of appeals have held the certain conduct did not constitute Organized Crime.  Check it out.  It helped us get a EOCA charge dismissed recently.  It may help you too.

Apr 30
Love0

No Per Se Exigency for Warrantless Blood Draw in DWI Cases

By DWI, Warrantless Search

U.S. Supreme Court holds:  “In drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify a blood test without a warrant.” 

, No. 11-1425 (U.S. Apr 17, 2013). The Defendant was charged with DWI.  He filed a motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw that was taken without a valid search warrant.  The trial court granted the motion to suppress.  The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the motion.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court. Kennedy concurred. Roberts concurred in part and dissented in part. Thomas dissented. The question was whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presented a per se exigency that justified an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases.  The Court held that it did not.  While the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, it does not do so categorically.

Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable has to be determined on the totality of the circumstances.  Any compelled intrusion into the human body implicates significant, constitutionally protected privacy interests.  The general importance of the interest in combating drunk driving does not justify departing from the warrant requirement without showing exigent circumstances that make securing a warrant impractical in a particular case.  Because the case was argued on the broad proposition that drunk-driving cases present a per se exigency, the Court was not provided with an adequate analytic framework for a detailed discussion of all the relevant factors to determine the reasonableness of acting without a warrant.

Apr 19
Love0

Where’s Your Sign? No Traffic Offense if Road Sign Not Visible

By Drug Crimes

In Abney v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop when a vehicle was driving in the left lane of a road without passing.  There was a road sign that prohibited driving in the left lane without passing, but it was located over 20 miles away from where the Appellant was pulled over.

As tends to happen, the police officer found marijuana during the traffic stop. At trial, and on appeal, the Appellant claimed that he did not commit a traffic violation because the road sign was not anywhere near where the stop occurred.  The trial court and 5th Court of Appeals (Dallas) overruled this argument.  The CCA, on the other hand found it meritorious.

The Transportation Code certainly indicates that if there is a sign present that says the left lane is for passing only, then it is a traffic offense to travel in the left lane when not passing another vehicle. Section 544.004(a) states that an operator of a vehicle shall comply with an applicable official traffic control device such as a “left lane for passing only” sign. Without such a sign present within a reasonable distance of the traffic stop, there is no offense.

The CCA reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the officer lack reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.  The evidence should have been suppressed at trial.

Mar 20
Love0

5th Circuit Update: Evidence Admitted Over Miranda Violation

By Drug Crimes, Miranda

United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3366 (5th Cir. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013)

A federal agent saw Appellant walk out of a house under surveillance as part of a drug investigation.  The agent approached Appellant, handcuffed him and placed him in his police vehicle.  Without advising Appellant of his Miranda rights, the agent asked him if he was guarding a drug-house and if there were drugs in the house.  Appellant replied, “Yes” to both questions and then requested an attorney.  The agent asked Appellant for consent to search the house, which Appellant granted.

The agents found over two thousand kilograms of marijuana in the house. The district court suppressed Appellant’s admissions that he was guarding marijuana in the house because they were obtained in violation of Miranda, which the government conceded on appeal.  However, the district court refused to suppress the marijuana recovered from the house.

First, Appellant argued the marijuana should have been suppressed because the agent obtained consent to search from Appellant after he requested an attorney.  Second, Appellant claimed the agents’ use of his admissions, which were later suppressed, automatically rendered his consent to search involuntary. The Court disagreed.

In Edwards v. Arizona the Supreme Court held when an accused invokes his right to counsel, he is not subject to further questioning until counsel has been made available to him.  However, a violation of the Edwards rule does not require suppression of physical, non-testimonial evidence.  Consequently, even if the agent violated Edwards when he asked Appellant for consent to search the house, that violation would not justify suppression of the marijuana, which is physical, non-testimonial evidence.

Next, the court held Appellant’s consent was not automatically rendered involuntary because his Miranda rights were violated.  Such a rule is not consistent with the multi-factor approach courts must use when determining voluntariness.  Using that approach, and considering the Miranda violation, the district court found Appellant voluntarily consented to the search of the house.

Mar 01
Love1

Another Dog Scent Lineup Case Overturned

By Dog Scent Lineup

The Court of Criminal Appeals does not like dog scent lineup evidence.  While it has not come right out and declared such evidence categorically inadmissible (like polygraph evidence), it seems pretty close.  With each new dog scent lineup case, we learn how unreliable this type of evidence can be.

In Winfrey v. State, the CCA overturned a capital murder conviction wherein the evidence included a dog scent lineup.  The Court noted that the dog scent lineup along with the remainder of the evidence (all of it circumstantial) was only enough to raise a “suspicion of guilt,” but not enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The CCA overturned the conviction as being legally insufficient.

*Anytime we have a case involving a drug dog, we employ an expert consultant to review the dog handling technique of the officer. One of the best drug dog experts in Steve Scott with Scott’s Police K9 LLC in Flower Mound, Texas.