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Texas Expunction Update

Misdemeanor Offenses in Texas Now Eligible for Expunction on an Individual Basis

By Brandon Barnett · Expunction

Texas Expunction UpdateIn January of this year, the Supreme Court of Texas heard arguments for Ex parte R.P.G.P. in which it declared that an arrest involving multiple offenses is divisible for expungement purposes under Article 55.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, it answered a question left open by a previous case, finding that misdemeanor offenses are eligible for expunction on an individual basis.

What is an Expunction of Criminal Records ?

When a criminal record is expunged, that means that the record of is destroyed or sealed (for juvenile records). In an expunction order the court orders the various agencies that maintain records to treat a criminal arrest as though it never happened. People generally have their records expunged so that it does not show up on a routine background check, as an expungement removes any record of the arrest or case from public record.

How Do You Go About Getting an Expungement in Texas?

Under Texas law, there are a number of things that make a record eligible for expunction. If you qualify for expunction, there is a process you must go through, beginning with filing what is called a Petition for Expunction with the district court requesting that it grant an Order for Expunction. While it is possible to prepare this on your own, the somewhat complicated process is best handled by an attorney. The prudent course is to consult a lawyer in order to have the best chance at successfully expunging a record. You only get one shot and if your petition is not granted you don’t get to try again, so it is best to get it right from the start.

After completing the petition, it must be filed with the proper court. You must file the petition for expunction in the district court of the county where the arrest occurred. Following the filing, the court schedules a hearing and notifies the record-keeping agencies that you included in your petition. Once everyone has been notified, the court will hold a hearing and allow those notified the chance to object to the expunction.

If you meet all the requirements, the court will grant the expunction and you will need to give an Order for Expunction to the court for the judge’s signature. Important to know is that the court will probably expect you to have this order ready at the hearing for the judge to sign then and there. Once the order is signed, it has to be submitted to the respondent agencies that you listed in the petition. Those records will then be either deleted or returned to the court clerk for destruction.

A Change in Texas Expunction Law: Arrests for Multiple Offense Can Now be Divided for Expungement?

Prior to a recent court decision, Texans could not expunge an arrest unless ALL alleged offenses qualified for expunction under the law. If any of the alleged offenses in the arrest report were not eligible for expunction, then NONE of the offenses were eligible. A partial expunction was not allowed.

However, State v. T.S.N., was a case which a single arrest involved several unrelated offenses and the court held that partial expunction of the arrest record was required and could be achieved through redaction, leaving the portions of the arrest record regarding an unrelated offense not eligible for expunction. While this case left open the question regarding misdemeanor offenses and their eligibility for expunction on an individual basis, it set the stage for R.P.G.P.’s case.

Thanks to Ex Parte R.P.G.P., if you are arrested for multiple offenses, those offenses are considered divisible—you can expunge one even if the other would not qualify. Ex Parte R.P.G.P. is a great illustration of what exactly this means. In that case, R.P.G.P. was arrested for a DWI and a search of the car revealed marijuana, so he was also charged with possession. The DWI charge was dismissed and R.P.G.P. pled no contest to the possession charge, which was ultimately dismissed after serving nine months of deferred adjudication probation. After both charges were dismissed, R.P.G.P. filed for expunction of the DWI arrest, but the State argued that no part of the arrest record could be expunged because the possession charge was ineligible for expunction. However, the court ultimately held that the DWI portion of the record could be expunged, even though the possession portion would remain on the record.

What Does This Change in the Expunction Law Mean for Texans?

What this means going forward for Texans is that if your arrest record reflects multiple misdemeanor offenses, some of which would be eligible for expunction on their own and some that are not, the ones that are eligible can be expunged, leaving the other portions on the record. This is a shift from the all-or-nothing approach previously adopted by the state. Rather than treating each arrest for various offenses as a collective, we can look at each individual charge and proceed from there. Hopefully, this line of thinking will be expanded to cases involving felony arrests as well, but time will tell.

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Butt-Dial Statement Texas Templeton

Can the Statements You Make During a Butt-Dial be Used Against You?

By Brandon Barnett · 5th Amendment

Butt-Dial Statement Texas TempletonThe short answer is Yes. According to both local and federal courts, what you say during a butt-dial phone call can potentially be used against you in court. In Texas, a hearsay exception makes those overheard statements admissible. In the federal system, these calls are viewed as having no reasonable expectation of privacy—since you did not take simple precautions to avoid this kind of situation, you cannot expect someone on the receiving end of the call not to repeat what they heard.

Butt-Dials in Texas: Can Words Overheard During an Unintended Phone Call be Used Against Me?

Under Texas law, statements made during an accidental butt-dial are likely admissible and the speaker likely has no reasonable expectation of privacy in those statements. Typically, repeating something in court that you heard someone else say outside of court is not allowed—it is referred to as hearsay and is considered inadmissible in a court of law. But, as with everything, there are hearsay exceptions that, in certain circumstances, allow someone to testify about something they heard someone else say. So, it should not be too surprising that a recent case found that butt-dials fall into one of the many hearsay exceptions.

Templeton v. State involved a felony assault family violence case in which the victim’s father received a butt-dial call from the victim and overheard defendant Templeton make incriminating statements about the assault, which the father then repeated in court. The Templeton court likened butt-dial statements to the requirements of Texas Rules of Evidence 801(e)(2)(A), commonly known as the admission of a party-opponent. Under this rule, a statement is not considered hearsay if it is a statement made by the person whom it is then offered against. In Templeton’s case, that meant that the statements he made on the butt-dial, which were overheard and then repeated by the victim’s father, could be used against him in court where he was the defendant. These statements do not have to be against the interests of the speaker when they are made in order for them to be admissible, rather, the requirement is that the statements be offered as evidence against the speaker/defendant.

Templeton sets the bar rather low in terms of the work it takes to get these kinds of phone calls in. Essentially, any Texas defendant who accidentally butt-dials someone faces the possibility that anything they say—whether they know someone is listening or not, or whether it is against their interest or not—can be repeated in court so long as it is used as evidence against them. The phrase “be careful what you say” could not ring more true. While a majority of butt-dials result in the overhearing of harmless conversations (your comments about who you saw at Trader Joe’s and the gossip you exchange with your friends are not likely to be subjects of court cases), it is important to know that anything you say on those calls has the potential to be repeated in court.

Butt Dials in the Federal System: Do I Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?

Somewhat unsurprisingly, the sentiment that what someone said during a butt-dial can be used against them extends beyond just Texas and into the Federal system as well. In another recent case, Huff v. Spaw, the Sixth Circuit Appeals Court addressed butt-dials in two contexts: the traditional context in which a call is accidentally made and someone on the other end overhears and perhaps even documents or records the calls, and instances in which a butt-dial is made and the listener records the conversation the caller has with a third-party while in a hotel room.

The judge in Huff determined that in the first instance, there is no privacy claim. Essentially, according to the federal courts, it is the duty of every cell phone owner to make sure that their phones are secure. The court points out the commonality of cell phones and their use. There is no expectation of privacy (and therefore no claim) when someone fails to take simple measures to secure their phone and accidentally shares their activities or statements while using an everyday cell phone. As far as precautions go, the biggest one is to lock your phone. From there, there are a number of apps available to help prevent butt-dialing.

As to the second issue, the judge determined that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, so that part of the case was remanded to the lower court for reconsideration. The key difference between these two issues was the fact that Bertha Huff, with whom James Huff spoke to in her hotel room. Bertha’s part of the conversation, in the judge’s opinion, was protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy because she did not make the butt-dial—as far as she was concerned, all she was doing was speaking to her husband in the comfort of her hotel room.

What Can You do to Protect Your Privacy?

No matter what type of phone you have, the first line of defense in preventing butt-dials and protecting your privacy is to lock your phone. From there, there are a number of other settings you can change that make butt-dialing less likely.

For iPhone users, adding a passcode (or touch/face I.D.) provides an additional layer of protection for users. If you are prone to butt-dialing, you can take it a step further, allowing your phone to auto-lock quickly (Settings --> Display & Brightness --> Auto-Lock). For iPhone users with models that still have the home button, it might be smart to also disable tap-to-wake (Settings --> Accessibility --> Touch --> Tap to Wake).

There are precautions for Android users too! Begin by setting a passcode. To turn off the tap to wake feature on these phones, go to Settings --> Display --> Lock Screen Display --> Double-Tap to Check Phone. To change the time it takes for these phones to auto-lock, go to Settings --> Security --> gear lock icon next to Screen Lock.

If you really want to go above and beyond, there are some apps available for certain phone users to download. If you take all these precautions and still end up in a situation where what you said on a butt-dial is being used against you, consult an attorney to discuss the best plan of action.

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Bitcoin Privacy 4th Amendment

Are Bitcoin Transactions Private Under the Law?

By Brandon Barnett · Warrantless Search

Do You Have a Fourth Amendment Privacy Interest in Your Bitcoin Transactions?

Bitcoin Privacy 4th AmendmentNo, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information (1) contained on the Bitcoin blockchain and (2) that you provide to cryptocurrency exchanges.1 The Court reached this decision through an analysis of the facts under the “third party doctrine” of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This doctrine is explained in further detail below.

Read full case HERE. US v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020).

First Off, what is Bitcoin?

Bitcoin is a “collection of concepts and technologies that form the basis of a digital money ecosystem.”2 More colloquially, the word “bitcoin” refers to a bitcoin—a unit of digital currency used to store and transmit value among participants in the bitcoin network. Bitcoin derives its value not from physical characteristics like gold or trust in a central authority like fiat money. Instead, bitcoin is backed by the cryptographic technology behind it.

Bitcoin is powered by open-source code known as blockchain, which creates a shared public ledger that is viewable by anyone. Each transaction is a “block” that is “chained” to the code, creating a permanent record of each transaction. In order to transfer anything in this world, you need to be able to send and receive your items to and from a certain location. Bitcoin is no different. Like an email, Bitcoin is transferred between locations on the internet called Bitcoin addresses. A Bitcoin address indicates the source or destination of a Bitcoin payment. The Bitcoin blockchain contains only the sender’s address, the receiver’s address, and the amount of bitcoin transferred. Bitcoin wallets provide these addresses and utilize software that allows you to securely send, receive, and store bitcoin in the bitcoin network.

The central tenet behind the creation of Bitcoin was that willing parties should be able to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party.3 A large part of the value in that kind of decentralization is in the privacy that it assumes will accompany the transaction. However, as the use and influence of cryptocurrencies expands, so too does the need of law enforcement to crack down on the illicit activities of crypto users that our society finds to be reprehensible. Analyzing the block chain for evidence of crimes involving bitcoin inevitably means that information of bitcoin transactions will be collected. This kind of forensic analysis, aside from collecting information on whether the bitcoin was used for something illegal, “can include the collection of large amounts of personal information about a user’s spending habits [and] total holdings[.]”4 The natural question for criminal law attorneys is whether a bitcoin user has a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the information related to their bitcoin transactions.

Bitcoin Transactions and the 4th Amendment

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Gratkowski recently held that individuals do not have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest the information related to their bitcoin transactions.5 More specifically, the court found that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in: (1) information on the bitcoin blockchain itself, and (2) bitcoin transactions in virtual currency exchanges.6

Gratkowski became the subject of a federal investigation when federal agents began investigating a child-pornography website. Users like Gratkowski paid the website bitcoin in exchange for downloadable child pornography. As mentioned above, the bitcoin blockchain only contains the sender’s address, the receiver’s address, and the amount of bitcoin transferred between the two parties. The identity of the owners do not appear on the bitcoin blockchain, but it is possible to discover the owner of a bitcoin address by analyzing the blockchain:

“For example, when an organization creates multiple Bitcoin addresses, it will often combine its Bitcoin addresses into a separate, central Bitcoin address (i.e., a “cluster”). It is possible to identify a “cluster” of Bitcoin addresses held by one organization by analyzing the Bitcoin blockchain’s transaction history. Open source tools and private software products can be used to analyze a transaction.”7

Federal agents used an outside service to analyze the publicly viewable bitcoin blockchain and identify a cluster of bitcoin addresses controlled by the website.8 They then served a grand jury subpoena on Coinbase (a prominent cryptocurrency exchange) for all information the exchange had on the Coinbase customers whose accounts sent Bitcoin to any of the addresses in the child-pornography website’s cluster. Coinbase turned over Gratkowski’s information, and federal agents obtained a warrant to search Gratkowski’s house. The agents found a hard drive containing child pornography and subsequently charged Gratkowski with one count of receiving child pornography and one count of accessing websites with intent to view child pornography.

At trial, Gratkowski moved to suppress the evidence the government obtained under the warrant, arguing that both the subpoena to Coinbase and the analysis done on the blockchain violated the Fourth Amendment. For the government to infringe upon an individual’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches, the person must have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the items obtained.9 The “third-party doctrine” instructs that a person generally “has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”10

For instance, the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller held that bank records were not subject to Fourth Amendment Protections.11 The Court also held that telephone call logs were not subject to Fourth Amendment protections because the telephone numbers we dial are voluntarily conveyed to the phone company when we place a call.12 However, the Supreme Court recently held that individuals do have a privacy interest in their cell phone location records, despite the records being held by a third party.13 In deciding this, the Court set-up the current framework under which courts are to determine whether the third-party doctrine applies to certain information that is shared with third parties: The sole act of sharing the information is no longer determinative as to whether we have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in it. Rather, courts are to consider, “‘(1) the nature of the particular documents sought,’ which includes whether the sought information was limited and meant to be confidential, and (2) the voluntariness of the exposure.”14

The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the information on the Bitcoin blockchain is more similar to bank records and telephone call logs than to cell phone location records.15 The court held that the information contained on the Bitcoin blockchain (the amount of Bitcoin transferred and the Bitcoin addresses of the sender and receiver) is limited, and Bitcoin users are unlikely to expect that information to be kept private as it is well known that it is recorded on the publicly available blockchain.16 The court also reasoned that the public exposure of this information is voluntary because transferring and receiving Bitcoin requires an affirmative act by the Bitcoin address holder.17 The Fifth Circuit therefore held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained on the Bitcoin blockchain.18

The Court used similar reasoning regarding the question of privacy in the Bitcoin transactions on Coinbase. Coinbase is a financial institution like a bank. Both are subject to the Bank Secrecy Act as regulated financial institutions, and both keep records of customer identities and currency transactions. The Court held that, “[h]aving access to Coinbase records does not provide agents with ‘an intimate window into a person’s life’; it provides only information about a person’s virtual currency transactions.”19 The court also held that, “[s]econd, transacting Bitcoin through Coinbase or other virtual currency exchange institutions requires an ‘affirmative act on the part of the user[,]’ which speaks to the voluntariness with which the information was turned over to Coinbase.20

Conclusion

The Gratkowski decision makes it difficult to imagine any situation in which a court would find there to be a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in information on the Bitcoin blockchain itself. Although Bitcoin users may truly value and believe in the privacy considerations contained in the monetary philosophy of Bitcoin, there is no getting around the fact that a “block” on the blockchain requires two Bitcoin addresses and the amount of bitcoin exchanged. And as long as private blockchain analytics companies continue to analyze only that information in determining the identity of Bitcoin users, courts will likely continue to find there to be no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in that information.

There appears to be more room to work with when it comes to cryptocurrency exchanges. Perhaps a court could find there to be a privacy interest in information given to an exchange whose business centers around user confidentiality. However, exchanges must comply with the same federal financial laws that govern Coinbase, and the record-keeping requirements under those laws would likely provide for a strong analogy to the Gratkowski case.

ENDNOTES:

1. United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020).
2. A. M. Antonopoulos, Mastering bitcoin: Programming the open blockchain (2nd ed.). Beijing etc.: O'Reilly.
3. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (2008).
4. Sasha Hodder & Rafael Yakobi, Bitcoin Fungibility, Mixing and the Legal Limits on Maintaining Privacy, https://bitcoinmagazine.com/culture/bitcoin-fungibility-mixing-and-the-legal-limits-on-maintaining-privacy (2020).
5. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2020).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 309.
8. Private blockchain analytics companies also provide services of this nature to cryptocurrency exchanges to help the exchanges meet their obligations under federal money laundering laws. See footnote 4 on the previous page for a discussion of privacy and these laws.
9. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
10. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
11. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1976).
12. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
13. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
14. Gratkowski (quoting Carpenter, at 2219-20).
15. Id., at 311.
16. Id. at 312.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Carpenter, at 2217).
20. Id. (quoting Carpenter, at 2220).

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Watkins 39.14 Texas Evidence

What Evidence Must a Prosecutor Disclose to the Defense?

By Brandon Barnett · Evidence

New CCA Opinion - Watkins v. State - Clearly Interprets the Duty of the State in Discovery.

Watkins 39.14 Texas EvidenceProsecutors in Texas must disclose almost all of the evidence in their possession to the defense. Disclosure is the rule and not the exception in Texas.1 Section 39.14(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the prosecution to disclose anything that “constitutes or contains evidence material to any matter involved in the action. . .”2

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Watkins v. State (see opinion HERE) recently interpreted the word “material” to mean the equivalent of “relevant,” while interpreting the phrase, “any matter involved in the action,” as covering “any number of subsidiary issues impacting the outcome of the proceedings.”3 This interpretation requires Texas prosecutors to disclose virtually all of the evidence in their possession—more than they are mandated to under the federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland. In fact, for some types of evidence, the statute does not require the evidence to meet any materiality requirement.4 According to § 39.14(h), evidence tending to negate the guilt or mitigate the punishment of a defendant must be disclosed, regardless of whether the evidence is considered material or requested by the defense.5

Article 39.14 and the case law that accompanies it effectively establish an open-file policy between the prosecution and defense. As the Watkins court put it: “[w]ith the exception of privileged evidence and evidence specifically covered by other statutory provisions, the only obstacle to disclosure of evidence not [exculpatory in nature] is the lack of a specific request.”6

The “materiality” language that the Watkins court addressed is actually language that was carried over from a previous version of Article 39.14—language with its own case law that prosecutors and trial courts carried into practice even after the statute was amended.

How did Prosecutors Interpret 39.14 Before Watkins?

The current version of Article 39.14 came about through the Michael Morton Act, signed into law by Governor Perry in 2013. This bill was a response to the case of Michael Morton, a man wrongfully convicted for the murder of his wife in 1987 after the prosecutor in that case withheld evidence that could have proven his innocence. Morton was exonerated in 2011 after DNA evidence revealed that someone else committed the murder, and the state legislature took up the task of passing a complete overhaul of discovery procedure in Texas.

Because the same language— “material to any matter involved in the action”—was retained by the Morton amendments, confusion persisted among some attorneys about whether the pre-Morton “materiality” jurisprudence is properly attributed to the new, post-Morton version of Article 39.14. However, as the Watkins court addressed, those pre-Morton cases never actually spoke to the issue of what “material” actually meant.7

The Confusion Surrounding “Material”

You see, the pre-Morton Article 39.14 gave trial courts the discretion whether to order the prosecution to disclose evidence upon a motion showing good cause from the defense.8 The pre-Morton “materiality” jurisprudence was inextricably linked with the standard for determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in refusing to issue such an order, and it did not have anything to do with the phrase, “material to any matter involved in the action.”9

The standard for determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in this way was whether the judge’s ruling deprived the defendant of access to evidence that was material to the defendant’s defense.10 “Material,” in this sense, was defined “’under Texas law in the due process terms employed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs.’”11 This meant that a trial judge abused his or her discretion in refusing to order the disclosure of evidence when it was exculpatory in nature.12

Watkins Clearing Things Up

As we now know, the procedure that discovery followed before the Morton amendments was completely removed from Article 39.14, and the “materiality” jurisprudence that was tied to it went out the door as well.13 Because of the confusion that accompanied the judicial use of similar language in close contexts pre-Morton, it is understandable if some prosecutors may have—before Watkins—interpreted the, “material to any matter involved in the action,” language as being loaded with the pre-Morton jurisprudence. Other prosecutors, as shown in Watkins below, applied their own limiting interpretations to the language.

In Watkins, the defense counsel sent a discovery request to the prosecutor pursuant to § 39.14 asking for, “any other tangible things not otherwise privileged that constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case.”14 He “also requested notice of the State’s intent to offer any extraneous offenses, which the prosecution provided.”15 Watkins was convicted of second-degree possession of a controlled substance, and during the punishment phase of trial, the state sought to introduce 34 exhibits for the purpose of proving up Watkins’ prior felony convictions for enhancement purposes.16 The defense objected—the prosecutor did not disclose the exhibits to the defense because he did not believe Article 39.14 applied to punishment.17 The Trial court overruled the objection, allowing the evidence to be admitted.18

The issue surrounding the prosecution’s non-disclosure eventually worked its way up to the Court of Criminal Appeals, where the Watkins court seized the opportunity to review the requirements of Article 39.14 in light of the Michael Morton Act amendments. In short, the Court laid out the history of Article 39.14 explained above, and it clearly established that Texas now has disclosure requirements that track the spirit of the Michael Morton Act.19

[1] Watkins v. State, NO. PD-1015-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
[2] Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(a) (West 2017).
[3] Watkins, at 24-25.
[4] Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(h) (West 2017).
[5] Id.
[6] Watkins, at 23.
[7] Id. at 35.
[8] TEX. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14 (2009).
[9] Watkins at 35.
[10] Id. at 41-42.
[11] Id. at 40 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)).
[12] Id. at 41.
[13] See generally Watkins.
[14] Watkins at 4.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 5.
[19] See generally Watkins.

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Marijuana Smell Warrantless Search Texas

Is the Smell of Marijuana Enough to Permit a Warrantless Vehicle Search?

By Brandon Barnett · Drug Crimes

Does the Smell of Marijuana Allow Officers to Search My Vehicle Without a Warrant?

Marijuana Smell Warrantless Search TexasIn Texas, the answer is yes. The possession of marijuana is a crime in Texas, so if an officer smells marijuana emanating from your car, he has probable cause to believe a crime is being committed. With probable cause, the law permits the officer to stop and search your car— regardless of whether you consent.

The officer has the ability to do this through what is called the “automobile exception” to the 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement.1 Generally, the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution requires police officers to first obtain a warrant before they can search a person’s property. However, because automobiles can quickly move locations and evade law enforcement, the Supreme Court reasoned that it would be impractical to require officers to first secure a warrant before they are permitted to search a vehicle.2 So by claiming to smell marijuana, law enforcement officers can also claim to have probable cause to believe a crime is being committed—allowing them to take advantage of the automobile exception and search a vehicle without anything more.

Will the Search Laws Change if Marijuana Becomes Legal?

Maybe. There have been small changes in the law with the current trends in marijuana legalization. A couple of state courts adopted the rule that, after legalization or decriminalization, the smell of marijuana is no longer enough on its own to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle. For example, in Vermont, after the decriminalization of adult possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the odor of marijuana alone is insufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle.3 The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the state’s decriminalization policy means that the possession of marijuana is now a civil infraction, making the smell of it an insufficient basis for officers to believe a crime is being committed.

However, most states where marijuana is legalized or decriminalized still follow the rule that the smell of it establishes probable cause in support of a vehicle search.4 This is because these states still criminalize the possession of larger amounts of marijuana—meaning that the smell of it still indicates that a crime could be underway. This is the logic that the Washington, Maryland, Colorado, and Arizona courts follow.5

But what about Texas?

As stated above, the possession of marijuana in Texas is a crime, and officers are still justified in searching vehicles if they smell marijuana coming from them. However, Texas legalized the cultivation of industrial hemp in 2019, which smells like just like marijuana. The issue of whether probable cause can still be supported by the odor of marijuana in light of hemp’s legalization was raised in state court in 2020, but the court left it undecided as the vehicle search in question occurred before the legalization of hemp.6 It remains to be seen if or when Texas will legalize marijuana, and what attitude Texas courts will take towards the question of marijuana odor and vehicle searches.

 

[1] Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
[2] Id., at 153.
[3] Zullo v. State, 2019 Vt. LEXIS 1, * (Vt. January 4, 2019).
[4] Cece white, The Sativas and Indicas of Proof: Why the Smell of Marijuana Should Not Establish Probable Cause for a Warrantless Vehicle Search in Illinois, 53 UIC J. Marshall L. Rev. 187, 211 (2020).
[5] Id., at 211.
[6] Geberkidan v. State, 2020 WL 5406243, NO. 12-19-00296-CR (2020).

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