Fort Worth Criminal Law & Personal Injury Blog

Jan 05

Is CBD Oil Legal in Texas? Perhaps, But it Must Fit These Qualifications

By Luke Williams | Drug Crimes

What is CBD Oil?

CBD Oil Legal Texas CBD Oil, which is short for cannabidiol oil, is a cannabinoid extract that is alleged to have the health benefits of cannabis (e.g. pain relief, easing of inflammation, anxiety management and the treatment of epilepsy) without the psychoactive effects of marijuana. CBD Oil is sold as a supplement in marijuana dispensaries, nutrition stores, and even as an additive in smoothies. While the popularity of CBD Oil is growing substantially, the product remains unregulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, leading to wide discrepancies in the product’s ingredients and quality. The variety of ingredients and compounding methods may have significant ramifications for consumers depending on Federal and state law and the interpretation of those laws by state law and health code enforcement agencies.

Is CBD Oil Legal Under Federal Law?

Yes, if it is produced within federal guidelines.

As of December 20, 2018, the Fed Gov has legalized hemp that has a tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of no more than 0.3% by removing it from Schedule I of the controlled substances act. States and Indian Tribes may regulate the production of Hemp by submitting a plan to the USDA. This bill also makes hemp producers eligible for the federal crop insurance program and certain USDA research grants.

With the passing of the new 2018 Farm Bill, hemp and hemp-derived products have been officially removed from the purview of the Controlled Substances Act, such that they are no longer subject to Schedule I status. Meaning that so long as CBD is extracted from hemp and completely pure (with less than 0.3% THC on a dry weight basis of THC, something the DEA doubts is possible) and grown by licensed farmers in accordance with state and federal regulations, it is legal as a hemp product.

However, in 2016 the Drug Enforcement Agency released an administrative ruling considering CBD Oil to be a Schedule One drug, comparable to heroin, peyote and LSD, operating on the theory that it is extracted from the same parts of the Cannabis sativa plant that contain THC, the active ingredient of marijuana. CBD consumers and manufacturers assert that CBD can also be extracted from the non-intoxicating parts of the Cannabis sativa plant that produce hemp, however, a recent 9th Circuit decision affirmed the DEA’s authority to classify CBD Oil as within their administrative purview.²

For CBD Oil to be considered legal in the Federal system under the DEA’s guidelines it must “consist[] solely of parts of the cannabis plant excluded from the CSA definition of marijuana.” In the definition of marijuana given by the Controlled Substances Act, the “mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or . . . any other . . derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks” are excluded from the definition. Presently the DEA considers an extraction process using only the parts of the cannabis plant that are excluded from the CSA definition of marijuana to be “not practical.” This is because the extraction process used would “diminish any trace amounts of cannabinoids that end up in the finished product.”

Is CBD Oil Illegal Under the Laws of the Various Individual States?

Yes, CBD is legal, but not in all states.

At the state level, CBD Oil is considered legal in the states where marijuana is legal for recreational use (Alaska, California, Colorado, DC, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont). Twenty-nine states have made marijuana legal for medical use in various quantities and CBD is also considered legal under those state laws, irrespective of the THC content of the source of the oil. In states that have not decriminalized marijuana, CBD Oil is also likely illegal.

Is CBD Oil Legal In Texas?

NO, unless you fall within the qualifications set by the Compassionate Use Act.

If you are prescribed the use of medical CBD oil and use ‘low-THC” CBD, then the use is legal. Texas has legalized marijuana for medical use only, but only in a very narrow set of circumstances. The Compassionate Use Act of 2015 authorizes the prescription of “low-THC cannabis,” defined as having no more than 0.5% THC for patients diagnosed with intractable epilepsy and entered into the state-maintained “compassionate-use registry.”³ The Act requires prescription by two physicians however, it is currently illegal under federal law for a physician to “prescribe” marijuana. Under a 2000 court ruling, it is legal for physicians to “recommend” marijuana to their patients but the language of the Compassionate Use Act calls for a prescription, setting up a conflict with Federal law.⁴ Additionally, to qualify for the medical use of CBD, the patient must have tried two FDA-approved drugs and found them to be ineffective. There are currently three dispensaries licensed by Texas to sell qualifying products to authorized consumers.

If you do not fall within the qualifications set by the Compassionate Use Act, then possession of CDB oil containing any amount of THC is against Texas law. The State definition of marijuana closely tracks the Federal definition. The Texas Health and Safety Code defines marijuana as “the plant Cannabis sativa . . . and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of that plant or its seeds.” The Code excludes “the mature stalks of the plant or fiber produced from the stalks [and] a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, fiber, oil.” Texas does not currently have legislation allowing for the cultivation of hemp, though industrial hemp derived from the mature stalks of the Cannabis sativa plant may be sold and consumed.

What is the Penalty for Possession of CBD Oil in Texas?

In Texas, if you possess CBD oil with any trace of THC, you could be charged with a Felony for Possession of a Controlled Substance in Penalty Group 2, which (depending on the weight in grams) can carry a range of punishment from 180 days in a state jail facility up to 20+ years in prison and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Several of our clients have been arrested for possessing CBD oil after officers performed a field test and discovered that yielded a positive result for THC.

If the CBD oil does not contain any THC, is it currently a Schedule V substance not in any penalty group. Possession of CBD with no THC can be charged as a Class B Misdemeanor with a punishment range of 0 – 180 days in jail and a fine up to $2,000.

What To Look For In CBD Oil In Texas

CBD Oil made from the mature stalks of the Cannabis sativa plant are likely in conformity with both Federal and Texas State law. Consumers seeking to purchase CBD Oil in Texas should look for a product advertised as being the product of “industrial hemp” or “mature hemp.” Products advertised as containing “THC” or “CBD Oil” should be avoided because of potential conflict with State and Federal laws.

Texas consumers with intractable epilepsy may seek to join the Compassionate Use Registry and get a prescription for CBD Oil containing less than 0.5% THC from an authorized dispensary.
Physicians should be mindful that “prescribing” CBD Oil to Texas residents under the Compassionate Use Act may fall into conflict with existing Federal law.
Retailers that are not one of the three state-authorized dispensaries authorized by the Compassionate Use Act should take care to carry only products that do not advertise themselves as containing CBD Oil but instead focus on being the product of industrial hemp.

Where Can I Purchase CBD Oil with 0% THC?

While there are many CBD oil stores popping up all over Texas, we have found one near our office that sells CBD Oil with 0% THC in it. They test it to confirm the THC content so that you can be sure of what you are getting. Visit Your CBD Store at https://yourcbdstorekeller.com to learn more or purchase their CBD products online. But remember that even though many agencies are not choosing to arrest or prosecute for zero THC CBD oil, the Tarrant County DA’s office is still filing these cases if a person is arrested.

Sources:

H.R.2642 – 113th Congress (2013-2014): Agricultural Act of 2014.
Hemp Industries Association v. USDEA, No. 17-70162
SB339 Texas Compassionate Use Program
Conant v. McCaffrey WL 1281174

Jan 04

Unanimity Instruction Required and Not Given, But No harm, Says CCA

By Luke Williams | Jury Trial

Trial Court Failed to Give Unanimity Instruction to the Jury

The Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion regarding a unanimity jury instruction in an aggravated sexual assault case. The issue before the Court was whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that it must be unanimous in deciding how the sexual contact occurred when there were multiple allegations. The Court of Criminal Appeals found the jury instruction to be erroneous but concluded no harm occurred.

French v. State, (Court of Criminal Appeals 2018).

The Facts—The Defendant Was Convicted for Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child

The defendant was originally indicted on a single count of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The indictment alleged that the defendant caused the penetration of the child’s anus by the defendant’s sexual organ. Before trial though, the indictment was amended to add “contact with” and “penetration of” the sexual organ of the child by the defendant’s sexual organ. As a result, the indictment presented four options for a conviction: (1) the defendant contacted the child’s anus with his sexual organ; (2) the defendant penetrated the child’s anus with his sexual organ; (3) the defendant contacted the child’s sexual organ with his sexual organ; and/or (4) the defendant penetrated the child’s sexual organ with his sexual organ.

At trial, the jury instructions authorized the jury to convict the defendant on any one of the four theories. In addition, the trial court explicitly instructed the jury that they need not all agree on the manner in which the sexual assault was committed. This instruction essentially authorized the jury to convict the defendant without agreeing as to which orifice he had “contacted or penetrated”—even though there was little to no evidence presented that defendant ever contacted or penetrated the child’s sexual organ. This prompted the defendant to object and ask the court for a unanimity instruction regarding the manner in which the sexual assault was committed. However, the court overruled the objection and the defendant was subsequently convicted.

The Court of Appeals Reversed the Defendant’s Conviction—Holding the Trial Court Erred in Failing to Submit a Proper Instruction Which Caused “Some Harm”

On appeal, the defendant argued that the jury charge failed to follow the juror unanimity requirement because it did not require the jury to agree as to which orifice he contacted and/or penetrated. For double jeopardy purposes, he argued the theories were considered distinct and separate offenses, each of which demanded juror unanimity for a conviction. The court of appeals agreed, and it held that the trial court erred by failing to submit proper instructions. In light of this error, the court of appeals determined that the erroneous jury charge was sufficient to invoke the “some harm” standard under Almanza, which required a reversal.

The Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed the Court of Appeals’ Judgment—Finding No Actual Harm Occurred

On petition for discretionary review, the State did not contest the erroneous jury charge. Rather, it argued that any error in the jury charge as to the unanimity requirement did not result in harm to the defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed.

In analyzing whether there was “some harm,” the Court of Criminal Appeals considered the trial court’s error with respect to the four factors set out in Almanza: “(1) the entire jury charge, (2) the state of the evidence, (3) the jury arguments, and (4) any other relevant information as revealed by the record as a whole.”
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that in concluding that “some harm” occurred the court of appeals only relied upon the second Almanza factor—the state of the evidence. That court identified there was “some evidence in the record” for the jury to potentially conclude that the defendant penetrated both the child’s anus and sexual organ with his own sexual organ. And, since there was “some evidence” it believed that the jury could have regarded itself as authorized to convict different ways without reaching any agreement on a specific theory beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, even considering the above reasoning, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined there was no harm suffered when taking into consideration all four of the Almanza factors. The Court explained that “the risk that a rational juror would have convicted the defendant on the basis that he contacted and/or penetrated the child’s sexual organ with his own—and not also on the basis that he contacted and/or penetrated the child’s anus—is so ‘highly unlikely’ as to be ‘almost infinitesimal.’” Not only was there overwhelming evidence at trial that suggested anal contact and penetration occurred, there was no encouragement for a specific finding, and the defendant’s only defense was that it never happened. All of this supports the Court’s conclusion that the harm was merely hypothetical and not actual. As such, the Court reversed and remanded the case even in light of the error.

Dec 14

Stacking Sentences to Run Consecutively in Texas

By Brandon Barnett | Sentencing

The Importance Between Stacked and Concurrent Sentences

Stack Sentence Concurrent Sentence When a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes at the same trial, his sentences automatically run concurrently, unless there is an order for the sentences to be stacked (i.e. to run consecutively). When sentences are stacked, defendants are required to finish serving the sentence for one offense before they begin serving the sentence for another offense. So, if a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes, especially those with longer sentence ranges, the difference between stacking the sentences or running the sentences concurrently can be huge. Thus, it is very important to know when sentences must run concurrently, when sentences can be stacked, and who makes those decisions.

Who Decides Whether to Stack a Defendant’s Sentences or Run Them Concurrently?

In Texas, defendants have the right to elect to have the jury or a judge assess punishment. However, even when the jury assesses a defendant’s sentences in a case with multiple charges, it is up to the judge of the court to determine whether the sentences will be stacked or whether the sentences will run concurrently.

The trial court’s authority to stack sentences is derived primarily from article 42.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Under this article, when a defendant with multiple convictions is sentenced, the court must include in the subsequent judgment or judgments whether the sentences will run concurrently or consecutively. This general rule allowing stacking or concurrent sentences applies whether the sentences have been imposed or suspended. As a result, the trial court has broad discretion when pronouncing whether the sentences will be stacked or run concurrently. Nevertheless, there are certain occasions when the judge cannot stack a defendant’s sentence.

When is the Judge Prohibited From Stacking a Defendant’s Sentences?

Generally, when a defendant is found guilty of more than one offense arising from the same criminal episode and prosecuted in a single criminal action, the sentences must run concurrently (i.e. if a person is prosecuted in the same trial for DWI and Unlawful Carrying of a Weapon). However, there are exceptions to this rule that will allow for stacking. For example, if a defendant moves to sever his cases that arose from the same criminal episode, he runs the risk of having his sentences stacked. In addition, case law has permitted multiple convictions, arising out of the same criminal episode, for intoxication manslaughter and certain sex offenses under section 3.03(b) of the Texas Penal Code to be stacked.

What Criteria Does the Trial Court Use to Determine Whether to Stack a Defendant’s Sentence?

Trial Courts tend to consider the same factors used for determining the severity of a defendant’s sentence when deciding whether or not to stack sentences. For example, judges may consider:

whether the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other;
whether the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence;
whether the crimes were committed at different times or separate places; and
other aggravating or mitigating factors such as a defendant’s past record.

Are There Certain Circumstances When a Judge is Required to Stack Sentences?

Yes, but only in one scenario. As provided in Article 42.08, if a defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while the defendant was an inmate in TDC and the defendant has not completed the sentence he was serving at the time of the offense, the judge shall order the new sentence be stacked—to begin immediately upon the completion of the defendant’s previous sentence.

Can the Judge Stack a Probation Sentence with a Prison Sentence?

Yes. In Texas, a judge can choose to stack a probation sentence with prison sentence, but the judge must order the confinement sentence to run first and the probation thereafter.

In Conclusion . . .

To determine whether your case involves offenses that may be stacked, you should consult with your attorney. Stacking sentences is rare, but you should still seek proper legal advice when charged with multiple offenses. If you find yourself in this situation and need an attorney, give us a call.

Dec 07

Confrontation Clause Violation When Accuser Does Not Appear at Trial

By Brandon Barnett | Confrontation Clause

Tarrant County Trial Court Admits Testimony in Violation of the Confrontation Clause

The Second Court of Appeals recently released a memorandum opinion, which reversed a defendant’s conviction due to a confrontation clause violation. The issue was whether the trial court (Criminal District Court Number 1, Tarrant County) erred in allowing an officer to testify about certain statements the alleged victim made regarding a prior assault allegation.

McDowell v. State—2nd Court of Appeals (2018)

The Facts—Defendant Was Convicted for Felony Domestic Violence

On August 21, 2016, officers were alerted to a domestic disturbance in progress. When officers arrived at the scene they made contact with the victim and the victim’s friend who had reported the disturbance. While talking with the two females, officers noticed multiple bruises on the victim and learned that the suspect (i.e. Defendant), who had allegedly assaulted the victim, was still inside the home. Officers subsequently entered the residence and arrested Defendant.

At trial, dash-cam video showing the accusations made by the two females was admitted. In addition, one of the officers testified to additional statements made by the victim suggesting that the defendant had a history of violence. These additional statements, however, were not included in the dash cam video. Defendant objected to these statements under Crawford because the victim did not appear at trial. Nonetheless, the trial court allowed the out-of-court statements to be admitted over objection.

In addition to the officer’s testimony regarding the hearsay statements, the jury heard from two other witnesses about the cycle of domestic violence. The State then referenced this testimony in relation to Defendant’s history of domestic violence during closing arguments. As a result, Defendant was convicted. Defendant later appealed his conviction arguing that the trial court erred when it allowed the officer to testify to the victim’s statements in violation of the confrontation clause of the 6th Amendment.

Court of Appeals Reverses and Remands Case—Holding the Trial Court Erred in Admitting the Officer’s Testimony

Generally, the Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who does not appear at trial. In determining whether certain statements were testimonial in nature, “the Court looks to see whether circumstances were present at the time the statements were made that would indicate the existence of an ongoing emergency.” If such circumstances existed, the statements are admissible.

Here, the victim did not appear at trial. As such, the Court of Appeals attempted to analyze whether the victim’s statements were testimonial in nature by determining whether they were made during the ongoing emergency. However, the Court was unable to do so because there was no evidence from the State regarding when these statements were made. The Court concluded that without knowing the timing at which the statements were made, there was no way to determine the existence of an ongoing emergency. The Court explained that once there is an objection to the admission of evidence on confrontation grounds the burden shifts to the State. Here, the State was silent in regard to the confrontation objection. And, without the State providing more evidence, the Court could not conclude that the statements were nontestimonial. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred in admitting the statements.

The Court then conducted a harm analysis to determine whether the error impacted the jury’s verdict, which would require a reversal. In making its determination, the Court noted that the majority of the officer’s testimony was based on the inadmissible statements. These statements portrayed a history of violence rather than just one instance. Further, the other witnesses’ testimony hinged on these inadmissible statements. Thus, because the inadmissible statements were a crucial part in establishing the elements of the offense, the Court could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error did not contribute to Defendant’s conviction and, therefore, a reversal was required.

Dec 03

Organized Retail Theft: Does it Take Two to Tango? | Lang v. State (2018)

By Madeline Pricer Jones | Theft

Organized Retail Theft Lang The Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion on the applicability of Texas’ organized retail theft statute. The issue facing the court was whether the statute defining the offense of organized retail theft permits a conviction for ordinary shoplifting by a single actor rather than requiring a group or collaborative effort.

CCA Opinion: Lang v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

The Facts—Defendant Stole Merchandise from HEB and Was Convicted Under Texas’ Organized Retail Theft Statue.

Defendant was shopping at HEB when an employee noticed her placing merchandise into reusable shopping bags. Some of the bags were inside of Defendant’s cart and one was tied to the side of her cart. The employee thought this behavior was unusual, so she kept an eye on Defendant. When Defendant went to check out, the employee observed her place all but one of the reusable bags onto the conveyor belt—leaving the bag that was tied to the side of the cart untouched. After paying, Defendant began to leave the store. Defendant was subsequently stopped by employees and questioned about the bag that was tied to her cart, which was full of unpaid merchandise. The unpaid items totaled $565.59, whereas the paid-for merchandise totaled only $262.17. At that time, the store called the police and Defendant was eventually arrested, charged, and convicted of organized retail theft.

Defendant appealed her conviction arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her conviction. More specifically, Defendant claimed that the offense of “organized retail theft” could not be committed by a single actor because the statute requires group action or collaborative effort. The court of appeals rejected this argument for the reasons listed below.

Court of Appeals Affirms the Trial Court’s Decision—Claiming that Organized Retail Theft Does Not Require Multiple Actors.

In making their decision the court of appeals looked to the statute’s language, which provides that a person commits an offense if she “intentionally conducts, promotes, or facilitates an activity in which the person receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of: (1) stolen retail merchandise; or (2) merchandise explicitly represented to the person as being stolen retail merchandise.” The court contended that nowhere in the statutory language was there explicit terms requiring group behavior. As a result, the court held that the language was not ambiguous and used plain meaning to interpret the statue.

Using dictionary definitions, the court concluded that the statutory terms “conducts, promotes, or facilitates,” did not require multiple actors. The court also explained that reading those statutory terms in context, established that what is conducted, promoted, or facilitated is an “activity,” not another person. Thus, “leaving the store after stealing the retail merchandise” was sufficient activity to meet the elements required by the statute. Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction and another appeal ensued.

Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses and Remands Case—Determining that Organized Retail Theft Requires Multiple Actors.

On appeal Defendant maintained that the offense of organized retail theft could not be committed by a single actor. She did not dispute the facts, rather, as a matter of law, she disputed whether the facts were adequate to establish the offense of organized retail theft. To evaluate this argument the Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed the statute’s language and compared it with the court of appeals’ analysis and Defendant’s argument. In doing so, the Court determined that the language could reasonably be interpreted in more than one way, and therefore, extra-textual sources, such as legislative history must be considered.

To make this determination the Court looked at the statute’s use of the past participle of steal (e.g., “stolen”). The court explained that use of “stolen” indicated that the “activity” covered by the statute takes place with respect to items that have already been stolen. Thus, the question then becomes “what type of ‘activity’ suffices to satisfy the statute’s requirements.” “Is it enough, as the court of appeals suggested, for a person to shoplift items of retail merchandise and then attempt to leave the store with the stolen items, thereby conducting an activity (leaving the store) in which the person possesses the retail merchandise she has just stolen?” Or, as Defendant suggested, does the statute require proof of some activity distinct from the type of conduct associated with shoplifting? In other words, “does the statute require proof of something more than the mere continued possession of the stolen retail merchandise during an attempt to leave the store?” Not immediately knowing the answer to these two reasonable interpretations, the Court decided it had to look to legislative history to help find the right answer.

After examining the statute’s legislative history, the Court found that the organized retail theft statute was intended to reach conduct distinct from that of ordinary shoplifting. To support its decision, the Court cited the statute’s bill analysis and a senate research report. Both pieces of legislative history similarly stated that organized retail theft is a highly organized criminal activity, dependent on multiple actors, and organized by a central figure. Further, the sources stated that organized retail theft is distinct from ordinary shoplifting in that it involves professional theft rings that move quickly across state lines in order to steal and move large amounts of merchandise—requirements that are clearly not present during ordinary shoplifting.

As such, when considering the legislative history in conjunction with the ambiguous statutory language, the Court concluded that it supports the notion that the organized retail theft statute was not intended to apply to the conduct of an ordinary shoplifter acting alone but rather to multiple actors involved in highly organized theft rings. Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the case.

Keller, P.J., filed a concurring opinion.

Yeary, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Nov 26

Attorney Duty Not to Concede Guilt Turner

Attorneys Have a Legal Obligation Not to Concede Guilt

By Madeline Pricer Jones | Ineffective Assistance

Attorney Duty Not to Concede Guilt Turner The Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion regarding an attorney’s obligation not to concede their client’s guilt. The issue before the Court was whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial on direct appeal because his defense counsel conceded his guilt at trial against his wishes.

Turner v. State—Court of Criminal Appeals (2018)

The Facts—Defense Counsel Conceded Client’s Guilt Against His Wishes.

In the underlying case, defense counsel was appointed to represent Defendant for capital murder. Defendant had been charged with killing his wife and mother-in-law. Based on overwhelming evidence against Defendant, counsel insisted he admit his guilt and concentrate on obtaining a life sentence in order to avoid the death penalty. Defendant, however, did not want to admit guilt and made it readily apparent to counsel. Defendant also disputed counsel’s mitigation investigation in regard to his trial. Counsel responded to this claim by stating that Defendant did not have a voice in the matter that would override their voice or their tactics. Counsel further stated that Defendant was only allowed to decide whether to plea and whether to testify.

Against Defendant’s wishes, counsel told the jury in opening statements that the evidence would show Defendant killed his wife in a jealous rage, and it would also show that the grandma’s death was accidental. Counsel further told the jury that the facts of the case did not support the offense of capital murder, that Defendant was in denial about having committed the crime, and that the proper verdict was the lesser-included offense of murder. Defendant, however, maintained his innocence throughout trial and denied any involvement in the murders.

Even after Defendant testified to his innocence, counsel still conceded that Defendant was guilty in closing arguments. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals looked to a recent United States Supreme Court decision, McCoy v. Louisiana, to assess its impact.

McCoy v. Louisiana—Supreme Court Holds the Sixth Amendment Guarantees a Defendant “the Right to Insist that Counsel Refrain from Admitting Guilt.”

Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of an attorney conceding their client’s guilt without their consent. In McCoy, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, and the State was seeking the death penalty. Based on overwhelming evidence in that case, defense counsel advised the defendant he planned to concede guilt to avoid the death penalty. The defendant was irate and told his attorney “not to make that concession.” Against these demands, defense counsel conceded guilt in opening statements. Even so, the defendant maintained his innocence throughout trial.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant “the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experience-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty.” The Court further stated, “When a client expressly asserts that the objective of ‘his defense’ is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt.” The Court explained that a defendant’s choice to maintain his innocence is an “objective of representation, not merely an issue of trial tactics.” As such, the decision is one for the client, not the attorney.

With this decision, the Supreme Court concluded that the error was structural in nature and, therefore, required an automatic reversal. The Court explained that the issue was not one of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel because the issue was concerning “a client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence.”

Court of Criminal Appeals Reverses and Remands Case—Finding Counsel Committed a McCoy Violation by Conceding Guilt Against the Defendant’s Wishes.

In reviewing McCoy, the Court of Criminal Appeal held it was applicable. The State, however, argued that the defendant failed to timely object and preserve the record in order to show a McCoy violation. The Court disagreed with the State by explaining that a defendant should not be expected to object with the precision of an attorney. Rather a defendant can make a McCoy claim by presenting expressing his innocence.

Here, there was no question that the defendant wanted to maintain his innocence. During his testimony, he stated so explicitly. And, despite the defendant’s testimony disagreeing with counsel’s strategy, they continued to concede guilt in closing arguments. Further, as stated above, counsel believed the only decisions Defendant was entitled to make were “whether to plea and to testify.” Thus, solidifying the Court’s conclusion that counsel knew they were acting against Defendant’s wishes. And, moreover, that they believed they were not required to follow his wishes.

Based on the above facts, the Court determined that the defendant adequately preserved his McCoy claim and there was in fact a violation. And, even though counsel’s strategy to concede guilt was more rational than Defendant’s theory, whether to concede guilt is one of the few rights that the defendant alone must determine under the Sixth Amendment. It’s a decision reserved for the client, not the attorney. As a result, the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Nov 20

Can a Judge Grant Deferred Adjudication After a Jury’s Guilty Verdict?

By Madeline Pricer Jones | Jury Trial

Mau Deferred Adjudication Jury Verdict The Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion on a petition for writ of mandamus. The two issues facing the court were (1) the nature of a misdemeanor trial after a defendant pleads guilty to a jury; and, (2) whether a trial court has the ability to defer an adjudication of guilt after a jury finds a defendant guilty. The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to grant mandamus relief on the first issue but, for the reasons discussed below, it granted mandamus relief for the second issue.

Majority Opinion: In re State ex rel. Mau, (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

The Facts—The Trial Court Instructed the Jury to Return a Verdict of Guilty and Then Entered an Order Deferring Guilt.

The underlying case involved a defendant who was charged with the misdemeanor offense of assault bodily injury of a family member. The defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial for this offense, and the State never gave written consent to waive a jury trial. As a result, the case proceeded to a jury trial upon the defendant’s plea of not guilty. During trial, however, the defendant changed his plea to guilty, and the trial court retired the jury with an instruction that it return a verdict of guilty on the basis of the defendant’s plea, and it did.

After the defendant was found guilty, the trial court did not submit the issue of punishment to the jury. Instead, it dismissed the jury. There were no objections to the jury’s dismissal. However, the State did bring to the court’s attention that the defendant had not been properly admonished prior to pleading guilty. At that point, the court admonished the defendant without objection. Only at this point—after the jury had already returned a verdict of guilty—did the defendant waive his right to jury trial. The State, however, never consented in writing, before the entry of the guilty plea, as required by Article 1.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result, when the trial court deferred guilt, the state sought a writ of mandamus.

The State argued to the court of appeals that the trial court lacked the authority to defer the adjudication of the defendant’s guilt, and the court of appeals denied relief. After being denied, the State, again, sought mandamus relief with the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Court of Criminal Appeals Granted Mandamus Relief—Holding the Trial Court Was Without Authority to Enter an Order of Deferred Adjudication.

In its argument to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State maintained that the trial court lacked authority to defer guilt and argued that the trial court had a ministerial duty to enter judgment on the jury’s verdict. The State explained that by allowing the trial court to defer the defendant’s guilt, after the jury had rendered its verdict, would essentially nullify their statutory discretion to consent to a jury waiver.

In maintaining its position, the trial court relied on a court of appeals opinion, State v. Sosa, 830 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, pet. ref’d).

The issue in Sosa was whether the judge, having found the defendant guilty on his plea of not guilty in a bench trial, could thereafter withdraw the courts finding of guilt and assess deferred adjudication. The Court of Criminal Appeals allowed this because there was no authority that barred the trial judge’s discretion or the procedure in a bench trial. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that the same could not be said about a jury’s verdict of guilty.

“By its very terms, the statutory option authorizing deferred adjudication is limited to defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere before the trial court after waiving trial by jury.”

Here, at the time that the defendant pled guilty to the jury, he did not waive his right to a jury trial nor did the State consent to a waiver. Without such a waiver, the trial court was bound to resolve the issue of guilt by a jury trial and, further, the trial court then had a ministerial duty to enter judgment on the jury’s verdict. As a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted mandamus relief.

Takeaways . . .

While a defendant can always change his or her plea, the trial court cannot abrogate a jury’s finding of guilt by placing a defendant on deferred adjudication. At this point in the trial, the only way to defer guilt would be to grant a motion for new trial. However, this motion for new trial must have a legal basis, and deferred adjudication, alone, is insufficient.

However, a defendant may be placed on deferred adjudication after a jury trial has begun, but before a verdict has been returned if the defendant properly submits to the court, a waiver of his or her right to a jury trial, and the State agrees accordingly. The State may consent, at any time, but the consent must be in writing and filed appropriately. If the defendant waives this right and the State follows the aforementioned steps, then the judge can dismiss the jury, accept the defendant’s plea, and subsequently place the defendant on deferred adjudication.

Alcala, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Newell, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Nov 16

Unanimous “Not Guilty” Jury Note was Not a Verdict. Convicted on Retrial

By Madeline Pricer Jones | Jury Trial

Jury Note Not Verdict Jeopdardy Traylor The Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion regarding whether a jury can informally acquit based on a unanimous jury note. The issue facing the court was whether a jury note, which provided the jury’s voting breakdown of the charged offense and the lesser included offense, could be considered an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes even though a mistrial was later declared because the jury could not reach a unanimous decision.

Traylor v. State, (Court of Criminal Appeals, 2018).

The Facts—The Trial Court Declared a Mistrial After Unanimous Jury Note.

Appellant was on trial for first-degree burglary of a habitation. At the conclusion of his trial, the jury was charged with determining whether Appellant was guilty of first-degree burglary, the charged offense, or second-degree burglary, a lesser-included offense. The difference between the two offenses is that the jury did not have to find that Appellant used a deadly weapon in order to convict him of the lesser included offense.

During deliberations the jury sent out a note stating that it unanimously agreed that Appellant was not guilty of the charged offense but indicated they were deadlocked (5-7) on the issue of guilt for the lesser-included offense. The trial court instructed the jury to keep deliberating before ultimately declaring a mistrial because the jury claimed they still could not reach a unanimous verdict.

Appellant was later re-tried and convicted of first-degree burglary. Appellant appealed this verdict, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a mistrial without a manifest necessity, and therefore, creating a double jeopardy violation.

The Court of Appeals Agreed with Appellant—Holding Appellant’s Subsequent Trial for First-Degree Burglary Was Barred Because The Jury’s Note Amounted to an Acquittal.

In agreeing with Appellant, the Court of Appeals cited United States Supreme Court decision, Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599 (2012). The Court of Appeals held the facts in Appellant’s case to be significantly distinguishable from Blueford; thus, warranting an acquittal. The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, disagreed and reversed for the reasons discussed below.

The Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed the Court of Appeals’ Decision—Holding the Jury Note Was Not a Final Verdict of Acquittal Because it Lacked The “Finality Necessary to Constitute an Acquittal.”

Double Jeopardy protects individuals from multiple prosecutions for the same offense. However, a trial may be ended without barring a subsequent prosecution for the same offense when “particular circumstances manifest a necessity” to declare a mistrial. Such circumstances include a jury’s inability to reach a verdict. For a jury note regarding the jury’s inability to reach a verdict to bar a subsequent prosecution, there must be some indication that the jury had “finally resolved” to acquit the defendant.

In Blueford, the Supreme Court held that the jury’s report of the vote count was not finally resolved to acquit the defendant because it lacked the “finality necessary to constitute an acquittal.” The Supreme Court noted that the vote count lacked finality because: “(1) the jury was still deadlocked on the lesser-included offense; (2) the jury continued deliberating after the reported vote count; (3) the foreperson gave no further indication that the jury was still unanimous; and (4) nothing in the jury instructions prohibited the jurors from revisiting the prior vote.”

Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the jury’s note also lacked the “finality necessary to constitute an acquittal” on the charged offense. The Court of Criminal appeals reasoned that the jury note lacked finality because the jury continued deliberating after the unanimous vote count and there was no indication that the vote on the charged offense remained unanimous throughout deliberations. Furthermore, the jury never filled out the Court’s verdict forms because, as reported by the jury, they still had “no decision.” Thus, while there are circumstances in which a jury can informally acquit a defendant, the facts in this case do not warrant an acquittal.

TAKEAWAY: It appears that the CCA might have come down differently if the jury had returned a 2nd note stating that they were still unanimous that the defendant was not guilty of the greater offense after all deliberations, or if the jury had signed the verdict form indicating such, even if there was ultimately no verdict. If you are faced with a similar circumstance, before the judge declares a mistrial, try to find a way to pin the jury down so that you can use it later if the state decides to try the case a second time.

Oct 21

Pretext Phone Calls in Sexual Assault Investigations

By Luke Williams | Sex Crimes

Pretext Phone Call Texas Sexual Assault Did you ever get the feeling like someone is recording your conversation? Texas is a one party consent state meaning your conversations can be recorded and listened to by third parties as long as one party to that conversation consents. In sexual assault investigations, especially where the victim knows the suspect, investigators often use recorded phone calls between the suspect and the complaining witness of the alleged assault. These recorded calls are called “pretext” phone calls. Not only will these phone calls be used to build a case against a suspect but might also be used in court against the suspect.

What is a Pretext Phone Call?

A pretext phone call is a tool used by police officers in the early stages of investigation, especially in sexual assault investigations. It is a tape recorded phone call between the victim and the suspect made by the victim or a close friend of the victim. The phone calls will be made under the supervision of police officers and most preferably the lead investigator or detective. The victim will be provided with all of the equipment necessary to record the phone call. Additionally, the victim will be given direction by the officers on the time of day or night to call the suspect, what type of questions to ask the suspect, and what to prepare for. The victim will be told to ask questions in certain ways that are more likely to solicit an incriminating response instead of just going full speed ahead with the “Why did you rape me?” question, which, for good reason, will cause the suspect to shut down or become defensive stating they did no such thing. An example of a question a victim might told to ask is “Why did you have sex with me after I pushed you way and told you to stop?”

The purpose of pretext phone calls is to, hopefully, obtain an incriminating statement by the suspect. The statements made by the suspect will be used to build the case against the suspect by corroborating information that the victim has told the police officers and help make victim testimony more credible in front of a jury.

Pretext Phone Calls—Used in Drug or Alcohol Related Sexual Offenses and Where the Victim and Suspect Know Each other

Pretext phone calls are often utilized in cases where the victim and suspect know each other. This is because the victim will already have the suspects phone number and vice versa or the victim can come up with a creative way for how they got the suspect’s number, i.e. “I got your number from John Doe, our mutual friend.” Also, they can be particularly helpful in drug and alcohol related sexual assault cases where they knew each other, even if only acquaintances. In such an instance, the victim will be directed to ask questions such as, “You knew I was out of it and didn’t know what was going on, but you had sex with me anyway. Why?”.

When Can Pretext Phone Calls Be Made Under Texas Law?

Preferably, pretext phone calls should be made before the suspect knows there is an investigation against him. For legality purposes, pretext phone calls must be made before a suspects Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Rubalco v. State, 424 S.W.3d 560. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches “at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which the defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty.” Id.

Thus, if there are no Sixth Amendment issues, pretext phone calls will likely be admissible against the suspect in trial. Id.

Be Aware That Your Phone Conversations Might Be Used Against You

Being in the state of Texas we should all be aware that every phone conversation we have can legally be recorded but you should be especially aware if the conversation gets serious. If you have any “hunch” that an investigation against you might be underway for an alleged sexual assault, contact our experienced attorneys today to learn your rights during these investigations.

Oct 08

Is Driving Around a Water Barricade a Criminal Offense?

By Brandon Barnett | Criminal Defense

Rules of the Road During Flood Season in Texas

Driving Around Barricade Crime Texas For four years in a row, Texas has experienced significant flooding due to unusual amounts of rainfall. Many people have lost their lives in cars that were swept away in rushing water and many houses have been ruined by flooding across the state. First responders are on high alert and have been involved in numerous high water rescues.

One story made the news in 2016 when a man was rescued after his car entered a flooded roadway and was filled with water. Johnson County had to use a drone to fly overhead and locate the man and then emergency personnel executed a rescue. But what made this story different was what happened to the man after he was rescued. Johnson County Sheriff’s slapped handcuffs on the man and arrested him for driving around a barricade.

Driving Around a Water Barricade is a Class B Misdemeanor in Texas

Section 472.022 of the Texas Transportation Code governs “OBEYING WARNING SIGNS AND BARRICADES” and provides (in relevant part):

(a) A person commits an offense if the person:
(1) disobeys the instructions, signals, warnings, or markings of a warning sign; or
(2) drives around a barricade.
(d)(2) if a person commits an offense under Subsection (a) where a warning sign or barricade has been placed because water is over any portion of a road, street, or highway, the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.

In Texas, the punishment range for a Class B Misdemeanor is 0-180 days in jail and a fine not to exceed $2,000.

While arrests after a water rescue are not the norm, this certainly provides another reason not to drive around a high water barricade. You would think that the potential danger to life and property would be enough, but sometimes folks need a little more motivation. Johnson County has given us that.